2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 EDGAR UMANSOR, Case No. 2:21-cv-01805-RFB-NJK

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Edgar Umansor brings this civil-rights action under

to 13 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High 14 Desert State Prison. (ECF No. 1-1.) On October 5, 2021, this Court ordered Edgar 15 Umansor to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full 16 $402 filing fee on or before December 3, 2021. (ECF No. 3.) On December 20, 2021, 17 following receipt of a letter from Edgar Umansor (ECF No. 4), this Court extended Edgar 18 Umansor's deadline to January 19, 2022 to either file a fully complete application to 19 proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee. The Court warned Edgar 20 Umansor that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application 21 to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay the full $402 filing fee for a 22 civil action by the January 19, 2022 deadline. (Id. at 2.) That deadline expired and Edgar 23 Umansor did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the 24 full $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 25 I. DISCUSSION 26 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 27 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 28 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

, 831 2 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 3 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 4 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th 5 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 6 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 7 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 8 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 9 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 10 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 12 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 13 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Edgar 14 Umansor's claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor 15 of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable 16 delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. 17 Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring 18 disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring 19 dismissal. 20 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 21 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 22 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 23 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 24 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th 25 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 26 “implicitly accepted pursuit of last drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 27 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 28 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 1 || Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 2 || case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 3 || F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 4 || unless Edgar Umansor either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma 5 || pauperis or pays the $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a third 6 || order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often 7 || only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances 8 || here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Edgar 9 || Umansor needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s order. 10 || Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So 11 || the fifth factor favors dismissal. 12 || Il. CONCLUSION 13 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 14 || weigh in favor of dismissal. 15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is dismissed without prejudice 16 || based on Edgar Umansor's failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 17 || pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s December 20, 2021, 18 || order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 19 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Edgar Umansor wishes to 20 || pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 21 DATED: May 13, 2022. 22 A 23 RICHARD F. LWARE, Il 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28