Meyer v. Alliance Investment Co.
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Associates, Inc. (Utah 1982)
- PACKARD-BAMBERGER & CO., INC. v. Maloof (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964)
- Kendall v. Thirlwell (Ky. Ct. App. 1970)
- In re Clerc Chemical Corp. (District Court, D. New Jersey 1943)
- S. T. McKnight Co. v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (8th Cir. 1941)
- First American National Bank of Nashville v. Chicken System of America, Inc. (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)
- Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc. v. Maloof (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965)
- Seeburger v. Cohen (Iowa 1933)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiffs leased property to de Jong by a written lease which contained a covenant to pay the rent and a covenant not to assign without the written consent of the lessors. The lessors did consent in writing to an assignment by de Jong to the defendant. .This consent was subject to all the terms, conditions and covenants contained in the lease. Subsequently, the defendant reassigned to de J ong, hut to this assignment there was no written consent. This action is for rent that accrued after the attempted reassignment. The defence is that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and that as the privity of estate terminated by tbe reassignment, the defendant is no longer liable to pay the rent, but the plaintiffs must look to de Jong. The plaintiffs had judgment for one month’s rent which accrued after the reassignment to de Jong.
The claim of the plaintiffs to recover rent of the defendant rests upon the words of the consent, “subject to all the terms, conditions and covenants contained in said lease.” As Lord Denman said in a similar case, “These are words of qualification and not of contract.” Wolveridge v. Steward,1 Cromp. & M. 644. The ease is similar to a conveyance of land subject to a mortgage. The grantee is not personally bound unless there are words equivalent to an assumption of the mortgage. There is nothing to add to the argument by which the result in Wolveridge v. Steward was vindicated in the Exchequer Chamber. The only sviggestion that can he made to the contrary is that inasmuch as the lease contained a covenant not to assign without consent and the present defendant took subject to that covenant, it was not possible for it to terminate the privity of estate and its own liability arising therefrom by an assignment without consent since that would enable it to take advantage of its own wrong. But the law is settled that a lease may he so assigned as to terminate the privity of estate, notwithstanding the covenant not to assign. Paul v. Nurse, 8 B. & C. 486; Tayl. L. & T., § 680; 24 Cyc. 984, note 45.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.