2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

4

5 STEPHAN DARRELL WILLIAMSON, Case No. 2:21-cv-02136-CDS-DJA

6 Plaintiff SCREENING ORDER

v. 7

8 LAS VEGAS POLICE DEPARTMENT et al.,

9 Defendants

10 11 Plaintiff Stephan Darrell Williamson, who was formerly incarcerated in the custody of 12 the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint 13 pursuant to

, and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 14 1-1, 4). The Court now screens Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 15 I. SCREENING STANDARD 16 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner 17 seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 18 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 19 claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 20 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 21 Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

(9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege two 23 essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 24 States, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state 25 law. See West v. Atkins,

(1988). 26 In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison 27 Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a federal court must dismiss a prisoner’s claim, if “the allegation 28 of poverty is untrue,” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which 2 relief.”

(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 3 relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court 4 applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an 5 amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be 6 given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear 7 from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. 8 United States,

(9th Cir. 1995). 9 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. 10 Corp. of America,

(9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper 11 only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that 12 would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker,

(9th Cir. 1999). In making 13 this determination, the court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, 14 and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma 15 Corp.,

(9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less 16 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe,

, 9 17 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a 18 plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient.

20 Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, 21 because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 22 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of 23 a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.”

“When there are well-pleaded 24 factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 25 plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

“Determining whether a complaint states a 26 plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 27 on its judicial experience and common sense.”

28 2 if the prisoner’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based 3 on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from 4 suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims 5 based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 6

(1989); see also McKeever v. Block,

(9th Cir. 1991). 7 II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 8 In the complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple Defendants for events that took place while 9 Plaintiff was detained by the Las Vegas Police Department and subsequently incarcerated by 10 NDOC. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Plaintiff sues Defendants Las Vegas Police Department, Clark County 11 Detention Center, AFIS-Criminal Justice Information Division of the FBI Headquarters, Lakes 12 Crossing, and NDOC.

Plaintiff brings one count and seeks monetary relief. Id. at 1-12. 13 The complaint alleges the following: On March 3, 2017, Plaintiff was arrested in Las 14 Vegas. Id. at 1. The arresting officers somehow mixed-up Plaintiff’s identification with someone 15 else’s. Id. at 2. Plaintiff, whose name is Stephan Darrell Williamson, was booked under the name 16 Jerry Dennard Holloway. Id. Plaintiff attempted to make officers aware of the mix-up, but he 17 was placed into a psychiatric patient holding cell and told that he is now Jerry Holloway. Id. 18 Plaintiff’s fingerprints were taken, but the AFIS fingerprint machine failed to identify his 19 fingerprints, even though his fingerprints were in the system from a prison term in Arizona. Id. at 20 2-3. 21 Plaintiff was transported to Clark County Detention Center, and he spent several 22 months there while attending court hearings. Id. at 4. No one believed that Plaintiff was Stephan 23 Darrell Williamson. Id. The judge ordered that Plaintiff undergo a mental health evaluation, and 24 he was taken to a private airport and transported by a private jet to Lake’s Crossing, where he 25 was admitted under the name Jerry Holloway. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff was given various psychiatric 26 medications and came to believe that he was Jerry Holloway. Id. at 5. 27 Plaintiff’s mother sent Lake’s Crossing documents proving that he was Stephan 28 Williamson, not Jerry Holloway, and Lake’s Crossing immediately had him transported by 2 new lawyer who provided the judge documents proving that he was Stephan Williamson. Id. 3 But the judge simply said, “The paperwork has already been started and filed so as long as 4 Stephan Darrell Williamson is in the Nevada Department of Corrections his name will be Jerry 5 Dennard Holloway.” Id. at 6-7. 6 The judge did not provide any further explanation and sentenced Plaintiff to 60 months 7 imprisonment under the name Jerry Holloway. Id. at 7. Stephan Williamson was added to 8 Plaintiff’s prison file as a pseudonym, apparently in an attempt to cover up the issue. Id. at 7-8. 9 Plaintiff completed his term of imprisonment and was released about three years later. Id. at 8-9. 10 Since Plaintiff’s release, he has been diagnosed with multiple psychiatric mental health 11 disorders and is undergoing mental health treatment. Id. at 9. Plaintiff believes that the mistaken 12 identity led to a wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Id. Jerry Holloway is a much older man 13 in his 60s and looks nothing like Plaintiff. Id. 14 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff claims that his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and 15 Fourteenth Amendments were violated, and that he is entitled to compensation under 28 U.S.C. 16 § 2513, as well as Nevada Statutes. The Court will consider Plaintiff’s claims in turn. 17 A. Federal Claims 18

provides the standard for bringing a claim of unjust conviction and 19 imprisonment for an offense against the United States under

Plaintiff does not 20 articulate the specific claims that he is bringing under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth, but 21 based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears that any claims are based on an allegedly 22 unconstitutional conviction and imprisonment. 23 In Heck v. Humphrey,

(1994), the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover 24 damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm 25 caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 26 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, 27

28 1 Although it does not affect my analysis, I note that Plaintiff was not convicted or imprisoned for a crime against the United States. Rather, he was convicted and imprisoned under the laws of the State of 2 determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28

.”

. “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 4 sentence that has not been . . . invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487. “Thus, 5 when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a 6 judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 7 sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that 8 the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. 9 Plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned. Such a claim must be 10 brought in a petition for habeas corpus. The Court acknowledges that, if it were to dismiss this 11 case and direct Plaintiff to file a habeas corpus petition, Plaintiff could not do so because he is no 12 longer in custody. In Guerrero v. Gates, the Ninth Circuit discussed exceptions to Heck's bar for 13 plaintiffs no longer in custody.

, 704 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit explained 14 the following: 15 Although we held in Nonnette2 that the plaintiff could bring § 1983 claims 16 despite the Heck bar because habeas relief was unavailable, we did so because 17 Nonnette, unlike Cunningham, timely pursued appropriate relief from prior 18 convictions. Nonnette was founded on the unfairness of barring a plaintiff’s 19 potentially legitimate constitutional claims when the individual immediately 20 pursued relief after the incident giving rise to those claims and could not seek 21 habeas relief only because of the shortness of his prison sentence. In reversing the 22 district court’s dismissal of Nonnette’s § 1983 claims, we stated: 23 The fact that Nonnette has been released from the incarceration that his 24 civil suit, if successful, would impugn, and that a habeas petition would be moot 25 for that reason, differentiates this case from our recent decision in Cunningham v. 26 Gates3. In Cunningham, the plaintiff brought a civil suit that would have impugned 27 the conviction for which he was still incarcerated; habeas corpus was unavailable 28 2 Nonnette v. Small,

(9th Cir. 2002). 2 circumstances, we declined to take the case out of the rule of Heck. 3 Thus, a § 1983 plaintiff’s timely pursuit of available habeas relief is 4 important. Even so, we emphasized that Nonnette’s relief from Heck “affects only 5 former prisoners challenging loss of good-time credits, revocation of parole or 6 similar matters,” not challenges to an underlying conviction such as those 7 Guerrero brought. 8 We find Guerrero’s situation to resemble Cunningham more closely than 9 Nonnette. Guerrero never challenged his convictions by any means prior to filing 10 this lawsuit. Nearly three years passed from his last encounter with the LAPD 11 before he took any action at all. His failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self- 12 imposed. Thus, as in Cunningham, though habeas relief for Guerrero may be 13 “impossible as a matter of law,” we decline to extend the relaxation of Heck’s 14 requirements. Guerrero cannot now use his “failure timely to pursue habeas 15 remedies” as a shield against the implications of Heck. Accordingly, we hold that 16 Heck bars Guerrero’s § 1983 claims of wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and 17 conspiracy. 18 Id. at 705. 19 I find that, Heck bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Plaintiff seeks damages based on the 20 allegation that a case of mistaken identity led to an unconstitutional conviction and 21 imprisonment. Based on the allegations in the complaint Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence were 22 not invalidated. To the contrary, Plaintiff specifically alleges that he served out the majority of 23 his sentence before being released. The allegations in the complaint do not support that Plaintiff 24 diligently pursued habeas corpus relief while incarcerated. Rather, Plaintiff brought his action 25 for monetary damages in December 2021, almost five years after his initial arrest, and almost two 26 years after his release.4 Furthermore, Plaintiff seeks to invalidate his conviction, not challenge 27 good time credits. As such, the Nonnette exception does not apply to this case, and Heck bars 28 2 Heck-barred, and amendment would be futile. 3 B. State Law Claims 4 Plaintiff also brings claims under NRS 200.460 and NRS 200.640, which Plaintiff 5 describes as Nevada’s wrongful conviction compensation act and Nevada’s wrongfully 6 imprisoned statute. (ECF No. 1-1 at 10.) In civil actions in which federal district courts have 7 original jurisdiction, “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 8 claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 9 part of the same case or controversy.”

(a). But a district court may decline to 10 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over 11 which it has original jurisdiction.”

(c)(3). 12 Because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal claims the Court will not 13 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims. As such, the Court 14 dismisses Plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice, but without leave to amend in this case. 15 If Plaintiff wishes to pursue state law claims regarding his conviction and imprisonment, he 16 must do so in state court.5 17 III. CONCLUSION 18 For the forgoing reasons, it is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court file Plaintiff’s 19 complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and send Plaintiff a courtesy copy of the complaint. 20 It is further ordered Plaintiff’s federal claims alleging that he was wrongfully convicted 21 and imprisoned are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey because amendment 22 would be futile. 23 It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed without prejudice, but 24 without leave to amend, due to a lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff must pursue any state law claims 25 in state court. 26 It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) is 27 denied as moot. 28 2 order would not be taken “in good faith” under

(a)(3). 3 It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court close this case and enter judgment 4 accordingly. 5 6 DATED this 27th day of May, 2022.

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28