Durand v. Hernandez
Durand v. Hernandez
Trial Court Opinion
1
2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 ROBERTO DURAND, Case No. 3:22-cv-00544-ART-CSD 5 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING AND CLOSING 6 v. CASE
7 HERNANDEZ,
8 Defendant. 9 Plaintiff Roberto Durand brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 11 incarcerated at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 1-1). On January 26, 2023, this Court 12 ordered Durand to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis 13 or pay the full $402 filing fee on or before March 27, 2023. (ECF No. 5). The Court 14 warned Durand that the action could be dismissed if he failed to timely comply 15 with the order. (Id. at 2). That deadline expired and Durand did not file an 16 application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise 17 respond. 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 20 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 21 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 22 Angeles,
782 F.2d 829, 831(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 23 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 24 King,
856 F.2d 1439, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 25 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 26 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,
833 F.2d 128, 130(9th Cir. 1987) 27 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 28 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 1 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 2 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 3 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 4 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,
460 F.3d 1217, 5 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,
833 F.2d at 130). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 7 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 8 dismissal of Durand’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 9 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 10 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 11 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,
542 F.2d 522, 524(9th Cir. 12 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 13 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 15 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 16 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,
191 F.3d 983, 17 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 18 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 19 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,
291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not 20 exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but 21 must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779
22 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this Court cannot operate without 23 collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff’s 24 compliance with court orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order 25 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it 26 often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The 27 circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception because 28 there is no showing that Durand needs additional time or evidence that he did 1 || not receive the Court’s order. Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful 2 || alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 3 || II. CONCLUSION 4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 5 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 6 || dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff Roberto Durand’s failure to file a 7 || fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing 8 || fee in compliance with this Court’s January 26, 2023, order. The Clerk of Court 9 || is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 10 || may be filed in this now-closed case. If Roberto Durand wishes to pursue his 11 || claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing 12 || fee or properly apply for in forma pauperis status. 13 4 DATED THIS 14 day of April 2023.
15 Aras jlosect oun 16 ANNER.TRAUM ———C(Ci~‘: 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Reference
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