Freehold & New York Railway Co. v. Hodgson
Freehold & New York Railway Co. v. Hodgson
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The petitioner claims that being the purchaser and owner of an undivided half part of the decree rendered in favor of Jacob B. Rue, a land-owner, November 9th, 1874, he is entitled to execution to sell the lands named therein, to satisfy his debt, with interest and costs. These lands are now part of the roadbed of the Freehold and New York Railway Company, which purchased the road and franchises of the Monmouth County Agricultural Railroad Company, an insolvent corporation, and is now using them for railway purposes under its charter. The appellant, James P. Lowrey, purchased the property at the sale made by the receiver appointed by the court of chancery, and having completed the railroad, transferred and conveyed it to the Freehold and New York Railway Company. Being still interested therein as stockholder and bondholder, grantor and part owner of the decree, Lowrey was made a party under the
The property of the insolvent company having been sold by the receiver under the act of 1866 (Rev. p. 192 § 81¡) clear of eneumbi’ances, it is first argued that this decree, owned in • part by Hodgson, has been thereby canceled, and that the only claim he can have is upon the proceeds of sale in the court, or in the hands of the receiver. But Hodgson was not made a party to the bill filed by Emson, as an individual, but only as president of the Monmouth County Agricultural Railroad Company. Lowrey assumes to act on settlement with the receiver, not only as representing the one-half of the decree which had been transferred to him by Schultze, but also for Hodgson’s half, which is claimed in these proceedings. It is obvious that Hodgson could not be bound by a decree in the action, wherein he was not made a party, nor could the fact that he was made such, as the presiding officer of the insolvent corporation, affect his private and individual interest, or take away the encumbrance of his share of the Rue decree. Parties having adverse interests must be made parties in action. Wade v. Miller, 3 Vr. 296; Middleton v. N. J. West Line R. R. Co., 10 C. E. Gr. 306; Williamson v. N. J. Southern R. R. Co., 10 C. E. Gr. 13; Kirkpatrick v. Corning, 11 Stew. Eq. 234.
But Lowrey did not act without some show of authority in settling this decree, for, at the time, he was negotiating with Hodgson for the purchase and transfer of t-h.e latter’s interest in it. Both were promoters of the railroad, and had shown great interest in its success. The formal offer for the purchase of the railroad was made by Lowrey to the receiver on March 15th, 1876, and on March 16th, 1876, he had written to Hodgson these words:
“I have arranged as respects all the debts known to me, except the Rue judgment, of which, as I understand, you own one-half. Please tell me, at your earliest convenience, exactly what interest you have in this judgment, and what amount you will take in discharge thereof.”
“ I propose that you shall assign to me all your claims and rights of every nature upon the old company, including moneys advanced, the Rue judgment, and everything, upon my agreeing to cause to be issued to you upon the actual •organization of the new company, not later than September 15th next, seventy-five shares of $100 each, of the capital stock of the new company, upon a “basis of a capital of $200,000, or in that proportion, in whatever sum the capital may be fixed.”
On June 15th, 1876, Hodgson replied by postal card:
“ I was to see you to-day, but you were out; will arrange the contract you •sent as you wish, and bring it over soon.”
On July 13th, 1876, Hodgson again wrote:
“ In regard to the assignment of my claim &c., I will have it arranged, and bring it over before long.”
Mr. Plodgson went to reside in the state of Tennessee in 1878, where he has since lived, and there has been no communication between the parties since that time. Lowrey now says that he had forgotten that the actual transfer of the seventy-five shares had not been made to Hodgson, and Hodgson testifies that he was easy, supposing his lien was good under the Rue decree and could not be taken from him without some further act or assignment on his part. He seems not to have known, or to have forgotten, that he has so acted as to exclude all evidence of his claim against those who have subsequently acquired rights in this railroad, and that he is estopped by his conduct from enforcing his assigned decree against them in the form sought in his petition, that is, by a sale of a part of the road under execution, which would cut off the deeds of conveyance made by the receiver to Lowrey, and from Lowrey to the Freehold and New York Railroad Company, the two mortgages to'Whiting, and the bondholders secured thereby. He had knowledge and participated in the transfer of this title and its acceptance, and in the creation of these securities, which were declared to be first liens on all the property of the railroad, as already appears. He admits that he was present at the meeting of directors, but says he was silent while the board was acting in these matters. But the concealment of his claim of a prior lien by virtue of the Rue decree evidently misled Lowrey, who transferred the title to the new corporation and accepted their bonds in part payment, on the assurance that they should be first liens, and upon the agreement which had been made between them that seventy-five shares of the capital stock of the railway company would be accepted in
Decree unanimously reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.