2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 SHAWN RAE HANCOCK, Case No. 3:22-cv-00218-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 WASHOE COUNTY, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Pro Se Plaintiff Shawn Hancock brings this action under

and the 13 Americans with Disabilities Act to redress civil-rights violations he claims he suffered while 14 incarcerated at the Washoe County Detention Facility. (ECF No. 4.) On June 6, 2022, the 15 Court ordered Hancock to file an amended complaint by July 6, 2022. (ECF No. 3 at 12.) 16 The Court warned Hancock that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an 17 amended complaint by that deadline. (Id.) That deadline expired, and Hancock did not file 18 an amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 20 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 21 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.,

(9th Cir. 22 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 23 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) 24 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 25 court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 26 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss 27 an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 28 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 2 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 3 Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

). 4 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 5 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Hancock’s 6 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 7 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 8 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air W., 542

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 10 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 11 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 12 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 13 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 14 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 15 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th 16 Cir. 2002) (explaining “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly 17 accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 18 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the 19 warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need 20 not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must 21 explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

, 22 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 23 Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Hancock files an 24 amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another 25 deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the 26 inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not 27 indicate that this case will be an exception as there is no hint Hancock needs additional 28 time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening order. Setting another 1 || deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. Thus, the fifth factor 2 || favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds 3 || that they weigh in favor of dismissal. 4 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 5 || Plaintiff Shawn Hancock’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this 6 || Court's June 6, 2022 order and for failure to state a claim. 7 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 8 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Hancock wishes to pursue 9 || his claims, Hancock must file a complaint in a new case. 10 DATED THIS 19" Day of July 2022. 11 12 —

14 MIRANBAW DU 15 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28