Ramadan-Nwokedi v. Washoe County Jail

District Court, D. Nevada

Ramadan-Nwokedi v. Washoe County Jail

Trial Court Opinion

2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 WADEEAH RAMADAN-NWOKEDI, Case No. 3:22-cv-00490-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 WASHOE COUNTY JAIL, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Pro Se Plaintiff Wadeeah Ramadan-Nwokedi brings this civil-rights action under 13

42 U.S.C. § 1983

to redress constitutional violations that she claims to have suffered 14 while detained at Washoe County Detention Facility (“WCDF”). (ECF No. 1-1.) On 15 November 22, 2022, this Court denied Ramadan-Nwokedi’s application to proceed in 16 forma pauperis (“IFP application”) because it was incomplete and ordered her to file a 17 fully complete IFP application or pay the full $402.00 filing fee on or before January 23, 18 2023. (ECF No. 3.) Ramadan-Nwokedi was warned the action could be dismissed if she 19 failed to file a fully complete IFP application with all three documents or pay the required 20 filing fee by that deadline. (Id. at 2.) When the January 23, 2023, deadline expired, 21 Ramadan-Nwokedi had not filed a fully complete IFP application or paid the full $402.00 22 filing fee. 23 Because the Court’s mail to Ramadan-Nwokedi had been returned as 24 undeliverable and Ramadan-Nwokedi later confirmed that WCDF was her correct 25 address (ECF Nos. 4, 5), the Court considered meaningful alternatives to dismissal and 26 issued another order on March 15, 2023, granting Ramadan-Nwokedi one final 27 opportunity to submit a fully complete IFP application or pay the required filing fee by the 28 deadline of April 14, 2023. (ECF No. 8.) The April 14, 2023, deadline has now expired, 2 $402.00 filing fee, or otherwise responded to the Court’s order. And the Court’s mail to 3 Ramadan-Nwokedi was again returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 8.) 4 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 5 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 6 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

782 F.2d 829

, 831 7 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 8 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

856 F.2d 1439

, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 9 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 10 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th 11 Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 12 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 13 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 14 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition 15 of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 16 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d 1217, 1226

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 17 Malone,

833 F.2d at 130

). 18 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 19 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Ramadan- 20 Nwokedi’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of 21 dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable 22 delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. 23 Air West,

542 F.2d 522, 524

(9th Cir. 1976). And the fourth factor—the public policy 24 favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring 25 dismissal. 26 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 27 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 28 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 1 || that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 2 || does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

291 F.3d 639

, 643 & n.4 (9th 3 || Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 4 || dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 5 || Duncan,

779 F.2d 1421, 1424

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this Court cannot operate without 6 || collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff's compliance 7 || with the Court’s orders, the only alternative is to enter a third order setting another 8 || deadline. But issuing a third order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the 9 || Court’s finite resources. Setting a third deadline is not a meaningful alternative given 10 || these circumstances. The fifth factor thus favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered 11 || these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. 12 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 13 || Plaintiff Wadeeah Ramadan-Nwokedi’s failure to file a fully complete IFP application or 14 || pay the full $402.00 filing fee in compliance with this Court's November 22, 2022, and 15 || March 15, 2023, orders. 16 It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly 17 || and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If 18 || Ramadan-Nwokedi wishes to pursue her claims, she must file a complaint in a new case 19 || and either pay the required filing fee or properly apply to proceed in forma pauperis. 20 DATED THIS 2" Day of May 2023.

22 MIRANDA M. DU 23 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28

Reference

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