The opinion of the court was delivered by

The complainant’s grantor, William J. Cooper, and the defendant, were in 1870 owners of adjoining lots on Market street, in Morristown. On the defendant’s lot stood a dwelling about eleven feet back from the street. Cooper being about to erect a building on his lot, discovered that the eaves of defendant’s house projected over the division line, and thereupon an arrangement was made between him and the defendant in fulfillment of which he, for a cash consideration of $100, conveyed to the defendant in fee a strip of ground one foot wide along the dividing line, the deed therefor containing the following clause:

“ This deed is made and accepted upon this express condition and reservation that the said William J. Cooper, and his heirs or whosoever may at any time hereafter own the adjoining land of said Cooper, shall have the full right, liberty and privilege of building up to the line of the lot hereby conveyed and of having and enjoying two windows, one on the first story and one on the second story in the side of such building as he or they may put up, looking out upon said lot, which windows shall not be hindered or obstructed in any way by said Louanstein or his heirs or assigns to any other or greater extent than such windows if now erected could be obstructed by the house of said Louanstein at present standing on his said lot.”

Cooper then erected a brick building upon his lot, extending to the street line in front and to the newly-constituted division line on the side toward the. defendant, and in that side placed a window in the second story, near the front, overlooking the de*301fendant’s front yard. In January, 1882, the defendant began the erection of an addition to his house,' extending to the front of his lot and to the old division line between him and Cooper, and being of a height sufficient to obstruct the view from the window before mentioned. The complainant’s bill is filed to enjoin such obstruction.

Under the view which we have adopted in this case, no other question need be decided than that of the true meaning of the clause upon which the complainant relies for the maintenance of her suit. She contends that by the “ condition and reservation” in the deed from her grantor to the defendant, she has a right to have her window unobstructed by any erection on the defendant’s lot save the building which stood there when the deed was made. This claim, if maintained, practically deprives the defendant of the use of the front part of his lot except for the purposes of a yard. In view of the facts that in purchasing the one-foot strip, he was protecting only the eaves of his house, and that he paid in cash the full value of the land he bought, it is plain that the claim is one which a priori would be thought not likely to accord with the intention of the defendant. These circumstances may legitimately be regarded as throwing light upon the language of the written instrument, for the court is called upon to put itself in the position of the parties and to avoid, if it fairly can, any interpretation of their words and acts which will 'lead to an unreasonable result.

Turning, then, to the language of the clause, we see that the rights which Cooper affirmatively reserved were: 1st, that of building up to the line of the lot conveyed, viz., the one-foot strip; 2d, that of having two windows in the side of his building, looking out upon said lot; and then was added a negative sentence as to the obstruction of these windows. Of these affirmative reservations, the right of building up to the line of the lot conveyed and the right of having two windows in the side of his building, were such as would have belonged to Cooper without being expressly preserved, and the only important words to be found are the phrase “ looking out upon said lot.” This it *302is that gives character and scope to the right which the parties intended to secure. There can be no question of the meaning of this phrase; “ said lot ” is the one-foot strip, just before mentioned, and therefore the windows which Cooper reserved .the right to have and enjoy were windows looking out upon the one-foot strip. If the entire clause, of the deed stopped here, no reasonable doubt could be raised about its interpretation. It would clearly import that the strip, and the strip only, was to be kept open for the use of the windows; an examination of the remainder of the clause does not, I think, disclose any different purpose. It in effect forbids Louanstein to create any new obstruction to the windows, and permits him to maintain whatever obstruction his old building interposed. But in determining the extent of this prohibition, we are to bear in mind that the significant feature of the windows protected is that they are windows loohing out upon the one-foot strip, and hence it is quite reasonable to conclude that this outlook constitutes the measure of the prohibition. In accord with the same notion is the permission to maintain the old obstruction, for, as the house then standing on the defendant's lot overlapped a portion of this strip, he would have been required to remove this projection, unless this permission had been added to qualify the right before reserved.

My conclusion, therefore is, that by this deed the parties designed to vest in Louanstein the fee of this one-foot strip, and to reserve to Cooper and his heirs and assigns a right to the use of said strip for his two windows, except so far as such use was already impaired by the house then standing on defendant's lot.

An additional circumstance favoring this conclusion is found in the fact that the grantor in this deed denominated the retention of his right a “ reservation,” a sufficiently apt term, if applied to something which he might otherwise have been thought to be surrendering, a totally inapt term, if applied to something which he was then for the first seeking to acquire.

The chancellor’s decree dismissing the complainant’s bill should be affirmed, on the ground that the complainant is not entitled to the right which she sets up.

The question before the court does not, in my opinion, depend on the construction of a written contract, for the conveyance from Cooper to Louanstein is not regarded by me, with respect to the subject of the easement in controversy, as the deed of the latter. In point of fact, that instrument was not executed by him, and, touching the point in dispute, it is not to be attributed to him as a matter of law. As I understand the authorities, none of them lend any countenance whatever to such an attribution, and they can be made to wear such a semblance only by failing to discriminate between the facts to which such authorities properly apply and the facts involved in the present case.

The inquiry before the court relates to the grant of an easement by force of a deed not actually executed by the grantee, in lands of the grantee, and which are not, either in whole or in part, transferred by the conveyance. The case is the same as though A should convey to B a tract of land situated in the city of Trenton, and should insert in such conveyance the grant of a right of way over the lands of B, located in Princeton. The question is, by the acceptance of such a deed, is it the deed of B with respect to the transfer of the right of way ? To this query I answer unhesitatingly in the negative.

And in the first place it should be noted that if the instrument in the case suggested, and in the one before the court, is to be taken as the deed of the grantee, still it is indisputable that resting on its own footing alone, it would be unenforceable against him, either at law or in equity. This is the effect of the statute of frauds, which requires the signature of the person desirous of passing such an interest in his land. So that if we were to adopt the theory which is rejected by me, we would have the anomaly .presented of a deed of a party being utterly ineffectual for the purpose for which it was designed. It would be styled a grant, but nothing in point of law or of fact would pass under it. If the complainant in the present case had not set forth in his bill acts of part performance of the agreement for this easement, which he asserts is contained in this attributed deed, he would have exhibited a case without any legal or equitable basis; and to *304such a case the ascription of the deed to the defendant is not a necessity,' for if the agreement in question had been by parol it would have been, under the alleged facts, quite as efficacious as though it were under seal. The technical doctriue, therefore, which has in some instances the effect of attributing a deed as the act of a person who never signed or sealed it, is by no means essential or beneficial to the equitable disposition of the class of cases to which the present one belongs, nor indeed to any class of cases that can be imagined.

The principles on which the decisions rest, which ascribe a deed to a non-executing grantee, do not warrant their application to the present case. Such decisions relate to stipulations on the part of the grantee, which are connected with' or relate to the land embraced in the conveyance. Covenants contained in such instruments, which have been declared to be binding, have universally been of this character. Such agreements may indeed be collateral to the conveyance, but they must relate to the premises whose title is transferred. This was the condition of things in Finley v. Simpson, 2 Zab. 311, for in that instance the covenant ascribed, as a matter of law, to the grantee, was that he would pay off the money which was secured by a mortgage on the land granted. It is, I think, very plain that if the moneys in question had not been a burthen on the land, the statement of the assumption of the debt by the non-executing grantee contained in the deed of the grantor would not have been imputed to the former as his covenant. And yet that, in effect, is what is claimed on the side of the complainant in the present case. Such a doctrine is not supported by the decision just quoted, nor by any of the authorities which form its foundation. I have examined all of those authorities, and I find that, without exception, they relate to covenants connected with the premises demised or conveyed. Not one of them indicates the doctrine that a statement of an agreement touching alien lands will be imputed to the grantee. Among such authorities the leading one is the case cited from the year-books, 38 Edw. III. c. 8, 9. The facts involved were these: a demise was made to two lessees, only one of whom executed the counterpart of the lease, but both went into posses-*305session. The lease contained a covenant, on the part of the lessees, to pay £20 if certain conditions were not complied with. The court decided that the instrument was the deed of both lessees. But the conditions referred to all related to the land demised, and consequently such judgment was a proper basis for the decision in Finley v. Simpson, but will afford no basis for the decision of the present case. . Neither Sir Edward Coke nor Chief-Baron Comyns nor any other legal writer intimates any opinion that the technical rule in question can be. carried any further than it was in this case from the year-books. In Sheppard’s Touchstone vol. 1 p. 177, the law on this head is stated ’ with exactness. This learned writer says: “If'a feoffment or a lease be made to two, or to a man and his wife, and there are ■divers covenants in the deed to be performed on the part of the lessees, and one of them doth not seal, or the wife doth or doth not seal during coverture, and he or she that doth not seal doth notwithstanding accept of the estate and occupy the lands conveyed or demised; in these cases, as touching all inherent covenants, as for payment of rent and the accessories thereof, or clauses of distress, or re-entry, nomine pcence, reparations and the like, they are bound by these covenants as if they did seal the deed.” Both this distinguished author and Lord Coke expressly declare that the root of this legal rule is in the maxim : Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus, et transit terra cum onere—that is, that he who takes the land conveyed or demised must take it with the burthen upon it. It is obvious that this maxim cannot be applied to the ease before the court. If covenants relating to alien lands are to be construed as the agreements by specialty of a non-executing grantee, it would follow that any other stipulation which the grantor might insert in his conveyance would be so regarded. Thus the grantee might in such form be made to convey his lands, or to sell a ship or a stock of goods. It seems to me that a rule of law of this kind would be fraught with mischief. If a grantor wishes to obtain a conveyance of lands from his grantee, or wishes to obtain an easement in such lands, it is the reasonable and safe course to require him to obtain a deed to that end, executed by such *306grantee. The law gives a peculiar efficacy to deeds, on the ground that the act of signing, sealing and delivering such instruments denotes caution and deliberation in the person executing them. It would be an unwise policy to introduce into the law, instruments having such efficacy which have not been, in their formation, attended with such formalities.

My footing, therefore, in the present matter is this: I do not regard the clause relating to the easement in question, as contained in a deed of the defendant, Louanstein; but I regard such statement, the deed being accepted by Louanstein, as a circumstance of evidence, more or less strong, as the case may be, tending to show a parol agreement for such easement. ' If 'this were the deed of the defendant it could not be contradicted or altered by extraneous evidence; it would have to speak for itself, and all that this court could do would be to enforce its terms. This is the force that I refuse to give to it, looking upon it as simply evidence of a character susceptible of explanation or alteration by the other facts in the case. If there were no other proof on this subject except the statement of the bargain in the grantor’s deed, I should treat it as was done in the ease cited from the New York reports, as full proof of an agreement in the terms of such statement, and, as the transaction has (in part been executed, should favor its enforcement. But the matter does not stand on such statement alone; there is other testimony on the subject that has satisfied me that the easement, as claimed by the complainant, was not a part of the bargain. The defendant did not agree to grant the easement to the extent set up in the complainant’s bill. Taking this view of the testimony, I will vote, on that ground, to affirm this decree.

(dissenting).

I concur in the view of the special master that the defendant has made no case under his cross-bill for the reformation .of the deed. But I cannot approve of the decree he advised dismissing the complainant’s bill.

The doctrine of the common law was, and the law of this state is, that, if the grantee in an indenture of bargain and sale, *307purporting to be inter partes, accept the deed and the estate thereby conveyed, the deed becomes ipso facto his deed as well as the deed of the grantor, though it be not executed and delivered by him. The engagements and undertakings expressed in the deed to be performed by the grántee are regarded as covenants on his part, and on a breach he may be sued at law in an action of covenant, as for a covenant broken. The common law authorities for this principle are cited in the brief of Mr. (now Justice) Bradley, in Finley v. Simpson, 2 Zab. 311, and the principle was adopted by the court in its decision.

This doctrine is not restricted to such stipulations as are in the nature of covenants real and annexed to the inheritance, or relating to the mode in which the premises granted shall be used or enjoyed. On the contrary, the precedents of the judicial enforcements of this principle are mainly those in which actions have been brought on such covenants where they related to matters collateral to the grant, which were not in any sense qualifications of or restrictions upon the estate granted or the mode in which the premises should be used or enjoyed. Chief-Baron Comyn says: “ If a lease be to A and B by indenture, and A seals a counterpart, and B agrees to the'lease but does not seal, yet B may be charged for a covenant broken, though the covenant be collateral and not annexed to the land.” Com. Dig. tit. “Covenant ” A 1. “An indenture of lease is engrossed between A of the one part, and D and R of the other part, which purported to be a demise for years by A to D and R. A sealeth and delivered the indenture to D, and D sealed a counterpart to A, but R did not seal or deliver it. By the same indenture it is mentioned that D and R did grant to be bound to the plaintiff in £20, in case certain conditions comprised in the indenture were not performed. For this £20 A brought action against I) only. The defendant pleaded that the demise by indenture was made to D and R, and the non-joinder of R. The plaintiff replied that R did never seal and deliver the indenture, and so his writ was good against D sole. The counsel of the plaintiff took a diversity between a rent reserved which is parcel of the lease, and the land charged therewith, and a sum in gross, as here the *308¿620 is ■ for as to the rent they agreed that by the agreement of R to the lease, he was bound to pay it, but for the ¿620, that is a sum in gross, and collateral to the lease, and not annexed to the land, and groweth due only by the deed, and therefore R said he was not chargeable therewith, for that he had not sealed and delivered the deed. But inasmuch as he had agreed to the lease, which was made by indenture, he was chargeable by the indenture for the same sum in gross; and for that R was not named in the writ, it was adjudged that the writ did abate.” Coke on Lit. 231 a. A contract by the grantee to assume and pay a mortgage made by the grantor upon the premises is a collateral contract ; and yet it has repeatedly been held by the courts of this state, that the deed, though executed by the grantor only, is the deed of the grantee also, and that the latter may be sued in an action of covenant, upon the contract of assumption contained in the deed. Finley v. Simpson, supra; Golden v. Knapp, 12 Vr. 215; Sparkman v. Gove, 15 Id. 252.

Nor is there anything in the nature of an easement that for technical reasons would restrain the force of a covenant by the grantee to the premises granted. An easement, strictly speaking, cannot be made the subject of an exception or reservation, for it is neither parcel of the land granted nor does it.issue out of the land. A clause in a deed of conveyance reserving an easement operates as a grant of a newly created easement. Godd. on Ease. 108. The reservation is considered, as was said by Lord Westbury, precisely as if it were a counter-grant by the grantee. Goold v. G. W. Deep Coal Co., 2 DeG. J. & S. 600. It would undoubtedly.have been competent for Louanstein, by a counter-grant, to grant to Cooper and those who succeeded to his estate, an easement of light as a servitude upon his adjoining lands, as well as in the premises granted; and if the clause in question in this deed be treated as a clause of reservation merely, it would, in its strictest sense, be effective to create an easement in the premises granted, and the superadded covenant would be operative to prohibit such acts of interference with the easement granted as he covenanted to abstain from.

But if there should be any difficulty in giving effect to*309Louanstein’s covenant in a court of law, arising out of the notion that at law the covenant can be effective only to create an easement in the lands granted, no such difficulty exists in a court of equity. In equity it is clear that a stipulation of this kind in a deed accepted by a grantee will create an easement or a right in the nature of an easement in other lands of the grantee not comprised in the grant. In Case v. Haight, 3 Wend. 632; S. C., 1 Paige 447 Schuyler owned the south side of the lower falls in the outlet of Lake George, and also the land under the bed of the stream. He made a grant to Deals & Nichols of the bed of the stream. The deed contained a reservation of the right to Schuyler, his heirs and assigns, to abut any dam or dams on both shores of the river. The grantees were the owners of the lands on the north shore. The question arose as to the effect of this reservation. Sutherland, J., delivering the opinion of the court of appeals, said: “ The reservation can have no effect as an exception. * * * * * The deed of Schuyler did not convey or profess to convey any part of the north shore; he could not, therefore, reserve a right to build a dam against it. But, though void as an exception, the reservation is binding upon the grantees and their assigns, and becomes operative either as an implied covenant or by way of estoppel; the deed is to be construed as though the parties had mutually covenanted that each should have a right to abut a dam upon the shore of the other.” This case was approved by Chief-Justice Shaw, as founded upon the indubitable principle that a grantor, by a reservation in his deed, may acquire a right in other lands of the grantee not granted to him by the deed; and the learned chief-justice gives illustrations of such grants, resulting, as he expresses it, “from the plain terms of the contract.” Dyer v. Sandford, 9 Metc. 395—404. In Randall v. Latham, 36 Conn. 48, on a bill for specific performance of an agreement with regard to water from the respondent’s raceway, the complainant «claimed a right to water from the raceway under one Thomas. Thomas and the respondent, Latham, were respectively the -owners of mills on the same stream. Thomas conveyed to Lat-ham a tract of thirty acres adjoining the mill of the latter. The *310deed contained a reservation that the grantor should have the privilege of drawing water from the ditch of Latham’s gristmill, and that Latham and his successors should keep a spout ten inches square in the inside at the bottom of the ditch, to which the grantor should at all times have access for the purpose of drawing water. The ditch was never owned by Thomas, and he had no interest in it beyond that acquired by this provision in his deed to Latham. The court sustained the complainant’s bill, saying: “ The deed purports to require the respondent to put in the spout upon land not conveyed, and the question is whether a, court of-equity will compel him to do it under the circumstances of the case. That the respondent, by accepting the deed containing the provision, thereby agreed to perform this duty, there can be no doubt. ■ This duty was part of the consideration of his deed. The respondent has received full compensation, and it is difficult to see why he is not bound to perform it.”

But if we should yield to the reasoning that this stipulation, on technical grounds, is not the covenant of Louanstein because he did not sign and seal the deed, the complainant would nevertheless be entitled to the benefit of its provisions in a court of equity. A contract, the terms of which are reduced to writing, though signed by one party only, if delivered and accepted 'by the other party, becomes the written contract of both parties. For instance, the conditions of insurance contained in a policy signed by the insurer only, become, by the acceptance of the-policy, contracts of warranty on the part of the insured. A carrier’s bill of lading, or his ticket issued to a passenger, becomes, by the accepta.uce, a contract in writing between the carrier and the consignor or passenger, and neither party can vary the terms of such a contract by parol evidence. Long v. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 76; Burke v. S. E. R. R. Co., L. R. (5 C. P. D.) 1; Harris v. G. W. R. R. Co., L. R. (1 Q. B. D.) 515; Watkins v. Rymill, L. R. (10 Q. B. D.) 178; 2 Whart. Ev. § 921.

All the authorities agree that the grantee in a deed which has been accepted by him, is bound by the stipulations on his part contained therein. The only controversy has been with respect to the form of action or procedure by which his liability shall *311be enforced. If an action of covenant will not lie for a breach, for the reason that his contract is not technically a covenant, he is bound in equity by his agreement contained in the deed. The deed is evidence that he made the agreement contained in it, and a court of equity will restrain him from doing what he agreed not to do. Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35—42.

In any view of the nature of this stipulation—whether it be considered as a covenant dr only as a contract in writing—the. question is simply one of construction. In putting a construction upon the agreement in question, there is no place for the application of the maxim verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem ; for in indentures the words are the words of all the parties, and the intention is to be regarded. 1 Leon. 318; 2 Id. 47, 192; Lord Say and Seal’s Case, 10 Mod. 40, 43. And the maxim quoted is the last to be resorted to, and is never to be relied upon but when all other rules of exposition fail, and if any other come in place, this giveth place. Bac. Max. Reg. 3 pl. 14.

Before this deed was executed the parties were owners of adjoining lots fronting on Market street—Cooper’s lot having a frontage of fifty feet, Louanstein’s a frontage of twenty-six feet. On Louanstein’s lot there was an old house standing back eleven feet from the line of the street. In 1868, Louanstein altered and repaired his house. In the spring of 1870, Cooper made preparations.to build on his lot, and it was then ascertained that the division line between the two lots “ cut into the weatherboards on a portion of the southwesterly side of Louanstein’s house about a half or three-quarters of an inch,” and that the cornice projected over the line sixteen or seventeen inches. To settle this difficulty the deed in question was made, conveying to Louanstein one foot of land. In this deed Louanstein agreed that Cooper and his heirs and assigns should have the—

“ Full right, liberty and privilege of building up to the line of the lot hereby conveyed, and of having and enjoying two windows, one on the first story and one on the second story, in the side of such building as he or they may put up, looking out on said lot.”

Cooper then changed the plan of his proposed building, and *312erected on his lot a brick building flush up to the new division line, and placed in it two windows on the side towards Louanstein’s lot. In constructing this building the cornice of Louanstein’s house was sawed off and reduced to one foot in width, and flushed up against Cooper’s building. Louanstein now proposes to extend his house on the line of his original lot, out to the line of the street, which will bring his house directly in front of Cooper’s windows. His right to do so under the stipulation in the deed is the subject-matter of this suit.

It will be observed that it is admitted that the reservation in the deed creates an easement of light and air. The words already quoted are of such import as to be decisive on that subject. The question, then, is, how far that easement so created is protected from hindrance or obstruction by the contract of Louenstein. In the concluding portion of this stipulation he covenants that,

“ Which windows shall not be hindered or obstructed in any way by said Louanstein, or his heirs or assigns, to any other or greater extent than such windows, if now erected, could be obstructed by the house of said Louanstein, at present standing oil his said lot.”

The contention of the defendant is that this stipulation only prohibits the erection of any building on the one foot conveyed, and consequently he proposes to extend his house on the line of his original lot to the street, leaving a space of only one foot between his proposed building and Cooper’s, windows, practically cutting off light and air from the windows, and leaving a space not sufficient for the swinging of shutters. If a stipulation of such an import had been in the contemplation of the parties, it would have occurred to any scrivener, much more to a lawyer (and this deed was prepared by a lawyer), simply to interdict the erection of any building on the strip conveyed. Instead of this obvious method of expressing the understanding of the parties, the draughtsman of the deed adopted the sweeping language that the said windows shall not be hindered or obstructed in any way; and, as if to remove all doubt, he adds,

*313“ To any other or greater extent than such windows, if now erected, could be obstructed by the house of said Louanstein, at present standing on his said lot.”

To support his contention the defendant relies on two grounds —First, that the reservation cannot be construed, or rather be operative to create an easement or a right in the grantor in any other land of the grantee than that which is the subject of the conveyance. This contention, as I have shown, is discredited by judicial decisions, and, I believe, is wholly without approval or countenance in any judicial opinion. The other ground is an interpretation of this stipulation constructed upon the words “ on said lot,” and “ standing on his said lot.” It is argued that these are words of reference to some lot antecedently mentioned, and therefore must restrict the covenant to the land conveyed.

But on referring to the description of the premises in the deed, it will be found that in the first course there is a call for a boundary “ along the line of the lot conveyed by King and wife to said Louanstein,” which is Louanstein’s original lot; and the house is referred to as “ the house now owned and occupied by said Louanstein.” The first time the words “ said lot ” are used in the expression “windows * * * looking out ou said lot,” they were merely descriptive of the location of windows to be placed in a house to be erected. And the words “ on his said lot,” as afterwards used, would naturally be referable to the lot Louanstein previously owned rather than to the premises conveyed ; for it is not usual in a deed which takes effect and vests property from delivery to speak of the premises conveyed as being the property of the grantee. Especially is this construction more probable and rational where the reference is to a house all of which except from a half to three-quarters of an inch of the thickness of its weather-boards, and its projecting cornice, is on a lot in the ownership of the grantee, and the house is described as “ at present standing on his said lot,” and is previously mentioned in the deed as a house owned and occupied by the grantee.

But these grammatical criticisms, however well founded they may be, are in my judgment of little avail as against the language of this covenant taken as a whole, and the purpose the *314parties had in view in inserting the covenant in the deed. The parties were contracting for an easement of light and air—an easement which could not be enjoyed except by an open space reasonably sufficient for the admission of light and air. Such an easement is hindered and obstructed in a legal sense by any impediment to the passage of light and air which interferes with, the reasonable enjoyment of the privilege. The complainant, by the reservation in his deed, obtained a right of having and enjoying two windows in his building on that side, and he required and obtained, in addition thereto, a covenant that his windows— which are the mere instruments by which his easement of light and air is enjoyed—should not be obstructed to any other or greater extent than such windows would be obstructed by the house then standing on the defendant’s lot. The proposed extension of the defendant’s house would make this easement, as an easement of light and air, practically useless, and it seems to me to be a forced construction of this covenant, to impute to it a meaning that the parties contemplated a useless privilege when they contracted that the right reserved should be as free and unobstructed as it would be with the defendant’s house as it then stood.

It will also be observed that any other construction than that I adopt will expunge the whole of the covenant with respect to hindrance and obstruction from the deed; for the complainant, under the grant in the introductory part of the stipulation “ of the full right, liberty and privilege * * * of having and enjoying two windows * * * in the side of his building, looking out on said lot,” will be entitled, to all the rights now proposed to be accorded to him, and the subsequent covenant against hindrance and obstruction which is annexed to the grant is made nugatory—rejected, and practically expunged from the-deed.

I think, also, that the complainant is entitled to have his right protected by a decree of a court of equity instead of being remitted to his action at law as the master advises; for, when a right to light is claimed as a special right created by a covenant, a court of equity will protect it by injunction, under circum*315stances where the court would withhold such protection from an ordinary easement. Leech v. Schweder, L. R. (9 Ch. App.) 463.

I think the decree should be reversed, and a decree made in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

For affirmance — The Chief-Justice, Dixon, Knapp, Magie, Parker, Scudder, Van Syckel, Clement, Cole, Green, Kirk—11.

For reversal—Depue, Reed, Paterson, Whitaker—4.