1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 FERRILL J. VOLPICELLI, Case No. 3:22-cv-00281-ART-CSD 3 Plaintiff, ORDER 4 v.

5 STATE OF NEVADA, et al.,

6 Defendants.

7 Plaintiff Ferrill J. Volpicelli submitted a petition for declaratory judgment 8 under

. (ECF No. 1-1). On June 21, 2023, this Court ordered 9 Volpicelli to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay 10 the full $402 filing fee on or before August 18, 2023. (ECF No. 5). The Court 11 warned Volpicelli that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully 12 complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or 13 pay the full $402 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 2). That 14 deadline expired and Volpicelli did not file a fully complete application to proceed 15 in forma pauperis, pay the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 16 I. DISCUSSION 17 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 18 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 19 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 20 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 21 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 22 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 23 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 24 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 25 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 26 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 27 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 28 1 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 2 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 3 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 4 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 5 Cir. 1987)). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 7 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 8 dismissal of Volpicelli’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 9 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 10 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 11 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 12 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 13 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 15 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 16 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 17 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 18 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 19 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 20 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 21 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 22 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 23 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 24 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 25 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 26 Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action 27 cannot realistically proceed until and unless Volpicelli either files a fully complete 28 application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $402 filing fee for a civil 1 || action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. 2 || But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the 3 || inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do 4 || not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Volpicelli 5 |} needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s order. 6 || Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 7 || circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 8 || II. CONCLUSION 9 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 10 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 11 || dismissed without prejudice based on Volpicelli’s failure to file a fully complete 12 || application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $402 filing fee in 13 || compliance with this Court’s June 21, 2023, order. The Clerk of Court is directed 14 || to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be 15 || filed in this now-closed case. If Volpicelli wishes to pursue his claims, he must 16 || file a complaint in a new case. 17 18 DATED THIS 12t* day of September 2023.

19 Ares floret Jon 20 ANNER.TRAUM ———C“C:«‘:«:*W 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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