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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6

7 RAYMOND JACKSON, Case No.: 3:19-cv-00115-MMD-WGC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER

9 v. Re: ECF No. 34

10 STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

11 Defendants.

12 13 Before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 34). Plaintiff 14 bases his motion on the fact that (1) he is unable to afford counsel, and (2) Plaintiff has no access 15 to the law library nor a law clerk for assistance. 16 While any pro se inmate such as Mr. Jackson would likely benefit from services of counsel, 17 that is not the standard this court must employ in determining whether counsel should be appointed. 18 Wood v. Housewright,

(9th Cir. 1990). 19 A litigant in a civil rights action does not have a Sixth Amendment right to appointed 20 counsel. Storseth v. Spellman,

(9th Cir. 1981). The United States Supreme 21 Court has generally stated that although Congress provided relief for violation of one’s civil rights 22 under

, the right to access to the courts is only a right to bring complaints to 23 1 federal court and not a right to discover such claims or even to litigate them effectively once filed 2 with a court. Lewis v. Casey,

(1996). 3 In very limited circumstances, federal courts are empowered to request an attorney to 4 represent an indigent civil litigant. The circumstances in which a court will grant such a request,

5 however, are exceedingly rare, and the court will grant the request under only extraordinary 6 circumstances. United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land,

(9th Cir. 1986); 7 Wilborn v. Escalderon,

(9th Cir. 1986). 8 A finding of such exceptional or extraordinary circumstances requires that the court 9 evaluate both the likelihood of Plaintiff’s success on the merits and the pro se litigant's ability to 10 articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Neither factor is 11 controlling; both must be viewed together in making the finding. Terrell v. Brewer,

, 12 1017 (9th Cir. 1991), citing

. Thus far, Plaintiff has shown an 13 ability to articulate his claims. 14 In the matter of a case's complexity, the Ninth Circuit in Wilborn noted that:

If all that was required to establish successfully the 15 complexity of the relevant issues was a demonstration of the need for development of further facts, practically all 16 cases would involve complex legal issues. Thus, although Wilborn may have found it difficult to 17 articulate his claims pro se, he has neither demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits nor shown that the 18 complexity of the issues involved was sufficient to require designation of counsel. 19 The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the District Court's exercise of discretion in denying 20 the request for appointment of counsel because the Plaintiff failed to establish the case was 21 complex as to facts or law.

. 22 23 2 1 The substantive claims involved in this action are not unduly complex. Plaintiff’s 2 complaint was allowed to proceed on the Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a 3 serious medical need against Defendants Martin, Artington and Munichin. (ECF No. 8 at 9.) 4 Similarly, with respect to the Terrell factors, Plaintiff has failed to convince the court of

5 the likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. In fact, Plaintiff has not discussed this issue 6 whatsoever. 7 The court does not have the power “to make coercive appointments of counsel." 8 Mallard v. U. S. Dist. Ct.,

(1989). Thus, the court can appoint counsel only under 9 exceptional circumstances. Palmer v. Valdez,

(9th Cir. 2009) [cert den 130

(2010)]. Plaintiff has not shown that the exceptional circumstances necessary for 11 appointment of counsel are present in this case. 12 In the exercise of the court's discretion, it DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of 13 Counsel (ECF No. 34). 14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

15 Dated: June 26, 2020. 16 _________________________________ WILLIAM G. COBB 17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 3