2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 JEFFREY STEVENS, Case No. 3:22-cv-00517-ART-CSD 4 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 5 v.

6 CHARLES DANIELS, et al.,

7 Defendants.

8

9 Plaintiff Jeffrey Stevens brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 11 incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”), Southern Desert Correctional 12 Center (“SDCC”), and Lovelock Correctional Center (“LCC”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-5, 13 7.) On March 24, 2023, this Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint 14 by April 24, 2023. (ECF No. 3 at 11-12.) The Court warned Plaintiff that the 15 action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that 16 deadline. (Id.) That deadline expired and Plaintiff did not file an amended 17 complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 20 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 21 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 22 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 23 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 24 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 25 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 26 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 27 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 28 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 2 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 3 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 4 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 5 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 7 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 8 dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 9 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 10 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 11 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 12 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 13 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 15 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 16 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 17 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 18 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 19 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 20 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 21 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 22 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 23 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 24 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 25 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 26 alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). 27 Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Plaintiff files 28 an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 2 only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The 3 circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is 4 no hint that Plaintiff needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive 5 the Court’s screening order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful 6 alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 7 II. CONCLUSION 8 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 9 they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 10 dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to file an amended 11 complaint in compliance with this Court’s March 24, 2023, order and for failure 12 to state a claim. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and 13 close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If 14 Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 15 It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 16 (ECF No. 1) without having to prepay the full filing fee is granted. Plaintiff will 17 not be required to pay an initial installment fee. Nevertheless, the full filing fee 18 will still be due, pursuant to

, as amended by the Prison 19 Litigation Reform Act. 20 It is further ordered that, pursuant to

, as amended by 21 the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Nevada Department of Corrections will 22 forward payments from the account of Jeffrey Stevens, #1157856 to the Clerk 23 of the United States District Court, District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding 24 month’s deposits (in months that the account exceeds $10.00) until the full $350 25 filing fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk of the Court will send a copy of 26 this order to the Finance Division of the Clerk’s Office. The Clerk will send a copy 27 of this order to the Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of 28 Corrections at [email protected]. 1 It is further ordered that, even though this action is dismissed, or is 2 || otherwise unsuccessful, the full filing fee will still be due, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 || § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 4 5 DATED THIS 2nd day of May 2023. 6 en Ape jot? ANNE*R, TRAUM 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28