2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 NICHOLAS NEAL, Case No. 3:22-cv-00349-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF 9 CORRECTIONS, et al.,

10 Defendants.

11

12 Pro se Plaintiff Nicholas Neal, who was formerly an inmate in the custody of the 13 Nevada Department of Corrections, brought this civil-rights action under

14 to redress constitutional violations that allegedly occurred at Northern Nevada 15 Correctional Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On October 17, 2022, this Court ordered Neal to 16 update his address and file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis by 17 November 16, 2022. (ECF No. 5.) That deadline expired without an updated address or 18 a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis from Neal, and his mail from this 19 Court is being returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 6.) 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets, and “[i]n the 22 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 23 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

, 831 24 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 25 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 26 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 27 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 28 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss 2 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 3 of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 4 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 5 Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal 6 Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 8 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Neal’s 9 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 10 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 11 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 13 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 15 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 16 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 17 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 18 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th 19 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 20 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 21 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 23 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 24 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without 26 the ability for the Court and the defendants to send Neal case-related documents, filings, 27 and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But 28 without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Neal 1 || is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the 2 || Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given 3 || these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. || Il. CONCLUSION 5 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 6 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 7 || prejudice based on Neal's failure to file an updated address or a non-prisoner application 8 || to proceed in forma pauperis in compliance with this Court’s October 17, 2022 order. The 9 || Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other 10 || documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Neal wishes to pursue his claims, he 11 || must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with his current address. 12 DATED THIS 21* Day of November 2022.

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