1

2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 ALBERT MEDINA, Case No. 3:21-cv-00001-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR v. RESTRAINING ORDER AND EXTENDING 8 DEADLINE TO FILE AMENDED NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF COMPLAINT 9 CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR, et al., (ECF No. 39) 10 Defendants.

11 12 Pro se plaintiff Albert Medina brings this civil-rights lawsuit to redress constitutional 13 violations he allegedly suffered while incarcerated at Ely State Prison (“ESP”). (ECF 14 No. 35.) On December 7, 2022, the Court screened Medina’s Second Amended 15 Complaint (“SAC”), dismissing one claim with leave to amend by January 5, 2023, and 16 dismissing the others with prejudice (“Screening Order”). (ECF No. 37.) That deadline 17 has passed, and Medina has not filed an amended complaint or sought to extend the 18 deadline to do so. Instead, Medina refused delivery of the Screening Order. (ECF No. 38.) 19 And he later filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requiring the 20 law librarian to stop having mail from the Court delivered by prisoners. (ECF No. 39.) 21 The Court denies the motion for a TRO because it is not meritorious. But the Court 22 will extend the deadline for Medina to file a third amended complaint consistent with the 23 Screening Order. And the Court will send Medina one-time paper courtesy copies of this 24 order and the Screening Order via U.S. Mail. 25 I. LEGAL STANDARD 26 Restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary remed[ies] never 27 awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

(2008). The 1 obtaining a preliminary injunction are “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales 2 Co. v. John D. Bush and Co.,

, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other 3 grounds by Winter,

. The Supreme Court clarified the standard for these 4 forms of equitable relief in Winter v. Natural resources Defense Council, Inc., instructing 5 that the plaintiff “must establish that [he] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [he] is 6 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 7 equities tips in [his] favor, and that an injunction [or restraining order] is in the public 8 interest.”

. The Ninth Circuit also recognizes an additional standard: “if a 9 plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser 10 showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still 11 issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two 12 Winter factors are satisfied.’” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.,

, 13 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

, 14 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). 15 A plaintiff who seeks a mandatory injunction—one that goes beyond simply 16 maintaining the status quo during litigation—bears a “doubly demanding” burden: “[he] 17 must establish that the law and facts clearly favor [his] position, not simply that [he] is 18 likely to succeed.” Garcia v. Google, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 19 The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that mandatory injunctions are “particularly disfavored” 20 and “should not issue in doubtful cases.”

(internal quotations omitted). The Prison 21 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) similarly instructs that any restraining order or preliminary 22 injunction granted with respect to prison conditions “must be narrowly drawn, extend no 23 further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and 24 be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.”

(a)(2). 25 Finally, “there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for 26 injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Pac. Radiation 27 Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Medical Ctr.,

(9th Cir. 2015) (“Pacific 1 injunctive relief and the claims in the underlying complaint itself.”

The necessary 2 connection is satisfied “where the preliminary injunction would grant ‘relief of the same 3 character as that which may be granted finally.’”

(quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, 4

(1945)). “Absent that relationship or nexus, the district court lacks 5 authority to grant the relief requested.”

6 II. DISCUSSION 7 Medina argues that around November 11, 2022, a prisoner who identified himself 8 as “Country” handed Medina a copy of his complaint that the Court emailed to the prison. 9 (ECF No. 39 at 1-2.) Medina asked how the prisoner obtained his complaint. (Id. at 2.) 10 The prisoner responded that Law Library Supervisor Ms. Garcia instructed him to deliver 11 it to Medina. (Id.) Medina wrote Garcia complaining that it wasn’t proper to have prisoners 12 deliver “legal mail from the federal courts.” (Id.) 13 When Garcia did not respond, Medina filed a grievance about the incident. (Id.) 14 Caseworker Smith denied the grievance on procedural grounds for failing to attach a 15 claim form and handed Garcia’s response. (Id. at 3.) Around December 12, 2022, Garcia 16 had another prisoner deliver more mail from the Court to him. (Id.) Medina refused to 17 accept the mail because the prisoner delivering it was “curt” and would not let Medina 18 count the pages before signing for it. (Id. at 3-4.) Medina filed a grievance about this 19 incident. (Id. at 4.) 20 Medina’s SAC sought to bring claims under the Prison Rape Elimination Act 21 (“PREA”), Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment for visual strip searches that were 22 conducted during routine cell inspections over a four-month period. (ECF No. 35.) In 23 screening the SAC, the Court dismissed Medina’s claims under the PREA and Eighth 24 Amendment with prejudice because amendment would be futile. (ECF No. 37 at 4-6.) But 25 the Court granted Medina leave to amend to attempt to replead his Fourth Amendment 26 claim by alleging additional true facts to show that the strip searches were excessive, 27 vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest. (Id. at 5-6.) For 1 the searches, facts suggesting that he did not have an opportunity to obtain contraband 2 or a weapon before or between the searches, if other prisoners were also required to strip 3 during these cell searches, how often the searches were conducted, and if his cell 4 afforded sufficient privacy for the searches. (Id. at 6.) 5 Medina’s motion for a TRO argues that having prisoners deliver legal mail violates 6 the Nevada Department of Correction’s administrative regulations and HDSP’s operating 7 procedures, but he does not identify which regulation or procedure this violates. Medina 8 also argues that Garcia has directed prisoners to deliver Medina his mail from the Court. 9 It is not clear if this mail has been delivered to Medina in an envelope, a sealed envelope, 10 or bare printed pages. But in any event, like the claims in Devose v. Herrington, these are 11 “new assertions of misconduct” that might support different claims against new 12 defendants, but they do not support Medina’s request for a restraining order because they 13 are “entirely unrelated to the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Pacific 14 Radiation,

(citing Devose v. Herrington,

(8th Cir. 1994)). 15 Moreover, to the extent that Medina believes the Court’s mail to him constitutes “legal 16 mail,” he is mistaken. The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[m]ail from the courts, as 17 contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail.” Keenan v. Hall,

1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion amended on denial of reh’g,

(9th Cir. 19 1998). 20 The Court denies the motion for a TRO because it seeks relief for new acts of 21 misconduct that fall outside the corners of the SAC and the narrow leave to amend that 22 the Court has granted Medina. If Medina wishes to pursue a claim about his mail needs, 23 he must file a complaint under a new case number and either pay the $402 filing fee or 24 properly apply to proceed in forma pauperis. But because it appears that Medina refused 25 delivery of the Screening Order under the mistaken belief that the Court’s mail to him 26 constitutes “legal mail,” the Court will extend the deadline for Medina to file an amended 27 complaint consistent with the Screening Order. And the Court will send Medina one-time 1 || Ill. ©CONCLUSION 2 It is therefore ordered that the motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF 3 || No. 39) is denied. 4 It is further ordered that the deadline for Plaintiff Albert Medina to file a third 5 || amended complaint consistent with the Court’s December 7, 2022, screening order is 6 || extended to February 22, 2023. 7 It is further ordered that this action will be subject to dismissal with prejudice and 8 || for failure to state a claim if Plaintiff Medina fails to timely file a third amended complaint. 9 The Clerk of the Court is directed to: (1) serve this order on Plaintiff Medina at the 10 || address listed for him with the Court in the ordinary course; and (2) send Plaintiff Medina 11 || courtesy paper copies of this order and the Court’s December 7, 2022, screening order 12 || and attachments (ECF Nos. 37, 37-1, 37-2) via U.S. mail, first class. 13 DATED THIS 23" Day of January 2023. 14

16 MIRANDA M. DU 17 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28