State v. Lewis
State v. Lewis
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This application brings up in concrete form the question whether the Prudential Insurance Company of
*281 “Total net value (excluding amount apportioned to deferred dividend policies), $174,421,973 00” And adds this item:
“Amount apportioned to deferred dividend policies as a class pursuant to chapter 71, laws of 1907, and held awaiting apportionment between policyholders..... 23,441,441 15
“Grand total................... $191,863,414 15”
Pursuant to the Taxing act of 1906, page 418, quoted in the opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals already cited, the company-in making reí urn in Ac iaxingjmthorities returncd^MsAfgr^d, total” as the liabilities onpolicies7and" cliumed^exeinptionjfonalLnf—it. The assessors, cgmxMeC-that the itemjrf _$174,421,973 .should be jülgwed,JbutMeelinecLto allo\^hmunmr]iiirepportioned,lm-deferreiMividend_jDplicies, and the city now applies for a mandamus (to quote the language of the rule) :
“Commanding and enjoining the said Vivian M. Lewis, Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, that he forthwith correct his valuation of the outstanding policies of the Prudential Insurance Company of America, as of December thirty-first, s. n. 1910, and his certificate thereof, by striking therefrom the item of $23,441,441.15 and the statement ‘Amount apportioned to deferred dividend policies as a class, pursuant to chapter 71, law's of 1907, and held awaiting apportionment between policyholders’ and the words and figures ‘Grand total, $197,863,441.15,’ so that the same, when corrected, shall clearly show the total value of the outstanding policies of said Prudential Insurance Company of America, on December 31, 1910, to be the sum of $174,421,973.00.”
We are by no means clear that mandamus is the proper remedy in such a case as this, and do not wish to be understood as sanctioning a resort to it for the relief desired, which, it will be observed, is not lo compel a public officer to do something that he is by law required to do and has failed or refused to do, but to compel him to do in a different way what he has
To clear the way for this question a short resume of the statutory method of taxation and exemption will not be out of place, though the ground has largely been gone over in the case of Newark v. Board of Equalization of Taxes, ubi supra. The requirements of the statute are these:
1. Life insurance companies are to be assessed and taxed upon the full amount of value of their property, exclusive of real estate in this state, and of securities to the value of $500,-000, deducting from such amount or value the amount of their debts and liabilities. Pamph. L. 1906, p. 418.
2. To ascertain such debts and liabilities a statement is to be made by the company to the taxing officer annually as of December 31st preceding the same. Ib.
3. In stating the liabilities on policies the basis of such statement shall be the value of such policies on December 31st, and not the gross amount insured thereby. Ib.
4. Such value shall be according to the computation of the same by the commissioner of banking and insurance by such standard of valuation as may be adopted and used by him at the time such computation shall be made according to law. Ib.
5. In computing the policy values the commissioner follows the provisions of section 24 of the Insurance act of 1902 (Pamph. L., p. 407), as amended in 1907 (Pamph. L., p. 144), but this act does not prescribe or contain any intimation whether or not the element of a specific reserve to meet deferred dividends is to be taken into account in calculating policy values. Eor present purposes, therefore, section 24 in its present form seems to be unimportant. Viewing the taxa
. 1. Computation of value of the policies by the commissioner.
2. This is the basis of the liabilities on policies reported by the company to the assessor; and the Court of Errors and Appeals has held that it is itself the item of “liabilities on policies.” Newark v. Board of Equalization, ubi supra.
3, 4. The company makes statement accordingly and is allowed deduction for such value of policies, and the other items mentioned, and is taxed on the balance of its total property remaining.
As a result of all this the question at issue takes this modified form: Does the deferred dividend fund, with its accretions, properly constitute a part of the total value of the policies to be ascertained by the commissioner? If yea, it is by statute made part of the liabilities on policies and becomes exempt. It is perhaps inaccurate to say that the fund itself is a liability. What we mean is that when the company in obedience to law ascertains the “amount of surplus to which all such (deferred dividend) policies as a, class are entitled,” and apportions such surplus to said class, and carries it with its earnings and accretions “as a distinct and separate liability” to that class, and is forbidden to use it for any other purpose, the obligation exists to pay that amount to that class at some time or other, as the units forming the class become entitled to their respective shares therein, and it is, of course, this obligation that constitutes the liability, and not the fund accumulated to meet it. But by statute and by the segregation of the assets the liability becomes precisely equal to the fund reserved to meet it, and in this respect differs from the general assets of the company, which are normally somewhat in excess of the estimated policy liability at large, and not its precise equivalent.
How, it seems to us perfectly clear that when the deferred dividend policies as a class are entitled in any event except Shat of a universal catastrophe, to have divided among those meeting the necessary requirements this great sum of money,
It should be unnecessary to say more. Our conclusion is that the twenty-three million item is properly returned by the commissioner as forming part of the total policy values; that the ultimate obligation to pay that amount is a liability on policies;, and the company is lawfully entitled to have it deducted as part of the liabilities on policies from the taxable valuation for 1911.
The rule to show cause will bo discharged.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- THE STATE, THE MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, RELATOR v. VIVIAN M. LEWIS, COMMISSIONER OF BANKING AND INSURANCE, AND PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published