Heckel v. Sandford
Heckel v. Sandford
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This writ of error brings up the record of a judgment in the Essex Circuit Court, containing exceptions
The plaintiff’s action was sustained in the court below.
The applicability of this statute to the facts proved at the trial, and its constitutionality, if so applicable, are the main •questions raised in this court.
By force of two acts of the legislature, passed in 1868, (Pamph. L., pp. 1152, 1153,) the then township of Belleville was divided into the Franklin polling district, the Woodside polling district, and what was thereafter known as the Belle-ville polling district. On April 6th, 1871, (Pamph. L., p. 1475,) “An act authorizing the appointment of commissioners to institute and make local improvements in that portion of the township of Belleville included within the boundaries of
On April 4th, 1873, (Pamph. L., p. 716,) an act to revise the above act was passed, by which the commissioners of the Belleville polling district were constituted a body politic and corporate, and their powers somewhat enlarged, and the bonds-which they were authorized to issue were to be binding upon all the property within the district. Under these statutes,, the money in controversy was raised, partly under the power to raise money for doing work preliminary to laying out streets in the district, and partly under the power to raise-road tax for the repair of highways therein.
By two acts, one approved February 18th, 1874, (Pamph. L., p. 191,) and the other approved March 5th, 1874, (Pamph. L., p. 241,) a part of the township of Belleville, including a small portion of the Belleville polling district, was set off and made the township of Franklin, with all the rights, powers, privileges and advantages belonging to the townships in the-county of Essex.
Upon these statutes arises the first question in the cause,, viz., whether so much of the Belleville polling district as was embraced within the limits of Franklin township was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the district commissioners.
I think it was. The statutes in regard to the district speak of it and manifestly contemplate it as a division of the township of Belleville, and some of the powers of the commissioners are required to be exercised by means of officers of
On March 26th, 1874, (Pamph. L., p. 493,) another portion of the Belleville polling district was severed and formed into the Montgomery polling district, and as to this, the Belleville district acts were expressly repealed.
On March 27th, 1874, (Pamph. L., p. 674,) an act was passed, creating the city of Belleville, and organizing its local government, -embracing within its provisions all the territory and inhabitants which, at that time, constituted the Belleville polling district. The local government which it was designed to establish was utterly inconsistent with the exercise of the functions of the Belleville district commissioners, and therefore its repeal of all laws inconsistent with its provisions must be regarded as putting an end to all acts under which those commissioners could operate. The saving of “all rights, dues or privileges which the township of Belleville, or the Belleville polling district, or any person or persons were entitled to,” cannot be construed to prevent this result: for if that would save the commissioners, so it would save the township officers, and thus would establish, throughout the limits of the proposed city, two incongruous authorities. The rights, dues and privileges preserved were not governmental powers.
On February 23d, 1876, (Pamph. L., p. 481,) the act organizing the city of Belleville was repealed,, but it was enacted that such repealer should not revive the commissioners’ acts already referred to, which, this statute declared, had been repealed by the city charter. By this repeal, however, the township of Belleville was rehabilitated, and the powers of the township over what had been the Belleville polling' district were revived. An act, passed April 10th, 1876, (Pamph. L., p. 495,) recognized these results.
This review of legislation has been necessary in order to
Such a case is, I think, within the purview of the act of April 21st, 1876, upon which this suit rests; and that act, therefore, made it the duty of the defendant to pay over to the plaintiff the money in his hands, unless there be something in the constitution which deprives the legislative will of force in this case.
A little reflection upon plain and well-settled principles will show that there is no such constitutional provision.
The defendant was a public officer, holding his office under an act of the legislature; as such only had he any right to retain the moneys in controversy. The corporation whose immediate servant he was, itself was created for public ends by the same legislative act, and this act was subject to modification and repeal at the will of .the power that framed it. By that will, the rights of the defendant as an officer, and the very existence of the corporation, might lawfully be, and. they have been, abolished.
The money was raised under the taxing power of the legislature, not for any private purpose of the corporation, but for a public governmental purpose—the laying out and repairing of highways; one in which the citizens of all the state have a legal interest of the same character as that of those residing in the neighborhood.
Under such circumstances, the legal control of the legislature over the money is almost absolutely untrammeled.
Having, therefore, concluded that the legislature has directed him to pay these moneys to the plaintiff, it was his duty so to do.
As to the defendant’s claim that he should be allowed to retain, out of these moneys, the - expenses for counsel fees which he has incurred in consequence of his doubts as to his legal duty in the premises, I know of no authority for such a course in a court of law.
The judgment below should be affirmed.
For affirmance—The Chancellor, Ch-iee Justice, Dixon, Reed, Scudder, Yan Syckel, Woodhull, Clement, Dodd, Green, Lilly. 11.
For reversed—None.,
Reference
- Full Case Name
- EDWARD HECKEL, IN ERROR v. THEODORE SANDFORD, IN ERROR
- Status
- Published