UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARCIO ANDRES RUIZ PEREZ,

Civil Action No. 25-16871 (JXN) Petitioner,

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LUIS SOTO, et al.,

Respondents.

NEALS, District Judge

Before the Court is Petitioner Marcio Andres Ruiz Perez’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to

challenging his continued detention by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing (ECF No. 7) and Respondents’ letter response (ECF No. 11). Petitioner has also filed a Motion to Amend (ECF No. 13) and a Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (ECF No. 12).1 Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, entered the United States at an unknown time without valid immigration documents. (Id. at 1.) On October 22, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. (Id.) Petitioner has been detained in ICE custody since his arrest. (Id. at 1-2.) Following Petitioner’s arrest and detention by ICE, he has not been afforded an individualized bond hearing because he is being held in mandatory detention under 8 U.S. C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id.)

1 In light of the relief granted herein, the Court will deny without prejudice Petitioner’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 13) and Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (ECF No. 12). On November 26, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents to file an answer and enjoined Respondents from transferring Petitioner from Delaney Hall Detention Center in Newark, New Jersey. (See ECF No. 8.) On December 10, 2025, Respondents filed a letter response. (ECF No. 11.)

In the Petition, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a bond hearing. (ECF No. 7.) Respondents acknowledge that here they assert the same position they have in many other similar cases in this District, including the position they took before this Court in the recent matter Fuentes Velasquez v. Noem, No. 25-16797 (JXN). (See ECF No. 11.) In Fuentes Velasquez, Respondents argued DHS has implemented a new policy interpreting INA § 235,

(b)(2)(A), to require mandatory detention of noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or inspection and to render them ineligible for release on bond, a position that the Board of Immigration Appeals recently adopted in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

(BIA 2025). See Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797 (ECF No. 5). In Fuentes Velasquez, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of

(b)(2). Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797 (ECF Nos. 8, 9). In a factually similar situation, the Court held that Fuentes Velasquez was unlawfully held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and must be treated as being held under the discretionary authority of

(a). See

In Fuentes Velasquez, this Court explained the following: The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the country. “The line historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11613,

, at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,

, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at the border.”). “[T]he provisions at issue here are mutually exclusive—a noncitizen cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary detention under § 1226 . . . .” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937,

, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).

. . .

For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either seeking entry to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and § 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the interior of the United States. The Supreme Court in Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction, describing § 1225 as the detention statute for noncitizens affirmatively “seeking admission” into the United States, and § 1226 as the detention statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.” 583 U.S. at 289. And although the Jennings Court characterizes § 1225(b)(2) as the “catchall” detention provision for noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it identifies § 1226(a) as the “default rule” for the arrest, detention, and release of non-criminal aliens who are already present in the United States. Id. at 303.

The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have rejected Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado, as contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.2 See, e.g., Soto,

, at *7 (finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e., affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners who have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682,

at * 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the government’s proposed interpretation of § 1225(b) [is] at odds with the context and structure of the provisions governing detention of noncitizens who are arriving at the border and those who are already present in the country”); Zumba,

at * 3 (noting that “up until July 8 the predominant form of detention authority for petitioner and other noncitizens arrested in the interior of the United States was § 1226(a)”); Salazar v. Dedos, No. 25-cv-835,

(D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163,

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684,

(D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-4048,

(N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-cv-0096,

(W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541,

(W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408,

(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–cv–01542,

(D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); [collecting additional cases].

Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797 (ECF No. 8 at 5-10).

2 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

(2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding,

(1840)). Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797, the Court finds the facts asserted in the Petition establish Petitioner’s detention is authorized only by

(a), and not § 1225(b)(2). Accordingly IT IS, on this 18th day of December 2025,

ORDERED that the Petitioner (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under

(a); it is further ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance with

(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight risk or a danger to the community; it is further ORDERED that within three (3) days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a written notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; it is further ORDERED that, in light of the relief granted, Petitioner’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 12)

is DENIED without prejudice; it is further ORDERED that, in light of the relief granted, the Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice (ECF No. 12) is DENIED without prejudice; and it is further ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying Opinion upon the parties electronically and CLOSE the case.

________________________ JULIEN XAVIER NEALS United States District Judge