Gioiosa v. Dzurenda
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA ANTHONY MICHAEL GIOIOSA, SR., Case No. 2:20-cv-01805-GMN-VCF
Plaintiff SCREENING ORDER v.
JAMES DZURENDA et al.,
Defendants Plaintiff, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1). The Court now screens Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. (ECF No. 1). Based on the information regarding Plaintiff’s financial status, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not able to pay an initial installment payment toward the full filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 17
1915. Plaintiff will, however, be required to make monthly payments toward the full $350.00 filing fee when he has funds available.
II. SCREENING STANDARD
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person’s claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 19
26 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id.
Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may therefore be dismissed sua sponte if that person’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, as malicious. On September 2, 2020, Plaintiff, proceeding in forma pauperis, initiated a federal lawsuit against Defendants James Dzurenda and Dennis Ware in Gioiosa v. Dzurenda et al, 2:20-cv-01618-APG-DJA.1 On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff, proceeding in forma pauperis, initiated the instant federal lawsuit against Defendants James Dzurenda and Dennis Ware by filing the exact same complaint that he filed in the previous lawsuit. (See 2:20-cv-01805-GMN-VCF at ECF No. 1).
The Court notes that duplicative litigation by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis may be dismissed as malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action
1 On June 21, 2021, U.S. District Judge Andrew Gordon issued a screening order in that case granting Plaintiff leave to amend. (See 2:20-cv-01618-APG-DJA at ECF No. 7). is subject to dismissal as malicious)); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that it is malicious for a “pauper” to file a lawsuit that duplicates allegations of another pending federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff). As such, the Court dismisses the complaint, with prejudice, as malicious. The Court further finds that this dismissal constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (stating that an action dismissed on grounds that the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim constitutes a “strike” under § 1915(g)).
IV. CONCLUSION
It is ordered that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) without having to prepay the full filing fee is granted. Plaintiff will not be required to pay an initial installment fee. Nevertheless, the full filing fee will still be due, pursuant to 28
12 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The movant herein is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of fees or costs or the giving of security therefor. This order granting in forma pauperis status will not extend to the issuance and/or service of subpoenas at government expense.
It is further ordered that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Nevada Department of Corrections will forward payments from the account of Anthony Michael Gioiosa, Sr., #1170052 to the Clerk of the United States District Court, District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month's deposits (in months that the account exceeds $10.00) until the full $350 filing fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk of the Court will send a copy of this order to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office. The Clerk will send a copy of this order to the attention of Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 7011, Carson City, NV 89702.
It is further ordered that, even if this action is dismissed, or is otherwise unsuccessful, the full filing fee will still be due, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court file the complaint (ECF No. 1-1). It is further ordered that the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice, as malicious. This dismissal constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 3
It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court close the case and enter judgment accordingly.
It is further ordered that this Court certifies that any in forma pauperis appeal from this order would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
DATED THIS _____ day of June 2021.
Gloria M. Navarro, Judge United States District Court
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.