In re Buckeye Pipe Line Co.
Opinion of the Court
This is a motion to dismiss the petition and vacate an order appointing commissioners in a condemnation proceeding. An opinion was prepared and filed dismissing the petition and vacating the order appointing commissioners. Thereafter, counsel for the New Jersey Turnpike Authority called to the court’s attention the fact that its interpretation of R. S. 20 :l-3 would jeopardize many titles which the Turnpike Authority and the Highway Department had theretofore acquired. At the court’s suggestion, the Turnpike Authority and the Highway Department appeared, the matter was reargued and briefs were filed.
The Buckeye Pipe Line Company presented a petition pursuant to Title 20, Revised Statutes of New Jersey, seeking an order appointing three commissioners to assess damages for an easement or right of way, to fix a date for hearing of the petition and a date on or before which the commissioners’ report should be filed, and directing notice to the owner and persons interested in the lands through which the easement or right of way will pass.
The petition recites that Buckeye, an Ohio corporation authorized to do business in this State, is empowered to own,
The order fixed the time and place for the appointment of commissioners to assess the damages upon the taking and
“It is further ordered that said notice lie published in the Hunterdon County Democrat on the 25th clay of October, 1951, and on the 1st day of November, 1951, and mailed to each of the several parties interested in the said lands and property who reside outside of the state and whose addresses can be ascertained on or before the 1st day ol November, 1951 with postage prepaid thereon."
The motion to dismiss is predicated upon the following grounds: (1) the notice of hearing of the petition was not published as required by statute (R. S. 20:1-3); (2) the proof of publication filed fails to show proper publication of notice of hearing as required by R. S. 20:1-3; (3) Buckeye Pipe Line Company is not a public utility of this State; (4) the petition on its face fails to reveal a prima facie right on the part of Buckeye to take lands by condemnation because: (a) as a foreign corporation, Buckeye has no right to take property by condemnation; (b) petition fails to aver lands sought to be taken are “necessary for public use” as required by R. 8. 48 :10-1; (c) the moving papers are fatally defective for failure to comply with the applicable statute.
The first matter for consideration is to determine the court’s function and jurisdiction in the present situation.
The Eminent Domain Act, R. S. 20:1-1 et seq., vests the appointment of condemnation commissioners in one, of the judges of the Superior Court. As such he is an agent of the Legislature and must appoint commissioners upon the ascertainment of certain facts prescribed by the Legislature. Bergen County Sewer Authority v. Little Ferry, 5
“The function of the special statutory tribunal of first instance is to appoint the commissioners to appraise the lands and assess the damages, if the petition on its face reveal(s) a prima faeie right to such expropriation and all other jurisdictional prerequisites, and satisfactory proof is filed of the giving of the statutory notice.”
R. S. 48:10-1 is explicit that the petition for appointment of'commissioners shall state that the taking by condemnation is of “land and other property necessary for public use.” That allegation is lacking and, since it is an essential averment, the petition is defective.
The arguments for dismissal predicated upon the pipe line company being a foreign corporation and therefore without standing to condemn property or land and the argument predicated upon the proposition that since the pipe line company is not a public utility, it is without the power of condemnation, are both questions which the legislative agent is without authority to pass upon. Ryan v. Housing Authority of Newark, supra. See Faubel v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 20 N. J. Super. 116 (Law Div. 1952).
The statute relating to notice is R. S. 20 :l-3, reading :
"The justice or judge of the circuit court to whom the petition is presented shall assign, by order, a time and place for the hearing of the petition before himself, or any other justice of the supreme court, or judge of the circuit court, not less than ten days after the date of the order, and direct notice 'thereof, not less than six days, to be given the owners, occupants and persons interested. The notice shall be served upon each party residing in this state, either personally or by leaving a copy thereof at his residence, if known. Where the residence is unknown or out of the state, notice shall be given and published as the justice or judge of the circuit court shall direct, by publication for not less than one week, and by mailing to each party whose address can be ascertained. Notice given in the manner prescribed by said justice or judge shall be valid and effectual to bind all parties interested in the land or property.
The petition and order shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county where the land or other property is situate.”
B. 8. 20 :1—3 deals with two classes of notice, (1) residents, (2) non-residents and those whose residence is unknown. As to residents, be they owners, occupants or persons interested, the meaning is clear. It requires service “either personally or by leaving a copy thereof at his residence, if known.” The language “not less than six days” means not less than six days before the date set for the hearing of the petition. As to the second class, the requirement is that “where the residence is unknown or out of the state, notice shall be given and published as the justice or judge of the circuit court shall direct, by publication for not less than one week, and by mailing to each party whose address can be ascertained.” The rule that a clear and unambiguous statute requires no judicial interpretation needs no citation of authority for its support. Where, however, the language is ambiguous, there is not only a need for judicial interpretation but a duty on the court to furnish it. Such an ambiguity arises from the fact that the Legislature has used the phrase “not less than six days” in the case of residents and “not less than one week” in the case of non-residents. The ambiguity arises from the double meaning inherent in the word “week,” which may mean (1) a period of seven days, or (2) a time seven days before or after a specified day. If the former, then publication would have to be seven times 20 N.J.Super.—9
“The statute means that notice shall be given either not less than twenty days before the time set, or on twenty distinct days before that time. We think it means the former. As to the usage of speech, when we speak of giving a week’s or a month’s notice we mean a notice that is a week or a month before the event.”
There is no question but that the phrase “not less than six days” refers to a period of time in advance of a specified date. Applying the doctrine of “noscitur a sociis" it seems reasonable to assume that “not less than one week” as used in the same paragraph of B. S. 20 :l-3 means a week, i. e., seven days, in advance of the hearing. The State Highway Department and more recently the Turnpike Authority have consistently construed the statute to require but a single publication not less than seven days before the date for the
For the reason that the petition does not follow the language of the statute as to necessity for public use, the petition is dismissed. No costs are allowed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.