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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 KERRY KRUSKAL, 3 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NO. 34,229 MIKE MELLIGER AND SABROSO RESTAURANT, d/b/a SABROSO L.L.C., 8 Defendants-Appellees.

9 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY Sarah C. Backus, District Judge Kerry Kruskal Arroyo Seco, NM Pro Se Appellant Walcott & Henry P.C.

15 Charles V. Henry, IV Santa Fe, NM for Appellees

18 MEMORANDUM OPINION WECHSLER, Judge.

2 {1} Plaintiff Kerry Kruskal (Plaintiff), in a self-represented capacity, appeals from the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice his complaint against Defendants Mike Mellinger and Sabroso Restaurant (Defendants). [RP 38] This Court issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm. Plaintiff has filed a “response to proposed disposition,” which we duly considered. Unpersuaded, we affirm.

7 {2} In this Court’s calendar notice, we noted that the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA) does not provide for de novo trial in district court where a person has not first exercised the process available through the NMHRA. See NMSA 1978, § 28- 1-10 (2005) (providing for trial de novo in district court in lieu of a hearing before the division); NMSA 1978, § 28-1-13 (2005) (providing for trial de novo in district court on an appeal from an order of the division). [CN 2] This Court further noted that the district court does not have jurisdiction of a NMHRA matter until Plaintiff has exercised the administrative remedies available to him under the NMHRA. See Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 282, 980 P.2d 65 16 (providing that under the NMHRA, a plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative remedies against a party before bringing an action in district court against that party); see also In re Application of Angel Fire Corp., 1981-NMSC-095, ¶ 5, 96 N.M. 651,

1 634 P.2d 202 (“Jurisdiction of the matters in dispute does not lie in the courts until the statutorily required administrative procedures are fully complied with.”). [CN 2–3] {3} In response, Plaintiff asserts that he has filed a complaint with an administrative agency other than the Human Rights Commission (Commission). [Response 1] Plaintiff does not, however, assert that he filed a complaint with the Commission and either completed the procedure to waive a hearing before the Commission in favor of a trial de novo in district court pursuant to Section 28-1-10, or sought a trial de novo in district court on appeal from an unfavorable decision by the Commission as permitted by Section 28-1-13. Plaintiff thus has not shown that he exhausted his administrative remedies and that the district court had jurisdiction of his claim.

11 {4} For the reasons set forth in our notice and above, we affirm.

12 {5} IT IS SO ORDERED.

13 ________________________________ 14 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge

15 WE CONCUR:

16 ________________________________ JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge

18 ________________________________ M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge