1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 RAMIRO CAMACHO, JR, Case No.: 2:22-cv-00860-APG-DJA

4 Plaintiff Order

5 v.

6 NEVADA GOVERNOR SISOLAK,

7 Defendant

8

9 Plaintiff Ramiro Camacho, Jr. brings this civil-rights action under

to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert 11 State Prison. ECF No. 1-1. On June 3, 2022, the magistrate judge ordered Camacho to file a 12 complaint and file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 13 filing fee on or before August 1, 2022. ECF No. 4. The magistrate judge warned Camacho that 14 the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a complaint and file a fully complete application 15 to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay the full $402 filing fee for a civil 16 action by that deadline.

. That deadline expired and Camacho did not file a complaint, 17 file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $402 filing fee, or 18 otherwise respond. 19 I. Discussion 20 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 21 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 22 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 23 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 1 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 2 Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 3 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) 4 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its

5 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 6 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 7 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone 8 v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 9 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 10 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Camacho’s claims. The 11 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 12 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 13 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th 14 Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is

15 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 16 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 17 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 18 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 19 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 20 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 21 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 22 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 23 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 1}| been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 3|| Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed 4|| until and unless Camacho files a complaint and either files a fully complete application to 5|| proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that 7\\ it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court’s finite resources. The circumstances 8|| here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Camacho needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the court’s order. Setting another deadline is a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. Conclusion 12 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 13]| dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 14||Camacho’s failure to file a complaint and file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 15|| pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with the magistrate judge’s June 3, 2022, 16|| order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other 17|| documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Camacho wishes to pursue his claims, he 18]|| must file a complaint in a new case. 19 Dated: August 15, 2022 20 La. U.S. District Judge 21 22 23