1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Kwame Gaines, Case No. 2:21-cv-02044-JAD-EJY

5 Plaintiff v. 6 Order Dismissing Officer Khabro, et al., and Closing Case 7 Defendants 8 9 Plaintiff Kwame Gaines brings this civil-rights lawsuit to redress constitutional violations 10 that he claims he suffered while detained at Clark County Detention Center. On February 22, 11 2022, this court ordered the plaintiff to update his address and file a non-prisoner application to 12 proceed in forma pauperis by March 24, 2022.1 That deadline expired without an updated 13 address or a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis from the plaintiff, and his 14 mail from this court is being returned as undeliverable.2 15 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets, and “[i]n the exercise of 16 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case.3 A 17 court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local 18 rules.4 In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must 19

20 1 ECF No. 3. 21 2 ECF No. 4. 3 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). 22 4 See Carey v. King,

, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 23 Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 1 consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 2 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 3 disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.5 4 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the

5 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. The 6 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 7 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 8 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action.6 The fourth factor—the public policy favoring 9 disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 11 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal.7 Courts 12 “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must 13 explore possible and meaningful alternatives.”8 Because this action cannot realistically proceed 14 without the ability for the court and the defendants to send plaintiff case-related documents,

15 filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But 16 without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach the plaintiff is 17

18 5 In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 19 6 See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). 20 7 Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); 21 accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic 22 alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to 23 comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 8 Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). 1}| low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s 2\| finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 4 Having thoroughly weighed these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 5] dismissal. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that THIS ACTION IS DISMISSED without prejudice based on the plaintiff's failure to file an updated address or a non-prisoner application 7|| to proceed in forma pauperis in compliance with this court’s February 22, 2022, order. The Clerk of the Court is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT accordingly and CLOSE THIS CASE. If plaintiff Kwame Gaines wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide the court with his current address. Dated: April 13, 2022 IY me □□ USS. District Judge lifer A. borsey 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23