1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY Case No. 2:22-CV-1474 JCM (DJA) COMPANY, et al., 8 ORDER Plaintiff(s), 9 v. 10 ANDRES SANCHEZ, et al., 11 Defendant(s). 12

13 Presently before the court are Bankers Life and Casualty Company and Bankers Life 14 Securities, Inc. (collectively, “plaintiffs”)’s motions for a temporary restraining order and 15 preliminary injunction (ECF Nos 3; 4). Andres Sanchez and Berenice Diaz (collectively, 16 “plaintiffs”) failed to respond, and the time to do so has now passed. 17 I. Background 18 Defendants are former employees of Bankers Life and Casualty Company, an insurance 19 company. (ECF No. 1). During their employment, defendants had access to a database 20 containing customer information, including personal data, applicable policies and products, and 21 policyholder goals. (Id.) Allegedly, defendants downloaded copies of some of the records in 22 that customer database after they each resigned their employment. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that this 23 downloading of data contravened employment agreements and data security agreements that 24 each defendant had executed as a condition of employment. (Id.) 25 Further, plaintiffs allege that the data each defendant downloaded constitutes trade secret 26 information. (Id.) Further, plaintiffs contend that defendants are using that customer data to 27 convince plaintiffs’ customers to defect to defendants’ current employer. (Id.) Plaintiffs now 28 1 bring this motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent 2 defendants from using that allegedly misappropriated data and to compel its return. (ECF Nos. 3 3; 4). 4 II. Legal Standard 5 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may issue a temporary restraining 6 order (“TRO”) when the movant alleges “specific facts in an affidavit” that immediate and 7 irreparable harm will occur before the adverse party can be heard in opposition. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 65(b)(1)(A). TROs and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies meant to “preserve 9 the status quo” and “prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment.” Estes v. Gaston, No. 10 2:12-cv-1853-JCM-VCF,

, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2012); see also Sierra On- 11 Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1984). The standard for 12 granting a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard for granting a preliminary injunction. 13 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,

, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 The court considers the following elements in determining whether to grant preliminary 15 injunctive relief: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable injury if 16 preliminary relief is not granted; (3) balance of hardships; and (4) advancement of the public 17 interest. Winter v. N.R.D.C.,

(2008); Stanley v. Univ. of S. California,

(9th Cir. 1994). 19 The movant must satisfy all four elements; however, “a stronger showing of one element 20 may offset a weaker showing of another.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011). This “sliding scale” approach dictates that when the balance of 22 hardships weighs heavily in the movant’s favor, he only needs to demonstrate “serious questions 23 going to the merits.” Id. at 1135. Yet, “[o]f course, plaintiffs must also satisfy the other Winter 24 factors.” Id. 25 III. Discussion 26 Having considered the Winter factors, the court DENIES plaintiffs’ motions for a 27 temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF Nos. 3; 4); primarily because they 28 fail to show a likelihood of irreparable injury. 1 Though plaintiffs aver that they risk irreparable harm from defendants’ use of allegedly 2 | confidential information, plaintiffs have provided nothing to substantiate that claim. While plaintiffs need only show a likelihood—trather than a probability—of irreparable harm, their 4) conclusory allegations of some unauthorized disclosure are unavailing. Plaintiffs provide no 5 | evidence that defendants have actually disclosed or used any of the allegedly misappropriated 6| data.' Without more, plaintiff fails to allege any harm, much less irreparable harm. 7 Without a likelihood of irreparable harm, plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief 8 | under the traditional or sliding scale approach. See Cottrell,

. 9| IV. Conclusion 10 Accordingly, 11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiffs’ motions for a 12 | temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF Nos. 3; 4) be, and the same hereby 13 are, DENIED. 14 DATED September 30, 2022. 15 ME ws 0. Atala 16 UN ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2, 00° 2, 0,0 ' Indeed, plaintiffs’ only evidence of any misappropriation of data are two unintelligible “download reports” that give no indication of what specific data was downloaded nor what potential customers were affected. See (ECF No. 1-11; 1-12). It is unclear from this evidence 28 | whether the customer Diaz tried to convince to defect was even a part of the alleged download. See (ECF No. 1-13). es C. Mahan District Judge -3-