Li 139 Nev., Advance Opinion IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA PARVIZ EIVAZI, No. 84427-COA Appellant, vs. FATEMEH EIVAZI, FL Respondent. OCT 05 2023 BY C EF DEPUTY CLERK Appeal from a district court decree of divorce. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Nancy Saitta, Sr. Judge.' Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Hofland & Tomsheck and Bradley J. Hofland, Las Vegas, for Appellant. Radford J. Smith, Chartered, and Garima Jain and Radford J. Smith, Henderson, for Respondent. BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and WESTBROOK, JJ. OPINION By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.: In this opinion, we take the opportunity to caution both practitioners and district courts of the dangers inherent in the practice of 'District Court Judge Nadin Cutter is now assigned to the case. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA -32-k.31 1.< 1) 19475 adopting wholesale a litigant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, following lengthy divorce proceedings, the district court summarily adopted respondent Fatemeh Eivazi's proposed 61-page findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce as drafted, without making any modifications. Appellant Parviz Eivazi contends that it was reversible error for the district court to do so. We conclude that utilizing a party's proposed order does not in and of itself constitute an abuse of discretion, as the practice of requesting and adopting proposed orders from the parties is both well established and often necessary to the administration of justice. Nevertheless, we strongly urge both litigants and judges to exercise care when preparing and adopting such orders. Practitioners should ensure that proposed orders are both factually accurate and legally adequate, and courts should diligently exercise their discretion and thoroughly review litigant-drafted orders before adopting them. In this case, while portions of the decree are legally and factually supportable, other parts contain numerous legal and factual deficiencies. With respect to the latter, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it granted financial awards for alimony, attorney fees, and expert fees and when it unequally distributed the parties' community property and debt. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTOR Y Although previously married in Iran, Parviz and Fatemeh moved to the United States and were married in Las Vegas in 2001. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 2 WI 1947B ArgrD Faterneh filed for divorce in June 2016.2 From the inception of the case, the divorce proceedings were drawn out and highly contested. In the first year alone, both parties filed multiple motions and countermotions, requesting attorney fees and costs in connection with those filings. The district court entered numerous orders granting and denying the parties' various requests for attorney fees and costs, and Fatemeh did not move to reconsider any of these orders. In April 2017, Parviz filed a motion for summary judgment related to the parties' marriage in Iran and again requested attorney fees and costs. Fatemeh opposed the motion and also sought attorney fees and costs in connection with that motion under EDCR 7.60(b) and NRS 18.010(2)(b), on grounds that Parviz had multiplied the proceedings in a manner that increased costs unreasonably and vexatiously and because his motion was maintained without reasonable grounds or to harass. Because there were genuine disputes of material fact, the district court denied Parviz's motion for surnmary judgment but scheduled an evidentiary hearing to resolve three discrete issues. The court deferred the parties' pending motions for attorney fees and costs until that time. The pretrial evidentiary hearing was held over a three-day period in October 2017, May 2018, and June 2018. Following this hearing, the district court entered a minute order in November 2018, ruling in favor of Fatemeh on all three issues, providing that the parties "would bear their own fees and costs," and directing Fatemeh to prepare the order. A year the initiation of divorce proceedings, Parviz filed for Chapter 2 After 13 bankruptcy. Prior to the entry of the divorce decree, Parviz's debt was reduced from approximately $187,000 to $65,000, and Parviz was making monthly payments towards the principal amount. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 3 (0 3 1947H later, Fatemeh still had not prepared the order. So, in November 2019, Parviz prepared an order that was filed by the district court. After Parviz served Fatemeh with a copy of the order, Fatemeh filed a notice of entry of order in December 2019. On the same day, she moved for reconsideration of that order. In her motion for reconsideration, Fatemeh argued she was entitled to all attorney fees from the inception of the case through the evidentiary hearing—not just the fees that related to the summary judgment motion and evidentiary hearing that the district court had denied in its December 2019 order. In the motion, Fatemeh also requested reconsideration as to expert fees, but she did not seek reconsideration as to costs. The district court granted Fatemeh's motion for reconsideration and set the case for tria1.3 A divorce trial was held over three days in June, July, and August 2020 to address the parties' remaining contested issues. During the trial, Faterneh alleged that Parviz had wasted a substantial amount of community funds and presented an expert forensic accountant who identified potential waste. Analyzing financial transactions from 2011 to 2017, Fatemeh's expert determined that a variety of "unknown or unsupported transactions" constituted potential marital waste in the aggregate amount of $208,294. Fatemeh posited that these transactions were waste because she had no knowledge of them and did not consent to the depletion of the community funds. When asked about the expenditures at trial, Parviz testified that the funds were used for marital expenses Although the district court granted Fatemeh's motion for 3 reconsideration, it did not enter an order formally awarding Fatemeh her requested fees until the entry of the divorce decree. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 4 19478 Plafiv including education, travel, jewelry for Fatemeh, fertility treatments, home improvements, a down payment on a new home, and cash given directly to Faterneh. Fatemeh and Parviz each also testified about their respective employment status. Fatemeh was previously employed full time as an ultrasound technician, but she suffered injuries during a car accident in 2018. Following her accident, Fatemeh initially worked part time, but in 2019 she ceased employment completely due to her physical limitations. Parviz was employed full time as a scientist with the Las Vegas Valley Water District. During the trial, however, Parviz testified that he had several health problems and that he was currently using his accrued sick days pending his request for FMLA leave. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court asked both parties to submit proposed orders. They complied, and in February 2021, the district court entered Faterneh's 61-page proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce in its entirety, without modification. Although the decree noted that neither party had significant assets, the decree awarded Fatemeh $5,000 per month in alimony for ten years, $176,976.99 in attorney fees and costs from the inception of the case through the pretrial evidentiary hearing, and $19,565 in expert fees. The decree ordered Parviz to reimburse Fatemeh $59,000 for monies she used "to fund the litigation." The decree also made an unequal distribution of community property and debt, requiring Parviz to reimburse Fatemeh for half of the wasted community assets in the amount of $100,357.50 and ordering Parviz to pay half of Fatemeh's credit card debt while Parviz remained solely responsible for his bankruptcy debt. In total, the decree required Parviz to pay Fatemeh more than $400,000. In addition, the COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 5 (0) 1447F1 decree ordered Parviz to sell the marital home. Lastly, the decree provided that any unpaid balance would be reduced to judgment and accrue interest. After entry of the decree, both Fatemeh and Parviz filed motions to amend the decree. The district court denied Parviz's motion but granted Fatemeh's motion in part and ordered that Fatemeh would also receive nearly the entire value of Parviz's retirement account, which the decree had previously split evenly between them, to satisfy the financial obligations that remained after the sale of the marital home.4 Parviz timely appealed. ANALYSIS In this appeal, we address the following issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion when it adopted Fatemeh's proposed decree verbatim in its entirety; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion when it found marital waste because Parviz was unable to account for unknown transactions by clear and convincing evidence; (3)whether the district court adequately considered the alimony factors in NRS 125.150(9), including Fatemeh's need for alimony and Parviz's ability to pay, when it awarded Fatemeh alimony of $5,000 per month for ten years; (4) whether the district court abused its discretion when it awarded Fatemeh attorney fees from the inception of litigation through the evidentiary hearing, $59,000 to reimburse her for money she borrowed to fund the litigation, and expert fees; and (5) whether the district court abused its discretion in connection with other miscellaneous financial awards and allocations in the divorce decree. 4 0n appeal, Parviz does not challenge any of the district court's rulings on the parties' post-decree motions, including the court's redistribution of his retirement account. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 6 10) 19471.1 .6161* This court reviews a district court's alimony determinations, attorney fee awards, and disposition of community property, including any underlying marital waste determinations, for an abuse of discretion. Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406 (2019). This court reviews the district court's factual findings deferentially and will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009). Substantial evidence "is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). "Although this court reviews a district court's discretionary determinations deferentially, deference is not owed to legal error" or findings so conclusory that they mask legal error. Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). The district court "must have reached its conclusions for the appropriate reasons," Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 241-42, and if there are no facts explaining how the district court reached its conclusions, this court cannot determine whether those conclusions were made for appropriate reasons, see Davis, 131 Nev. at 451- 52, 352 P.3d at 1143 (explaining that: because the district court did not tie its factual findings to its conclusion, the appellate court "cannot say with assurance that the ... determination was made for appropriate legal reasons"). Adopting Faterneh's proposed decree verbatim was not, by itself, an abuse of discretion Parviz initially contends that the divorce decree must be set aside because the district court accepted Fatemeh's proposed decree in its entirety, without making any modifications. Parviz argues that, by doing so, the district court abdicated its judicial role and, necessarily, abused its COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1Q4711 discretion. We disagree that a district court abuses its discretion simply by entering an order proposed by one of t.he litigants without modification; however, we caution courts and practitioners alike that there are risks inherent in this practice, and scrutiny should be given to the contents of any proposed orders before entering them. See Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Westland Liberty Vill., LLC, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 57, 515 P.3d 329, 337 n.6 (2022) (urging district courts "to scrutinize [proposed] draft orders, being mindful that they assume responsibility for those findings and attendant rulings upon entry of the order"). At the outset, we note that in the Eighth Judicial District Court's Family Division, the court rules expressly contemplate that parties may submit proposed orders for consideration and adoption by the court. See EDCR 5.515 ("Proposed orders may include such findings, conclusions, and orders as the submitting party believes relevant to each point in dispute in the proceedings."). Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court I1ias recognized that a district court may properly adopt a party's proposed order, provided that the opposing party is apprised of the order and given an opportunity to respond. See Byford v. State, 123 Nev. 67, 69, 156 P.3d 691, 692 (2007) (discussing the predecessor to Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) Cannon 2, Rule 2.6(a), which was substantively identical to the present rule).5 5Although NCJC Cannon 2, Rule 2.6(a) does not include the commentary from the former version of the rule that was discussed in Byford, the decision's rationale remains equally applicable today given that the current rule still requires the district court to "accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to the law." COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 8 (l)) 1947H c Parviz does not argue on appeal that he did not have an opportunity to respond to Fatemeh's proposed decree prior to the district court's adoption. In fact, the record reflects that both parties timely emailed their proposed decrees to the court and copied opposing counsel on those emails, at which point either party could have raised objections thereto. Further, after entry of the decree, Parviz had an opportunity, under NRCP 52(b), to request amendments to the decree. See NRCP 52(b) ("On a party's motion...the court may amend its findings—or make additional findings—and may amend the judgment accordingly."); cf. Byford, 123 Nev. at 70, 156 P.3d at 693. The availability of this procedure offers an additional level of protection to litigants in the event that they believe the district court's findings and conclusions are improper. In this case, Parviz availed himself of that opportunity by filing a motion to amend the decree. Nevertheless, Parviz contends that the district court erred by adopting Fatemeh's proposed order verbatim based on several cases that have criticized the practice of district courts adopting litigant-drafted orders. See, e.g., Anderson u. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985) (stating that "[w]e, too, have criticized courts for their verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties" and noting "the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings of fact"); In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 275 (11th Cir. 1987) ("The dangers inherent in litigants ghostwriting opinions are readily apparent"); Chudasama u. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1373 n.46 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that "[w]e have consistently frowned upon the practice of delegating the tasks of drafting important opinions to litigants," as the , `practice harms the quality of the district court's deliberative process"); Harris v. Davis, 88 N.E.3d 1081, 1086 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (stating that COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 9 ((J) 1947B algi* "[w]hen a trial court adopts verbatim a party's proposed findings and conclusions," it "weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although these cases strongly discourage the practice of adopting litigant-drafted orders verbatim, they do not support Parviz's argument that the practice is itself an independent basis for reversal. For instance, in Anderson, the United States Supreme Court explained that l calculate Parviz's average income as $189,331 per year, or approximately $13,000 per month. This was an abuse of discretion.15 See Burroughs Corp. v. Century Steel, Inc., 99 Nev. 464, 470, 664 P.2d 354, 358 (1983) (holding that a district court determination that was based upon an exhibit not admitted into evidence was clearly erroneous). Relatedly, when evaluating Parviz's ability to pay alimony, the district court determined that Parviz had "grossly exaggerated his expenses" but made no findings as to what his actual expenses were to determine if $5,000 per month was an amount that Parviz could pay. The court indicated that Parviz had "significant resources for the payment of support to Fatemeh" due to the discharge of some of his debt in bankruptcy. But the court also ordered Parviz to sell his home to compensate Fatemeh for awards under the decree because it found that "the only cash available is from the sale of the house." The court's acknowledgment that Parviz was unable to compensate Fatemeh under the decree without selling his home undermines its finding that he had "significant resources" to pay alimony. When considering Parviz's age and health, in connection with factors (e) and (k) as it related to his ability to work, the district court also made insufficient findings. On the one hand, the court acknowledged Parviz's testimony at trial that "his health is poor, and he has 'stress, anxiety, high blood pressure and suicidal ideation' as a result of this ' 5Parviz does not specifically challenge the district court's reliance upon this evidence; however, the error is apparent on the record, and we may "take cognizance of plain error sua sponte." Crow-Spieker # 23 v. Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., 103 Nev. 1, 3 n.2, 731 P.2d 348, 350 n.2 (1987). In her answering brief, Fatemeh points out that "Parviz's 2015-2019 W-2s were admitted at Trial reflecting his historical income." The district court should have looked to the adrnitted evidence when calculating Parviz's income. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 27 k0) 1947B divorce." Yet, the court inexplicably concluded that Parviz "did not provide any evidence of such allegations of his poor health." See In re DISH Network Derivative Litig., 133 Nev. 438, 445 n.3, 401 P.3d 1081, 1089 n.3 (2017) (noting that "evidence need not be in a particular format to qualify as evidence— testimony is evidence whether it is given in court or a deposition").'6 And while the court noted that Parviz was 59 years old, had already worked at the Las Vegas Valley Water District for 25 years, and was currently working, the court did not address Parviz's ability to continue working for the 10-year period of the alimony award, especially when he was nearing retirement age. For Fatemeh, the district court did not rnake any findings as to her earning capacity, but instead focused on her current lack of income after finding that she was not, at present, "willfully unemployed." In passing, the court noted that Fatemeh was previously employed as an ultrasound technician, that she earned an average of $32,540 annually between 2017 and 2019, that she had been in an automobile accident in 2018, and that she was actively looking for work. But the court did not consider Fatemeh's likelihood of obtaining employment in the future, nor did it consider how 16We reject Parviz's argument that the district court's income calculation was incorrect since he "lost his employment because of his poor health." Although Parviz claims to have lost his employment, he did not support this claim with any citation to the record. See NRAP 28(e)(1) (requiring every assertion in briefs pertaining to matters in the record to be supported by a cite to the appendix where the matter relied upon is to be found). Moreover, based on our review of the record, it does not appear that Parviz presented the district court with any evidence that he lost his employment prior to entry of the divorce decree; thus, the district court cannot have erred by declining to consider this issue at the time the court entered the decree. Parviz had applied for Family Medical Leave, but it is unclear what effect, if any, this had on his earnings. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 28 (0) 1947H much she might be able to earn under circumstances where she was actively looking for work. The district court appears to have determined that because Fatemeh was not willfully unemployed, it did not need to consider her earning capacity when calculating alimony but, instead, could look only to her actual income. Fatemeh takes a similar position on appeal, when she asserts that "Mlle district court did not impute income to Fatemeh because it correctly found that Fatemeh was not willfully unemployed." But regardless of whether Fatemeh was willfully unemployed, the district court was still required to consider her earning capacity when evaluating an award of alimony. See NRS 125.150(9)(e) (requiring consideration of the "earning capacity" of "each spouse"); see also Earning Capacity, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A person's ability or power to earn money, given the person's talent, skills, training, and experience."). The district court did not consider Fatemeh's ability to earn money in light of her talent, skills, training, and experience. Instead, the court examined Fatemeh's declared monthly expenses, determined that she currently does not have any income, and summarily concluded she had a financial need for ten years of alimony payments of $5,000 per month to cover those expenses. But by failing to consider Fatemeh's own earning capacity, the court could not properly evaluate her ongoing need for alimony in relation to Parviz's ability to pay." "To the extent Fatemeh argues on appeal t.hat a $5,000 per month award of alimony was necessary to compensate her for economic losses caused by the dissolution of their 20-year marriage, we note that the district court improperly considered misconduct by Parviz as evidence of hêr economic losses. Initially, when evaluating the nature and value of Fatemeh's property under factor (b), the court commented that "Fatemeh COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 29 ()} 1947H When "the trial court does not indicate in its judgment or decree that it gave adequate consideration" to the appropriate alimony factors, "this [c]ourt shall remand for reconsideration of the issue." Devries, 128 Nev. at 712, 290 P.3d at 264 (alteration in original) (quoting Forrest v. Forrest, 99 Nev. 602, 606, 668 P.2d 275, 278 (1983)). Even though the district court superficially addressed the 11 factors contained in NRS 125.150(9), it was not enough for the court to simply process this case through the list of statutory factors and announce its ruling. The court's factual findings had to be supported by substantial evidence, and the court needed to explain why those findings supported its alimony award in both has significant debt that she had to incur as a result of Parviz's unreasonable positions, all of which were denied, and his filing of the bankruptcy proceedings which further delayed the case." When analyzing Fatemeh's income and employment under factor (e), the court commented that "Fatemeh has borrowed significant funds to meet her basic needs, and to pay counsel to combat the litany of motions and other proceedings brought by Parviz in bad faith. While Parviz seeks to avoid responsibility for his actions through bankruptcy, Fatemeh should not have to do the same." Finally, when analyzing Fatemeh's contributions as a homemaker under factor (i), the court chastised Parviz for "fail[ing] to acknowledge Fatemeh's contributions toward their marriage" and for "vehemently object[ing] to Fatemeh going to Iran in December 2014 and February 2016 to visit her father when he was sick and in a coma." Although the court could properly award attorney fees and costs to sanction Parviz for needlessly multiplying the proceedings, it was error for the district court to rely on his alleged misconduct during the divorce as justification for awarding alimony. See Rodriguez, 116 Nev. at 998, 13 P.3d at 418 ("[W]hen considering an award of alimony, the court may not consider either party's misconduct or fault."). On remand, the district court should instead consider the economic loss factors set forth in NRS 125.150(9)(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) when evaluating alirnony, including the length of the marriage, the parties' standard of living, and Fatemeh's contributions as a homemaker. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 30 (0) 19476 463. amount and duration. Because the district court abused its discretion in evaluating alimony in this case, we reverse the district court's alimony award and remand for a proper determination of alimony. See Devries, 128 Nev. at 711-12, 290 P.3d at 264. The district court abused its discretion when it awarded Fatemeh all attorney fees and costs from the inception of litigation, an additional $59,000 that she borrowed to fund the litigation, and $7,450 for translation services Parviz contends that several of the decree's other financial awards are legally improper or not based on substantial evidence, including an award of $176,976.99 representing all of Fatemeh's attorney fees and costs from the inception of the case in June 2016 through a pretrial evidentiary hearing, an award of $59,000 to reimburse Fatemeh for money she borrowed to pay for her litigation fees, and an award of $19,565 for expert witness and translator fees. Parviz first challenges the district court's award granting Fatemeh all of her attorney fees and costs through the pretrial evidentiary hearing. This award was entered in response to Fatemeh's motion for reconsideration of the district court's December 2019 order that the parties were to bear their own fees and costs in connection with Parviz's failed motion for summary judgment and the subsequent evidentiary hearing. However, when the district court granted Fatemeh's motion for reconsideration, it improperly awarded Fatemeh attorney fees and costs that had been the subject of prior motions that had already been resolved on the merits and were never challenged. In addition, the court awarded costs even though Fatemeh's motion for reconsideration only requested attorney fees and expert witness fees. While the court could permissibly reconsider its decision Pot to award attorney fees in connection with the summary judgment motion and evidentiary hearing, any additional fees COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 21 (0) i947s calatip were outside the scope of the order for which Fatemeh sought reconsideration. Further, it was improper to award costs when Fatemeh did not address them or request them in her motion for reconsideration. We therefore reverse the district court's award of attorney fees and costs in the amount of $176,976.99 and remand for the district court to consider only those fees incurred in connection with the summary judgment motion and evidentiary hearing. When calculating those fees, the court must ensure that any fees that were already addressed in prior court orders are excluded. The court must also consider any fees that Parviz has already paid toward that amount to ensure the attorney fee award is not duplicative. In addition, the $59,000 award to reimburse Fatemeh for rnonies she borrowed to fund the litigation was an abuse of discretion. The decree contains no findings or analysis about this award but merely states that "Parviz shall be required to reimburse the money to her." It appears that the award of money borrowed to fund the litigation is duplicative of the other attorney fee awards in the decree. Yet, in the absence of factual findings, this court cannot adequately review the district court's award. See Robison, 100 Nev, at 673, 691 P.2d at 455; see also Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21, *33-36, P.3d , (Ct. App. July 27, 2023). We therefore reverse this award and, on remand, direct the court to ensure that Fatemeh does not receive double recovery of her attorney fees. Next, Parviz challenges the award of expert fees. The decree awarded a total of $19,565 in expert fees for three experts, including $7,450 for translation services. NRS 18.005(5) provides for the recovery of fees "ih an amount of not more than $1,500 for each witness, unless the court allows a larger fee after determining that the circumstances surrounding the COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 32 (0) 1947B expert's testimony were of such necessity as to require the larger fee."18 "A district court's decision to award more than $1,500 in expert witness fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Frazier v. Drake, 131 Nev. 632, 644, 357 P.3d 365, 373 (Ct. App. 2015). A district court abuses it discretion when it fails to provide "an express, careful, and preferably written explanation of the court's analysis of factors pertinent to determining the reasonableness of the requested fees and whether the circumstances surrounding the expert's testimony were of such necessity as to require the larger fee." Id. at 650, 357 P.3d at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted). The decree made specific findings to justify the fees for the first two experts but failed to further address the translation fee. Because the decree failed to justify the translation services award," granting Fatemeh this expert fee for translation services was an abuse of discretion.2° "Following the entry of the divorce decree, the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 18.005(5) to authorize awards up to $15,000, rather than $1,500, for each expert witness, which amendment became effective on July 1, 2023. 2023 Nev. Stat., ch. 70, § 1, at (enacting A.B. 76, 82d Leg. (Nev. 2023)). For clarity, we cite to the pre-amendment version of NRS 18.005(5), which was the version in effect when the divorce decree was entered. 'Although it is arguable whether the expenses of the translation services qualify as expert fees, in this case the decree explicitly included the translation fee as an expert fee award, and neither party challenged the expert designation on appeal, only the amount of the fee awarded. 20 Parviz argues on appeal that the expert fee award in the decree failed to account for a preliminary $5,000 expert fee awarded to Fatemeh more than three years before the parties' divorce trial. On remand, similar to the attorney fee award, the district court should review any amounts that Parviz has already paid to ensure the expert fee award is not duplicative. If the court finds that Parviz had already paid toward the expert fee prior to trial, the decree should reduce the expert fee award correspondingly. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 33 (0) 19478 Miscellaneous financial awards and allocations Lastly, Parviz challenges a number of miscellaneous financial awards and allocations to Fatemeh and argues they were not supported by factual findings or substantial evidence. Specifically, he challenges an award for interim spousal support arrears, the division of insurance proceeds from Fatemeh's car accident, the unequal allocation of the parties' debt. and the sale of Parviz's residence. The interim spousal support arrears were supported by substantial evidence, as Fatemeh filed a schedule of arrearages shortly before trial. See Ogawa, 125 Nev. at 668, 221 P.3d at 704. The division of insurance proceeds from Fatemeh's car accident was also supported by substantial evidence because Fatemeh testified that Parviz received the full insurance payout. Therefore, we affirm these two awards. However, the decree does not contain adequate findings to support the unequal distribution of debt, where Parviz was ordered to pay half of Fatemeh's community credit card debt but was deemed solely responsible for his bankruptcy debt. Because the district court failed to state its reasoning for why it made an unequal distribution of the parties' community debt, the court abused its discretion. NRS 125.150(1)(b) (providing that the court must make an equal disposition of community property, unless the court sets forth in writing the reasons for making an unequal disposition); Lofgren, 112 Nev. at 1283, 926 P.2d at 297. We reverse these allocations as well and remand for further findings. The final issue is the sale of Parviz's home. Parviz contends on appeal that the district court violated his due process rights by ordering the forced sale of the home, despite the parties' stipulation to the contrary, without affording him the opportunity to be heard. We disagree. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 34 O0 19475 Initially, the parties stipulated that Parviz would be permitted to keep the marital home and buy out Fatemeh's interest so long as he paid for an appraisal, which Parviz agreed to do. However, in his closing brief after trial, Parviz requested that the district court order the sale of the marital home and split the net proceeds between the parties. Similarly, in her closing brief, Fatemeh also requested the district court order the sale of the home to satisfy Parviz's financial obligations under the decree. Finally, in his rebuttal brief, Parviz repeated his request for the district court to order the sale of the marital home, though he disputed which party should be financially responsible for home maintenance and costs pending the sale. "The doctrine of 'invited error' embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself has introduced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. It has been held that for the doctrine of invited error to apply it is sufficient that the party who on appeal complains of the error has contributed to it." Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) (citing 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962)). In this case, Parviz twice requested that the district court order the sale of the marital home, but he then contends on appeal that the district court denied his due process rights when it did, in fact, order the sale of the home. Because Parviz introduced the very error he challenges on appeal, he invited the error and is not entitled to relief. Pearson, 11.0 Nev. at 297, 871 P.2d at 346 (stating that the appellant "may not be heard to complain of the decision which resulted from her own attorney's request"). CONCLUSION This case illustrates the importance of both practitioners and courts exercising diligence when submitting and adopting proposed orders; COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 35 (0) I947Ft practitioners should ensure that proposed orders are factually accurate and legally adequate, and courts should exercise due diligence and judgment when reviewing litigant-drafted orders prior to adoption. Although we strongly caution courts against adopting litigant-drafted orders without first engaging in thorough and diligent review, we cannot conclude under these circumstances that adopting a proposed order without modification is itself an abuse of discretion. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is to examine the district court's substantive findings, and in this case, we conclude that the court abused its discretion when making several of the financial awards and orders. In conclusion, we affirm the financial award for interim spousal support arrears and the distribution of the insurance proceeds from Fatemeh's car accident, which were supported by substantial evidence in the record. We also affirm the decree's order to sell the marital home. However, we reverse and remand the financial awards for alimony, attorney fees, and translation services fees. We also reverse and remand the decree's $59,000 award to reimburse Fatemeh for monies she borrowed to fund the litigation and the unequal distribution of the parties' community property and debts. Insofar as the parties have raised any other arguments that are not specifically addressed in this opinion, we have considered the same and conclude that they either do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given the disposition of this appeal.21 21We note that Parviz made several arguments that did not include appropriate citations to the record, and therefore, we decline to consider them. See Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 109 Nev. 990, 997, 860 P.2d 720, 725 (1993) ("This court need not consider the contentions of an appellant where the appellant's opening brief fails to cite to the record on appeal."). We remind counsel that every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 36 WI 194,14 <4WD On remand, the court must reevaluate the financial awards for alimony, attorney fees, and expert fees under the appropriate legal standards as set forth in this opinion.22 The court must also reevaluate the issue of waste and make particularized findings to identify any compelling reasons to justify the unequal distribution of the parties' community property and debt in accordance with NRS 125.150(1)(b). J. We concur: , J. Bulla record shall be supported by a reference to the appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. NRAP 28(e)(1). 22Asnoted earlier, Parviz does not challenge the district court's redistribution of his retirement account. Nevertheless, in light of our disposition, the district court should reevaluate the necessity of using Parviz's share of his retirement account to satisfy his financial obligation to Fatemeh in light of any financial awards the court orders in accordance with this opinion. COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA 37 (0) 194713 -