1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 DIONDRAE L. PARKER, Case No. 3:22-cv-00488-ART-CLB 3 Plaintiff, ORDER 4 v.

5 TASHEENA COOKE, et al.,

6 Defendants.

7 Plaintiff Diondrae L. Parker brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 8 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 9 incarcerated at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 1-1). On November 3, 2022, this Court 10 ordered Parker to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or 11 pay the full $402 filing fee on or before January 3, 2023. (ECF No. 3). The Court 12 warned Parker that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully 13 complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or 14 pay the full $402 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 2). That 15 deadline expired and Parker did not file a fully complete application to proceed in 16 forma pauperis, pay the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 17 I. DISCUSSION 18 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 19 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 20 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 21 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 22 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 23 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 24 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 25 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 26 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 27 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 28 1 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 2 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 3 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 4 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 5 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 6 Cir. 1987)). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 8 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 9 dismissal of Parker’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also 10 weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 11 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 12 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 13 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 14 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 15 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 16 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 17 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 18 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 19 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 20 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 21 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 22 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 23 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 24 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 25 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 26 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 27 Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action 28 cannot realistically proceed until and unless Parker either files a fully complete 1 || application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $402 filing fee for a civil 2 || action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. 3 || But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the 4 || inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do 5 || not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Parker needs 6 || additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s order. Setting a 7 || second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So 8 || the fifth factor favors dismissal. II. CONCLUSION 10 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 11 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 12 || dismissed without prejudice based on Parker’s failure to file a fully complete 13 || application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in 14 || compliance with this Court’s November 3, 2022, order. The Clerk of Court is 15 || directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 16 || may be filed in this now-closed case. If Parker wishes to pursue his claims, he 17 || must file a complaint in a new case. 18 19 DATED THIS 13th day of January 2023.

20 j Vd 21 wat pret baad Im 29 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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