1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 TARAS KRYSA, Case No. 2:20-CV-106 JCM (NJK)

8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER

9 v.

10 STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 13 Presently before the court is plaintiff Taras Krysa’s (“plaintiff”) motion to remand. (ECF 14 No. 5). Defendant State of Nevada ex rel. Board of Regents of the Nevada System of Higher 15 Education, on behalf of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (“UNLV”) filed a response (ECF 16 No. 7), to which plaintiff replied (ECF No. 10). 17 I. Background 18 The instant action arises from a dispute between plaintiff, a tenured professor, and UNLV 19 regarding the conditions of his employment. (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff sued UNLV on December 20 9, 2019, and amended his complaint on January 14, 2020. (ECF No. 5 at 2). 21 As relevant here, plaintiff mailed a copy of his initial complaint to UNLV’s general 22 counsel the day after it was filed. (ECF No. 5 at 2). Plaintiff did not serve the complaint in 23 accordance with Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) § 41.031(2), which governs service of state 24 entities in Nevada. (ECF No. 7 at 3). Plaintiff properly served UNLV with his amended 25 complaint on January 14, 2020. (ECF Nos. 6 at 2; 7 at 4, 44). Three days later, UNLV removed 26 this action. (ECF No. 1). 27 . . . 28 1 II. Legal Standard 2 “‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power 3 authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton,

(2013) (quoting 4 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,

(1994)). Pursuant to 28

(a), “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 6 United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to 7 the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such 8 action is pending.”

(a). 9 Because the court’s jurisdiction is limited by the constitution and

, 10 1332, “[t]he threshold requirement for removal under

is a finding that the 11 complaint contains a cause of action that is within the original jurisdiction of the district 12 court.” Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Toumajian 13 v. Frailey,

(9th Cir. 1998)). Thus, “it is to be presumed that a cause lies 14 outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the contrary 15 rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA,

, 1042 16 (9th Cir. 2009). 17 Upon notice of removability, a defendant has thirty days to remove a case to federal court 18 once he knows or should have known that the case was removable. Durham v. Lockheed Martin 19 Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing

(b)(2)). Defendants are not 20 charged with notice of removability “until they’ve received a paper that gives them enough 21 information to remove.”

. 22 Specifically, “the ‘thirty day time period [for removal] . . . starts to run from defendant’s 23 receipt of the initial pleading only when that pleading affirmatively reveals on its face’ the facts 24 necessary for federal court jurisdiction.”

at 1250 (quoting Harris v. Bankers Life & Casualty 25 Co.,

, 690–91 (9th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original)). “Otherwise, the thirty-day 26 clock doesn’t begin ticking until a defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended pleading, motion, 27 order or other paper’ from which it can determine that the case is removable.”

(quoting 28

(b)(3)). 1 A plaintiff may challenge removal by timely filing a motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1447(c). On a motion to remand, the removing defendant must overcome the “strong 3 presumption against removal jurisdiction” and establish that removal is proper. Hunter,

at 1042 (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)). Due to this 5 strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of 6 remand to state court.

7 III. Discussion 8 The parties agree that plaintiff’s various discrimination claims clearly assert federal 9 claims within this court’s jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 5; 7; 10). The only point of contention is 10 whether UNLV’s removal was timely. 11 On one hand, plaintiff contends that UNLV received notice of removability “through 12 service or otherwise” when he mailed his initial complaint to UNLV’s general counsel on 13 December 10, 2019. (ECF No. 5 at 2 (quoting

(b)(1))). Thus, by plaintiff’s 14 estimation, UNLV’s thirty-day removal window closed on January 11, 2020.

. On the 15 other hand, UNLV argues that the removal clock did not start ticking until plaintiff properly 16 served UNLV on January 14, 2020. (ECF No. 7 at 4). 17 Although neither party cites it, Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

344 (1999), is directly on point and dispositive of this motion. In Murphy Bros., the plaintiff 19 filed his complaint and, three days later, “faxed a ‘courtesy copy’ of the file-stamped complaint 20 to one of [defendant’s] vice presidents. The parties then engaged in settlement discussions until 21 . . . [plaintiff] officially served [defendant] under local law by certified mail.” Id. at 348. Thirty 22 days after it was served, the defendant in Murphy Bros. removed that case. Id. Plaintiff moved 23 to remand, arguing that the defendant’s time to remove began when he sent a courtesy copy. Id. 24 On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court held that removal was proper, reasoning as 25 follows: 26 We read Congress’ provisions for removal in light of a bedrock principle: An individual or entity named as a defendant is not 27 obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process. Accordingly, 28 we hold that a named defendant's time to remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of 1 the complaint, “through service or otherwise,” after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint 2 unattended by any formal service. 3 Id. at 347-48. 4 The facts before the court indisputably show that UNLV was not properly served until 5 . . . . January 14, 2020, despite the fact that UNLV “provided numerous professional courtesies to 6 [plaintiff Krysa, explicitly informing [p]laintiff Krysa of [his] statutory obligations [regarding 7 service], explaining that UNLV’s attorney was unable to waive service/notice, and providing 8 specific contact information for both the Attorney General’s Office and the Chancellor.” (ECF 9 No. 7 at 4). 10 oo. . . . . . Plaintiff “served” only a courtesy copy by mail, which was ineffective to perfect service 11 on UNLV. Only three days after it was properly served, UNLV removed this action. Thus, the 12 facts so closely resemble those in Murphy Bros. that the court must deny the motion to remand. 13 IV. Conclusion 14 . Accordingly, 15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff's motion to 16 remand (ECE No. 5) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 17 DATED May 8, 2020. 18 CE. (4a) 2. Atallan 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

es C. Mahan District Judge -4-