1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 RUBY HUNTER, Case No. 2:18-cv-00252-RFB-DJA

8 Plaintiff, ORDER

9 v.

10 NATIONAL RELOCATION VAN LINES; NATIONAL RELOCATION SOLUTIONS, 11 Defendants. 12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Before the Court is Plaintiff Ruby Hunter’s Motion for Default Judgment against 15 Defendants National Relocation Van Lines and National Relocation Solutions. ECF No. 16. 16

17 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 10, 2018. ECF No. 1. On July 31, 2018, the Court 19 issued and order allowing Plaintiff to serve Defendants by publication. ECF No. 9. On September 20 28, 2019, Plaintiff served Defendants by publication. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff moved for entry of 21 default against Defendants, which the clerk entered on August 19, 2019. ECF Nos. 13,14. 22

23 III. FACTUAL BACKGROUN 24 In the complaint, Hunter alleges the following: 25 Hunter contracted with National Relocation Solutions (NRS) to ship her items from Indiana 26 to Las Vegas. However, NRS did not actually move her items and instead sub-contracted National 27 Relocation Van Lines (“NRVL”) to handle the move. When Hunter found NRVL online she 28 1 received a quote for a 26-foot trailer from a Kyle Parker for $4,375.55. Hunter listed 84 items she 2 wanted delivered to Las Vegas and Parker represented that all those items would be delivered to 3 her new home. Therefore, Hunter agreed to pay a deposit of $1,640.90 and executed an online 4 contract. Hunter was to pay $1,640.90 at pick up and make a final payment of $1,640.90 when the 5 furniture was delivered. Parker instructed Hunter that the company would only accept credit cards, 6 money orders, and cashier checks. Hunter agreed to pay by credit card. 7 NRS arranged for pick up of the items on August 28, 2015 and delivery was scheduled for 8 September 22, 2015. On August 28, 2015, the pickup truck arrived and the driver informed Hunter 9 that she had to pay more because she was over the cubic-feet limit. The driver quoted Hunter an 10 additional $3,307.50 and would not move her items unless she agreed to pay. Hunter called NRVL 11 to review the agree-upon quote she discussed with Parker but was informed that he no longer 12 worked there. Hunter reluctantly agreed to pay the driver $3,307.50 and was assured that there 13 would be no more charges. 14 On September 22, 2015, the agreed-upon delivery date in Las Vegas, NRVL did not deliver 15 Hunter’s items. Hunter contacted NRVL to no avail. Eventually NRVL informed Hunter that they 16 would deliver her items by October 3, 2015 but they never came. NRVL called and rescheduled 17 delivery for October 13, 2015. The pickup truck came on October 13, 2015 and NRVL’s drivers 18 and movers charged Hunter an additional fee because she lived at a “distance” and on the second 19 floor. The NRVL driver and movers demanded $3,500 cash and refused to let her have her 20 belongings until she paid them. Hunter reluctantly paid NRVL the cash and the driver refused to 21 give Hunter a bill of landing, receipt, or any paperwork. Instead of a total quoted move of 22 $4,375.55, Hunter ended up paying $7,858.75 23 24 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 25 The granting of a default judgment is a two-step process directed by Rule 55 of the Federal 26 Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; Eitel v. McCool,

(9th Cir. 1986). 27 The first step is an entry of clerk's default based on a showing, by affidavit or otherwise, that the 28 party against whom the judgment is sought “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ.

(a). The second step is default judgment under Rule 55(b), a decision which lies within the 2 discretion of the Court. Aldabe v. Aldabe,

(9th Cir. 1980). Factors which a 3 court, in its discretion, may consider in deciding whether to grant a default judgment include: (1) 4 the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the substantive claims, (3) the 5 sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at stake, (5) the possibility of a dispute of 6 material fact, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the Federal Rules’ 7 strong policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. 8 If an entry of default is made, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the 9 complaint as true; however, conclusions of law and allegations of fact that are not well-pleaded 10 will not be deemed admitted by the defaulted party. DirecTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh,

, 11 854 (9th Cir. 2007). Additionally, the Court does not accept factual allegations relating to the 12 amount of damages as true. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp.,

, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Default 13 establishes a party's liability, but not the amount of damages claimed in the pleading. Id. 14 The district court may determine the amount of damages without an evidentiary hearing 15 where “the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or capable of mathematical calculation." Davis v. 16 Fendler,

(9th Cir. 1981). 17 18 V. DISCUSSION 19 In considering the seven Eitel factors, the Court finds default judgment against Defendants 20 is warranted. The first and sixth factors favor granting default judgment because Defendants failed 21 to defend or appear at all in this matter since being served with the summons by publication. Their 22 failure to appear for the past two years prejudices Plaintiff by preventing her from recovering the 23 amount she was overcharged for her cross-country move. Further, their failure to appear for the 24 substantial period of time demonstrates the lack of excusable neglect. And while the seventh factor 25 generally counsels against the granting of default judgment Defendants failure to appear prevents 26 the Court from determining the matter on its merits. 27 The second and third factors also favor a grant of default judgment. Plaintiff seeks for 28 Defendants to be held liable for their breach of contract, conversion, negligence, deceptive trade 1 practiced and violation of

as well as the additional $3,483.20 she paid for the 2 move. There are sufficient allegations in the complaint and exhibits attached to this instant motion 3 demonstrating Plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested. Thus, Plaintiff has demonstrated her 4 claims are meritorious. 5 Finally, there is money at stake ($3,483.20) in this action. And while both the Federal 6 Rules' policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits and the amount of money at stake ($3,483.20) 7 caution against the granting of default judgment, the Court does not find that either factor so 8 heavily weighs against entry of default judgment in this instance. See Employee Painters' Tr. v. 9 Ethan Enters., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2007) (upholding entry of $1,030,344.95 default 10 judgment against corporate employer for delinquent contributions under ERISA).Thus, the Court 11 finds the Eitel factors favor the grant of default judgment against Defendants. 12 The Court further finds that Plaintiff has submitted credible evidence to support the amount 13 of damages in this case. The Court has reviewed this evidence and finds her damages to be 14 reasonable and subject to calculation. Davis,

. 15 The Court also finds pursuant to the District’s Local Rules that the Defendants have 16 consented to the granting of this motion by failing to respond. LR 7-2. 17 18 VI. CONCLUSION 19 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment [ECF No. 16] is 20 GRANTED. The Court awards $9,140.20 in damages, and $1,015.00 in costs for a total of 21 $10,155.20. Judgement is entered for damages and costs jointly and severally against Defendants 22 National Relocation Van Lines and National Relocation Solutions. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court enter judgment accordingly and 24 close this case. 25 DATED September 30, 2020.

26 __________________________________ 27 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28