Johnson v. McTee

District Court, D. Nevada

Johnson v. McTee

Trial Court Opinion

1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 DAMON JOHNSON, Case No. 3:23-cv-00055-ART-CSD 3 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING AND CLOSING 4 v. CASE

5 McTEE, et al.,

6 Defendants.

7 8 Plaintiff Damon Johnson brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 9 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 10 incarcerated at Warm Springs Correctional Center. (ECF No. 1-1). On February 11 17, 2023, this Court ordered Johnson to file a fully complete application to 12 proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee on or before April 18, 13 2023. (ECF No. 3). The Court warned Johnson that the action could be dismissed 14 if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with 15 all three documents or pay the full $402 filing fee for a civil action by that 16 deadline. (Id. at 2). That deadline expired and Johnson did not file a fully complete 17 application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise 18 respond. 19 I. DISCUSSION 20 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 21 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 22 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 23 Angeles,

782 F.2d 829, 831

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 24 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 25 King,

856 F.2d 1439

, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 26 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 27 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th Cir. 1987) 28 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 1 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 2 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 3 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 4 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 5 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d 1217

, 6 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

833 F.2d at 130

). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 8 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 9 dismissal of Johnson’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 10 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 11 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 12 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

542 F.2d 522, 524

(9th Cir. 13 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 14 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 15 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 16 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 17 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983

, 18 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 19 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 20 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

291 F.3d 639

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not 21 exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but 22 must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

23 F.2d 1421

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this Court cannot operate without 24 collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff’s 25 compliance with the Court’s orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order 26 setting another deadline. But issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable 27 and further squander the Court’s finite resources because there is no evidence 28 that Johnson did not receive the Court’s February 17, 2023, order or needs more 1 || time. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 2 || circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 3 || II. CONCLUSION 4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 5 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 6 || dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff Damon Johnson’s failure to file a 7 || fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing 8 || fee in compliance with this Court’s February 17, 2023, order. The Clerk of Court 9 || is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 10 || may be filed in this now-closed case. If Damon Johnson wishes to pursue his 11 || claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing 12 || fee or properly apply to proceed in forma pauperis. 13 14 is DATED THIS 8 day of May 2023.

16 Aras jlosed Wn 17 ANNER.TRAUM =—C«W)” 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Reference

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