2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 MARK STEVEN HARRIS, Case No. 3:22-cv-00478-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 NORTHERN NEVADA CORRECTIONAL 9 CENTER, et al.,

10 Defendants.

11

12 Pro se Plaintiff Mark Steven Harris brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated 14 at Northern Nevada Correctional Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On October 27, 2022, this Court 15 ordered Harris to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the 16 full $402 filing fee on or before December 27, 2022. (ECF No. 4.) The Court warned Harris 17 that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed 18 in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay the full $402 filing fee for a civil action 19 by that deadline. (Id. at 2.) That deadline passed, and Harris did not file a fully complete 20 application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 21 I. DISCUSSION 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets, and “[i]n the 23 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 24 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.,

(9th Cir. 25 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 26 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) 27 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 28 court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987) 2 action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 3 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 4 of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 5 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 6 Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 8 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Harris’s 9 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 10 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 11 a pleading ordered by the Court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor, the public policy favoring disposition of 13 cases on their merits, is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 15 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 16 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 17 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 18 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th 19 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 20 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 21 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 23 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 24 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 26 unless Harris either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays 27 the $402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 28 another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays 1 || the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not 2 || indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Harris needs additional 3 || time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s order. Setting another deadline is not 4 || a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 5 || Ul. CONCLUSION 6 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 7 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 8 || prejudice based on Harris’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 9 || pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s October 27, 2022 10 || order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 11 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Harris wishes to pursue his 12 || claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 13 DATED THIS 4" Day of January 2023.

15 MIRANDA M. DU 16 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28