1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 JOHN THOMAS FALVEY, Case No. 3:23-cv-00120-ART-CSD 3 Plaintiff, ORDER 4 v.

5 ELKO SHERIFF DEPT, et al.,

6 Defendants.

7 8 Plaintiff John Thomas Falvey brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 9 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 10 incarcerated at Elko County Detention Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On March 23, 2023, 11 this Court ordered Falvey to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 12 pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee on or before May 23, 2023. (ECF No. 2.) 13 The Court warned Falvey that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a 14 fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents 15 or pay the full $402 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 2). That 16 deadline expired and Falvey did not file a fully complete application to proceed in 17 forma pauperis, pay the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. Furthermore, 18 the Court’s order came back as undeliverable to the address that Plaintiff 19 provided to the Court. (ECF No. 3.) 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 22 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 23 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 24 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 25 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 26 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 27 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 28 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 1 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 2 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 3 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 4 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 5 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 6 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 7 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 8 Cir. 1987)). 9 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 10 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 11 dismissal of Falvey’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also 12 weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 13 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 14 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 15 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 16 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 17 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 18 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 19 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 20 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 21 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 22 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 23 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 24 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 25 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 26 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 27 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 28 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 1 || Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action 2 || cannot realistically proceed until and unless Falvey either files a fully complete 3 || application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $402 filing fee for a civil 4 || action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. 5 || But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the 6 || inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do 7 || not indicate that this case will be an exception: the Court’s order came back as 8 || undeliverable to the address that Falvey provided to the Court. As such, it is 9 || unlikely that a second order would even reach Falvey. Setting a second deadline 10 || is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor 11 || favors dismissal. 12} Il. CONCLUSION 13 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 14 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 15 || dismissed without prejudice based on Falvey’s failure to file a fully complete 16 || application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in 17 || compliance with this Court’s March 23, 2023, order. The Clerk of Court is 18 || directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 19 || may be filed in this now-closed case. If Falvey wishes to pursue his claims, he 20 || must file a complaint in a new case. 21 29 DATED THIS 14 day of June 2023.

23 padi 24 ANNE R. TRAUM 95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

26 27 28