Williams v. NNCC
Williams v. NNCC
Trial Court Opinion
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 TERRANCE E. WILLIAMS, Case No. 3:22-cv-00048-RCJ-CLB
5 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING AND CLOSING v. CASE 6 N.N.C.C. 7 Defendant. 8 9 Plaintiff Terrance Williams brings this civil-rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Northern 11 Nevada Correctional Center. (ECF No. 1-1). On January 28, 2022, this Court ordered 12 Williams to file a complaint and either a fully complete application to proceed in forma 13 pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee on or before March 29, 2022. (ECF No. 3). The 14 Court warned Williams that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete 15 application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay the full $402 16 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 3). That deadline expired and Williams 17 did not file a complaint and either a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis 18 or pay the full $402 filing fee. Nor did Williams otherwise respond to the Court’s order. 19 I. DISCUSSION 20 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 21 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 22 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,
782 F.2d 829, 831 23 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 24 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,
856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41(9th Cir. 25 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 26 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,
833 F.2d 128, 130(9th 27 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 28 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 2 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,
460 F.3d 1217, 1226(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 5 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
833 F.2d 128, 130(9th Cir. 1987)). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 7 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissing Williams’s 8 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 9 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 10 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542
11 F.2d 522, 524(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 12 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 14 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 15 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,
191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 16 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 17 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,
291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 18 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 19 “implicitly accepted pursuit of last drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 20 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 21 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 22 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 23 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779
24 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 25 unless Williams files a complaint and either a fully complete application to proceed in 26 forma pauperis or pays the $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter 27 a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is 28 that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The 1 || circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint 2 || that Williams needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s order. 3 || Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So 4 || the fifth factor favors dismissal. 5 || Ul. CONCLUSION 6 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 7 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 8 || prejudice based on Williams’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in 9 || forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s January 28, 10 || 2022, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this 11 || case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Williams wishes to 12 || pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 13 14 DATED THIS 9th day of _ May 2022. 15 ; 16 . OBERT C. MNES 17 UNITED STAFES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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