1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 Keith A. Coleman, Case No. 3:23-cv-00134-ART-CSD

4 Plaintiff, Order Dismissing Action and v. Closing Case 5 NAPH Care, et al., 6 Defendants. 7

8 9 Plaintiff Keith A. Coleman brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while 11 incarcerated at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 14.) On November 16, 2023, this Court 12 ordered Coleman to file a second amended complaint by December 16, 2023. 13 (ECF No. 28.) The Court warned Coleman that the action could be dismissed if 14 he failed to file a second amended complaint by that deadline. (Id. at 10.) That 15 16 deadline expired and Coleman did not file an amended complaint, move for an 17 extension, or otherwise respond. 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 20 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 21 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 22 23 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 24 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 25 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 26 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 27 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 28 1 2 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 3 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 4 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 5 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 6 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 7 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 8 9 Cir. 1987)). 10 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 11 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 12 dismissal of Coleman’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 13 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 14 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 15 16 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 17 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 18 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 19 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 20 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 21 22 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 23 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 24 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 25 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 26 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 27 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 28 1 2 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 3 Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 4 dismissing a case but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 5 Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action 6 cannot realistically proceed until and unless Coleman files a second amended 7 complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. 8 9 But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the 10 inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do 11 not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Coleman 12 needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court’s screening 13 order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 14 15 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 16 II. CONCLUSION 17 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 18 they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 19 dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to file a second amended 20 complaint in compliance with this Court’s order dated November 16, 2023, and 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 for failure to state a claim. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment g || accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now- 3 || closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a 4 |! new case. ° It is further ordered that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5) is denied as moot. 9 10 DATED THIS 18t day of January 2024.

11 1 foo Matador 13 ANNE R. TRAUM 14. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 The docket reflects that Plaintiff is paroled (see ECF No. 27), rendering his application to proceed 28 |! in forma pauperis by an inmate moot.