2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 TYRONE NOEL NUNN, Case No. 3:23-cv-00468-ART-CLB

4 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA/STATE OF 6 NEVADA, et al.,

7 Defendants.

8 9 Plaintiff Tyrone Nunn brings this civil-rights-action under

10 to redress constitutional violations that he allegedly suffered while incarcerated 11 at Ely State Prison (“ESP”). (ECF No. 13). On July 12, 2024, this Court ordered 12 Nunn to file his updated address and file a motion either to substitute the true 13 name of ESP Doe Doctor or for the Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum for 14 the NDOC to produce that person’s true name by August 26, 2024. (ECF No. 29 15 at 18). That deadline expired without compliance or any response by Nunn, and 16 his mail from the Court was returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 30). The Court 17 considered alternatives to dismissal and entered a second order setting November 18 19, 2024, as another deadline for Nunn to provide his updated address. (ECF 19 No. 31). Because it appeared that Nunn had been transferred to High Desert State 20 Prison, the Court sent both of its orders to ESP and HDSP. (ECF Nos. 29, 31). 21 But the second deadline expired without compliance or any response to Nunn, 22 and his mail from the Court was returned as undeliverable. (ECF Nos. 32, 33). 23 DISCUSSION 24 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 25 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 26 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 27 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 28 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 2 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 3 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 4 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 5 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 6 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 7 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 8 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 9 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 10 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

). 11 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 12 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 13 dismissal of Nunn’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also 14 weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 15 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 16 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 17 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 18 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 19 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 20 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 21 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 22 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 23 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 24 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not 25 exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case but 26 must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed 28 without the ability for the Court and the defendants to send Nunn case-related 1 || documents, filings, and orders and without Nunn’s compliance with the Court’s 2 || orders, the only alternative is to enter a third order setting another deadline. But 3 || repeating an ignored order often only delays the inevitable and further squanders 4 || the Court’s finite resources. There is no indication that this case will be an 5 || exception. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 6 || circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 7 || II. CONCLUSION 8 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 9 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 10 || dismissed without prejudice based on Tyrone Nunn’s failure to file an updated 11 || address and a motion to substitute or for a subpoena duces tecum in compliance 12 || with this Court’s July 12 and September 20, 2024, orders. The Clerk of the Court 13 || is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 14 || may be filed in this now closed case. If Tyrone Nunn wishes to pursue his claims, 15 || he must file a complaint in a new case, under a new case number, provide the 16 || Court his correct address, and either pay the required filing fee or apply for in 17 || forma pauperis status. 18 It is further ordered that Nunn’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 19 || (ECF No. 16) is denied as moot. 20 21 DATED THIS 13t# day of December 2024. 22 23 oun pee Vaated

25 ANNER.TRAUM 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27 28