KAETZ v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KAETZ v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Trial Court Opinion
Not for Publication UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WILLIAM F. KAETZ, Plaintiff, Civil Action No, 2:23-cv-02772 V. OPINION & ORDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, e/ al., Defendants.
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J. On June 28, 2023, this Court granted pro se Plaintiff William F. Kaetz’s application to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed his complaint with prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court also terminated Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. D.E. 5 (the “Order”). Plaintiffs motion to vacate the Order is presently before the Court. D.E. 6, The Court reviewed Plaintiffs submission and decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1{b). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. Plaintiff seeks to vacate the Order pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (b}(3), and (d)(3). PIL Br. at 6. Through Rule 60(b), “the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The rule “allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment and request the reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or any reason justifying relief.” Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 529(2005), But “Rule 60(b) motions are viewed as ‘extraordinary relief which should be granted only where extraordinary justifying circumstances
are present.” Kiburz v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 446 F, App’x 434, 436 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Bohus v. Beloff,
950 F.2d 919, 929(3d Cir, 1991)), Rule 60(b)(3) permits a district court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “fraud . .
. , misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)\(3). To prevail under Rule 60(b)(3), the movant must “establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that [the adverse party] engaged in fraud or other misconduct, and that this misconduct prevented [the moving parties] from fully and fairly presenting their case.” Heriveaux v. Durkin & Durkin, LLC, 841 F, App’x 501, 504 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted). In this instance, Plaintiff seeks to vacate the Order due to alleged fraud by this Court rather than an opposing party. See PIf. Br. at 6-9, Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(3) is inapplicable. Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to relieve a party from final judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P, 60(b). Mistake includes errors by a judge. Kemp v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 142 8. Ct. 1856, 1862 (2022). Buta Rule 60(b) motion “may not be used as a substitute for appeal, and [] legal error, without more cannot justify granting a Rule 60(b) motion.” Holland vy, Holt, 409 F, App’x 494, 497 3d Cir, 2010) (quoting Smith v. Evans,
853 F.2d 155, 158 Gd Cir. 1988)). Although Plaintiff argues that this Court committed fraud, the substance of Plaintiffs arguments is that the Court purportedly committed numerous legal errors in screening Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915.' Asa result, Plaintiff
' Plaintiff largely takes issue with the fact that the Court screened his Complaint pursuant to Section 1915 because he is not a prisoner. See PIf. Br. at 6. But “the provisions of § 1915(e) apply to all in forma pauperis complaints, not simply those filed by prisoners,” Afamian v. Burns,
236 F. App’x 753, 755(3d Cir, 2007); see also Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury,
408 F.3d 1309, 1312(10th Cir, 2005) (‘Section 1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and not just to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1129(9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners.”); Floyd y. U.S. Postal Serv.,
105 F.3d 274, 275(6th Cir, 1997) (“We conclude that § 1915 permits individuals who are not incarcerated to continue to proceed as paupers in federal court.”),
is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). See, e.g., Nellom v. Ambrose, No. 23-1388,
2023 WL 3380622, at *1 n.1 (3d Cir. 2023) (‘To the extent Nellom’s motion for reconsideration and this appeal were based on mere dissatisfaction with the District Court’s judgment, he is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).”). Finally, Rule 60(d)(3} provides that Rule 60 “does not limit a court’s power to... set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R, Civ, P. 60(d)(3). “A court may set aside a judgment based upon its finding of fraud on the court when an officer of the court has engaged in ‘egregious misconduct.” Jn re Bressman,
874 F.3d 142, 150(3d Cir, 2017) (quoting Herring v. United States,
424 F.3d 384, 390 Gd Cir, 2005)). Such a finding “‘must be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence’ of ‘an intentional fraud.’” Jd. (quoting Herring,
424 F.3d at 390) (internal punctuation omitted), Again, Plaintiffs alleged fraud amounts to perceived legal errors. Plaintiff does not identify any egregious misconduct. Rule 60(d)(3), therefore, is also inapplicable. In sum, Plaintiff provides no legal basis to vacate the Order.
As a result, for the reasons set forth above, and for good cause shown, IT IS on this 8th day of August, 2023, ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to vacate (D.E. 6) is DENIED; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office is directed to mail a copy of this Opinion & Order to Plainteff.
John Michael Vazque ¢ | S.J.
Reference
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