Harrington v. Garrison
Harrington v. Garrison
Opinion of the Court
The writ of certiorari brings up the record in a workmen’s compensation matter wherein the award to the employe was affirmed by the Essex Common Pleas on appeal. The single point argued by the prosecutor is that the workmen’s compensation bureau is without jurisdiction for the reason, as alleged, that the employment was casual, and therefore not such as to come within the purview of the statute.
Maude Harrington was skilled as a household worker in the various duties that are incident to a home, including serving, sewing, cooking and cleaning. There were several
The prosecutor contends that the employment was casual and relies upon Forrester v. Eckerson, 107 N. J. L. 156; 151 Atl. Rep. 639, and Pamph. L. 1919, ch. 93. We find ourselves in disagreement with her conception of the citations and with her conclusion of law. Pamph. L. 1919, ch. 93, provides:
It is not argued that the employment was by chance or accidental, but it is said that it was not in connection with any business of the prosecutor and that it was neither regular, periodic nor recurring. Without attempting to determine whether Mrs. Garrison’s status as a housewife was a business within the meaning of the statute, we state our conclusion that the employment was at least “recurring.” That the employment was such was the view of both the deputy commissioner and the Common Pleas judge, and we concur. The circumtsances are wholly unlike those in Forrester v. Eckerson, supra; and yet the application of the principle stated in that case causes no difficulty in this. Por, as Judge Hartshorne said in the opinion below, “clearly there was a basic agreement.” Miss Harrington was in effect a part-time servant in the prosecutor’s employ, and her service had at least this degree of regularity, that the employment was for a part of every week that the Garrisons were at home over a long period of years and for a minimum of one day in each of those weeks. In this long repetition of weekly service, in the acceptance of it as a regularly recurring fact and in the mutual expectation of continuation, we find a condition utterly at variance with the common understanding of, as well as with the statutory definition of, a casual employment.
Judgment below will be affirmed, with costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.