1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 RAUL DIAZ, Case No.: 2:21-cv-01085-APG-DJA

4 Plaintiff Order

5 v.

6 NICK, et al.,

7 Defendants

8

9 Plaintiff Raul Diaz brings this civil-rights action under

to redress 10 constitutional violations he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. 11 ECF No. 1-1. On November 24, 2021, the magistrate judge ordered Diaz to file his current 12 address and a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis within 30 days. ECF No. 5. 13 That deadline expired without an updated address from Diaz, and his mail from the court was 14 returned as undeliverable. See ECF No. 6. 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 16 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 17 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 18 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 19 Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 20 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 21 Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 22 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) 23 1 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 2 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone

5 v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 7 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Diaz’s claims. The third 8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption 9 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the 10 court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The 11 fourth factor, the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, is greatly 12 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 14 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish

15 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 18 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 19 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 20 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 21 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 22 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 23 Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the court and the defendants to send Diaz case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Diaz is low, so issuing second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s finite resources. 5} Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. I find that these factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 7 I therefore order that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Diaz’s failure to file an updated address in compliance with this court’s November 24, 2021, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be 10|| filed in this now-closed case. If Diaz wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a 11||new case and provide the court with his current address. 12 Dated: February 15, 2022 13 U.S. District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23