Johnson, III v. Hospital Corporation Of America
Johnson, III v. Hospital Corporation Of America
Trial Court Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 WILLIE JOHNSON III, Case No. 2:24-cv-01289-GMN-BNW
5 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 6 v.
7 DANITA AUSTIN JOHNSON, et al.,
8 Defendants.
9 10 On July 14, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this case. ECF No. 1. On July 19, 2024, the Court 11 instructed Plaintiff to either complete an in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application or pay the filing 12 fee by August 19, 2024. ECF No. 3. To date, Plaintiff has failed to do so. As a result, the Court 13 recommends that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed without prejudice. 14 The law permits a district court to dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to comply 15 with a court order. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,
963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for 16 failure to comply with an order requiring amendment of complaint). In determining whether to 17 dismiss an action on this ground, the court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious 18 resolution of litigation, (2) the court’s need to manage its docket, (3) the risk of prejudice to the 19 defendants, (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, and (5) the 20 availability of less-drastic alternatives. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,
460 F.3d 21 1217, 1226(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
833 F.2d 128, 130(9th Cir. 22 1987)). 23 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 24 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. The third 25 factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 26 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 27 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,
542 F.2d 522, 524(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 1 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less-drastic alternatives can be used 2 || to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. Courts 3 || “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case but must 4 || explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,
779 F.2d 1421, 1424(9th 5 || Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot proceed without a complete IFP application or paid filing 6 || fee, the only alternative is to enter another order setting another deadline. The circumstances here 7 || do not indicate that Plaintiff needs additional time. Therefore, setting another deadline is not a 8 || meaningful alternative. So, the fifth factor favors dismissal. 9 In balance, the factors above favor a recommendation of dismissal. See Hernandez v. City 10 || of El Monte,
138 F.3d 393(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that dismissal is proper where at least four 11 || factors support dismissal or where at least three factors “strongly” support dismissal). 12 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that this action is DISMISSED without 13 || prejudice for failure to comply with the Court’s deadline. 14 NOTICE 15 This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge assigned 16 || to this case under
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party who objects to this report and recommendation 17 || may file a written objection supported by points and authorities within fourteen days of being 18 || served with this report and recommendation. Local Rule IB 3-2(a). Failure to file a timely 19 || objection may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,
951 F.2d 1153, 20 || 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 21 22 DATED: August 27, 2024 23 KK pm lea WEEN BRENDA WEKSLER 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28
Reference
- Status
- Unknown