1

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 EMERALD WILSON-BEY, Case No. 2:22-cv-00493-ART-BNW 5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 CORRECTIONS CORP. AMERICA, et al., 8 Defendants. 9 10 I. DISCUSSION 11 Plaintiff Emerald Wilson-Bey initiated this case with an incomplete 12 application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP application”) and a civil rights 13 complaint. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1.) The Court denied the incomplete IFP application 14 and ordered Plaintiff to file a complete IFP application within 60 days. (ECF No. 15 3.) Plaintiff did not file a complete IFP application, or otherwise respond to the 16 Court’s order, and the Court dismissed this case without prejudice. (ECF No. 5.) 17 Plaintiff has filed a motion requesting that this case be sealed “for privacy, 18 defamatory and also exploitative reasons.” (ECF No. 7.) Historically, courts have 19 recognized a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 20 including judicial records and documents.” See Kamakana v. City and County of 21 Honolulu,

(9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and 22 citation omitted). Documents that have been traditionally kept secret, including 23 grand jury transcripts and warrant materials in a pre-indictment investigation, 24 come within an exception to the general right of public access. See

Otherwise, 25 “a strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.”

(internal 26 quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 “A party seeking to seal a judicial record then bears the burden of 28 overcoming this strong presumption by meeting the ‘compelling reasons’ 1 || standard,” which means the party must “articulate[| compelling reasons 2 || supported by specific factual findings . . . that outweigh the general history of 3 || access and the public policies favoring disclosure.”

(internal quotation marks 4 || and citations omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh 5 || the public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when 6 || such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the 7 || use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous 8 || statements, or release trade secrets.” Jd. at 1179. 9 Plaintiffs vague reference to privacy, defamation, and exploitation is not a 10 || sufficiently compelling reason to seal any records in this case. The only records 11 || in this case are Plaintiff's complaint, and the Court’s orders. Plaintiff does not 12 || explain how any of these records have, or could, become a vehicle for an improper 13 || purpose. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is denied without prejudice. 14 || I. CONCLUSION 15 It is therefore ordered that Plaintiff's motion to seal this case (ECF No. 7) is 16 || denied. 17 18 DATED THIS 20th day of December 2022. 19 eset ex 20 ANNE'R. TRAUM 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28