Rothman v. City of Hackensack
Opinion of the Court
(temporarily assigned).
Plaintiffs, Leonard and Mildred Rothman, appeal from judgments of the Bergen County Board of Taxation determining Hackensack real property assessments as follows:
Parcel I - 1978 only
Assessment County Board Judgment
Block Lots Land Improvements Land Improvements
100 F 8, 9 & 10 $25,500 0 $20,000 0
*440 Parcel II - 1978 & 1979 (same amounts both years)
Assessment County Board Judgment
Block Lots Land Improvements Land Improvements
114 A 1 $138,000 $100 $138,000 $100
114 C 1-A, & 3 95,400 -0-95,400 -0-
Parcel I was vacant land, 75 X 135 feet, or 10,125 square feet fronting on Charles Street and with % located in a business district and Vs in a manufacturing district under the Hackensack Zoning Ordinance. The property was contiguous to other property of plaintiffs, and subsequent to the October 1, 1977 assessment date plaintiffs obtained a variance and during the 1979 tax year constructed a new commercial building thereon.
Parcel II was vacant land consisting of contiguous lots with about 200 feet of frontage on State Highway # 17, and adjacent to other property of plaintiffs in the Borough of Lodi upon which the construction of a large cinderblock building began in 1979.
The cases were consolidated for trial, plaintiffs’ son (now an owner-partner with his mother and father of Parcel I) acted as their counsel, and plaintiff Leonard Rothman and Hackensack Assessor John J. Johnson were the only witnesses. As to Parcel I, plaintiffs sought a reduction of assessment to asserted true value of $15,000 and, although no counterclaim was filed, Hackensack sought restoration of the original assessment of $25,500. As to Parcel II, the nominal improvement assessment of $100 for a sign was not disputed, but plaintiffs sought a reduction of the $138,000 assessment to $80,000 and reduction of the $95,400 assessment to $47,000.
PARCEL I
As of October 1, 1977 all real property in Hackensack was reassessed for tax year 1978 and the Bergen County Board of Taxation equalization table for 1978 determined that the real property ratio of aggregate assessed to aggregate true value
Johnson’s assessment method fails to distinguish between property valuation differences due to influence factors such as frontage, depth, shape, size, topography and location. Real Property Appraisal Manual for New Jersey Assessors (Third Edition, 1978) 1-31 to 1-62. The problem with Rothman’s “appraisal” is that his valuation was merely a 40% reduction from the “set value” or $1.00 per square foot to make his property “comparable” to others assessed at $2.50 per square foot. Although the assessor’s methodology leaves much to be desired, plaintiffs asserted true value of $15,000 was unsupported and the proof of comparative assessments is inadequate to sustain a claim of discrimination. Greenwald v. Borough of Metuchen, 1 N.J.Tax 228 (1980). The evidence was in a state of equipoise and neither side overcame the presumption of correct
This state of the evidence is to be distinguished from the situation in Samuel Hird & Sons, Inc. v. Garfield, 87 N.J.Super. 65, 208 A.2d 153 (App.Div. 1965) where affirmance of county board judgments by the Division of Tax Appeals produced anomalous results in successive years. There the presumption was overcome and substantial and competent evidence enabled determination of true value and fixing of a common assessment based upon a suitable equalization factor. In this case, as to Parcel I, plaintiffs had the burden of proof that the county board judgment was too high and defendant the burden of proof that it was too low. Defendant had the burden of ultimate persuasion in its attempt to seek restoration of the original assessment pursuant to Rek Investment Co. v. City of Newark, 80 N.J.Super. 552, 194 A.2d 368 (App.Div. 1963) and Bor. of Matawan v. Tree Haven Apartments, Inc., 108 N.J.Super. 111, 260 A.2d 235 (App.Div. 1969), just as plaintiff-appellants had the burden in seeking decrease of the county board judgment pursuant to Glenwood Realty Co., Inc. v. East Orange, supra. The evidence being in a state of equipoise on the ultimate issue of
PARCEL II
Although the evidence introduced by both sides was more extensive than that pertaining to Parcel I, it suffered from the same infirmities. The assessment was at $2.25 per square foot applied to all land in the general area despite obvious differences in property valuations due to influence factors such as those noted in the above discussion as to Parcel I. Much of the evidence compared plaintiffs’ property with that of an adjacent property owner, Sanzari. Hackensack sewers were not immediately available to the Rothman tract as they were for the Sanzari land. Additionally, the Rothman property had Stink Creek crossing it, whereas Sanzari’s lands were not so afflicted. There was also some evidence of flooding conditions and less highway frontage than possessed by the Sanzari lands. Both sides produced alleged “comparables” from other areas of Hackensack, but none were of any value in determining the true value of the properties under appeal.
Rothman’s opinion was that the Block 114A property should be assessed at $1.25 per square foot or $80,000 and the rear lands in Block 114C at $1.10 per square foot or $47,000. The only basis, however, was a percentage reduction from the $2.25 rate applied to the Sanzari tract and a somewhat greater reduction for the lots not fronting on Route 17. Just as in the case of Parcel I, the comparative assessments are inadequate to support the claimed discrimination. Greenwald v. Borough of Metuchen,
There was also a claimed error in the number of square feet to which the $2.25 multiplier was applied. A boundary dispute between Rothman and Sanzari resulted in a law suit that was ultimately settled and Rothman claimed a loss of 2,081.44 square feet. A settlement deed indicates, however, that 816 square feet were acquired by plaintiffs; but in any event the Deed was not recorded until November 6, 1978 and hence would not be applicable to the 1979 tax year which is based upon an October 1, 1978 assessment date. Additionally, it is customary for an assessor to make his assessments on the lots as shown on the district tax map as of the October 1st assessment dates. In summary, the quality and quantity of plaintiffs’ evidence as to valuation and discrimination is insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness of the county board judgments as to Parcel II.
Accordingly, as to both parcels, judgments will be entered for the years and in the amounts hereinabove set forth under the headings for county board judgments.
The Tax Court hears and determines appeals from county tax board judgments that formerly were heard in the Division of Tax Appeals, N.J.S.A. 2A:3A-3, and these are trials de novo. N.J.S.A. 2A:3A — 4. Effective January 1, 1980 N.J.S.A. 54:3-14 requires recording of such tax appeal proceedings and N.J.S.A. 54:3-26 requires written memoranda of judgments with reasons therefor.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.