Vaoga v. Ely State Prison

District Court, D. Nevada

Vaoga v. Ely State Prison

Trial Court Opinion

2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 COLEMAN JEFFERSON VAOGA, Case No. 3:21-cv-00342-RCJ-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 ELY STATE PRISON, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Coleman Jefferson Vaoga brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated 14 at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 1-1.) On August 10, 2021, this Court ordered Coleman 15 Jefferson Vaoga to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP 16 application") or pay the full $402 filing fee on or before October 12, 2021. (ECF No. 4.) 17 The Court warned Coleman Jefferson Vaoga that the action could be dismissed if he 18 failed to file a fully complete IFP application with all three documents or pay the full $402 19 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 3.) The October 12, 2021 deadline 20 expired and Coleman Jefferson Vaoga did not file a fully complete IFP application or pay 21 the full $402 filing fee. Because Coleman Jefferson Vaoga submitted an incomplete IFP 22 application on August 16, 2021 (ECF No. 5), the Court considered meaningful alternatives 23 to dismissal and issued another order on January 21, 2022 granting Plaintiff one final 24 opportunity to submit a fully complete IFP application that included an inmate account 25 statement for the previous six-month period by the deadline of February 21, 2022. (ECF 26 No. 12.) On January 28, 2022, Coleman Jefferson Vaoga once again submitted an 27 incomplete IFP application that did not include a Financial Certificate (page 4 of this 28 court's application) or an inmate account statement for the previous six-month period. 2 Vaoga submitted two letters (ECF Nos. 15, 16) that did not appear to request any further 3 extension of time to file a fully complete IFP application. Therefore, the February 21, 4 2022 deadline has now expired and Coleman Jefferson Vaoga still has not filed a fully 5 complete IFP application or paid the full $402 filing fee. 6 I. DISCUSSION 7 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 8 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 9 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

782 F.2d 829

, 831 10 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 11 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41

(9th Cir. 12 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 13 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th 14 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 15 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 16 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 17 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 18 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 19 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d 1217, 1226

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 20 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th Cir. 1987)). 21 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 22 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Coleman 23 Jefferson Vaoga's claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in 24 favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of 25 unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See 26 Anderson v. Air West,

542 F.2d 522, 524

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public 27 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors 28 favoring dismissal. 2 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 3 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 4 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 5 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

291 F.3d 639

, 643 & n.4 (9th 6 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 7 “implicitly accepted pursuit of last drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 8 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 9 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 10 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 11 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

12 F.2d 1421

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 13 unless Coleman Jefferson Vaoga either files a fully complete IFP application or pays the 14 $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a third order setting another 15 deadline. But the reality of repeating two ignored orders is that it often only delays the 16 inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not 17 indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Coleman Jefferson Vaoga 18 needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s order. Setting a third 19 deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor 20 favors dismissal. 21 II. CONCLUSION 22 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 23 weigh in favor of dismissal. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is dismissed 24 without prejudice based on Coleman Jefferson Vaoga's failure to file a fully complete IFP 25 application or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s August 10, 2021 26 and January 21, 2022, orders. 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions (ECF Nos. 5, 6, 14) are 28 denied. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment 2 || accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed 3 || case. If Coleman Jefferson Vaoga wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint 4 || in anew case. 5 DATED THIS 16th day of March 2022. 6

RO T ©. JORES 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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