1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 KEITH W. SULLIVAN, Case No.: 2:23-cv-01730-APG-DJA

4 Plaintiff Dismissal Order

5 v.

6 JAMES DZURENDA, et al.,

7 Defendants

8

9 Plaintiff Keith Sullivan brings this civil-rights action under

to redress 10 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Southern Desert 11 Correctional Center (“SDCC”). ECF No. 6 at 1. On April 23, 2024, the magistrate judge ordered 12 Sullivan to update his address by May 23, 2024. ECF No. 8. That deadline expired without an 13 updated address from Sullivan, and his mail from the court is being returned as undeliverable. 14 See ECF No. 9. In addition, in the screening order I ordered Sullivan to file an amended 15 complaint by May 21, 2024. ECF No. 5 at 7. I warned Sullivan that the action could be dismissed 16 if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline.

That deadline expired, and Sullivan 17 did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond. 18 I. Discussion 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 20 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 21 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 22 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 23 Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 1 Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 2 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) 3 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 4 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of

5 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 6 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone 7 v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 8 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 9 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Sullivan’s claims. The 10 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 11 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 12 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th 13 Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is 14 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

15 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 16 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 17 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 18 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 19 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 20 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 21 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 22 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 23 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 2|| Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed 3] without the ability for the court and the defendants to send Sullivan case-related documents, 4|| filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Sullivan is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s 7\| finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 9) TI. Conclusion 10 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 12|| Sullivan’s failure to file an updated address in compliance with this court’s April 23, 2024, order. 13|| The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other 14|| documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Sullivan wishes to pursue his claims, he must 15|| file a complaint in a new case and provide the court with his current address. 16 Finally, I order that the applications to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 1, 4) are denied as moot. 18 Dated: May 29, 2024 19 Co U.S. District Judge 20 21 22 23