1

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

4 FRANKLIN RYAN, Case No. 3:22-cv-00445-ART-CSD

5 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 6 WASHOE COUNTY, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 Pro se Plaintiff Franklin Ryan brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 11 incarcerated at the Washoe County Detention Facility. (ECF No. 1-1). On October 12 11, 2022, this Court ordered Plaintiff to file a fully complete application to proceed 13 in forma pauperis (“IFP application”) or pay the full $402 filing fee by December 14 12, 2022. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff was warned the action could be dismissed if he 15 failed to file a fully complete IFP application with all three documents or pay the 16 full $402 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 2). The deadline 17 expired, and Plaintiff did not file a fully complete IFP application or pay the full 18 $402 filing fee. Additionally, the Court’s mail to Plaintiff has been returned as 19 undeliverable because he has not updated the Court with his current address. 20 (ECF No. 4). 21 DISCUSSION 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets, and “[i]n 23 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 24 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 25 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 26 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 27 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 28 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 1 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 2 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 3 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 4 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 5 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 6 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 7 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 8 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 9 Cir. 1987)). 10 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 11 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 12 dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 13 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 14 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 15 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 16 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 17 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 18 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 19 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 20 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 21 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 22 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 23 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 24 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 25 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 26 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 27 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 28 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 1 || dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 2 || Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action 3 || cannot realistically proceed until and unless Plaintiff either files a fully complete 4 || IFP application or pays the $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is 5 || to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an 6 || ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s 7 || finite resources. And because the Court’s mail to Plaintiff has been returned as 8 || undeliverable, the chance that the order will reach him is low. Setting another 9 || deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 10 || factor favors dismissal. 11} Il. CONCLUSION 12 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 13 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 14 || dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to file a fully complete IFP 15 || application or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s October 16 |} 11, 2022 order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and 17 || close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If 18 || Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 19 DATED THIS 30t# day of December 2022. 20 21 22 Aras jlosect en 23 ANNER TRAM 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28