2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 TYRONE NOEL NUNN, Case No. 3:23-cv-00578-ART-CLB 4 Plaintiff, ORDER 5 v.

6 DISTRICT OF NEVADA,

7 Defendant.

8 9 On November 17, 2023, this Court ordered pro se Plaintiff Tyrone Noel 10 Nunn to submit a complaint and file a fully complete application to proceed in 11 forma pauperis (“IFP application”) or pay the full $402.00 filing fee on or before 12 January 16, 2024. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was warned the action could be 13 dismissed if he failed to submit a complaint and file a fully complete IFP 14 application with all three documents or pay the full $402.00 filing fee for a civil 15 action by that deadline. (Id. at 2-3.) When the deadline expired, Plaintiff had not 16 submitted a complaint and had not filed a fully complete IFP application or paid 17 the full $402.00 filing fee. 18 Because Plaintiff submitted a motion for appointment of counsel, an 19 incomplete IFP application, and a motion to consolidate (ECF Nos. 4, 5, 6), the 20 Court considered meaningful alternatives to dismissal and issued another order 21 on February 16, 2024, granting Plaintiff one final opportunity to submit a 22 complaint and file a fully complete IFP application by the deadline of March 15, 23 2024. (ECF No. 7.) The deadline has now expired and Plaintiff still has not 24 submitted a complaint and has not filed a fully complete IFP application, paid 25 the full $402.00 filing fee, or otherwise responded. 26 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 27 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 28 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 2 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 3 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 4 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 5 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 6 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 7 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 8 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 9 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 10 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 11 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 12 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 13 Cir. 1987)). 14 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 15 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 16 dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, 17 also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 18 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 19 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 20 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 21 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 22 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 23 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 24 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 25 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 26 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 27 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 28 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 1 || pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 2 || satisfying this element|,]” ie., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 3 || with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,|” have been “eroded” by 4 || Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 5 || finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 6 || alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). 7 || Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Plaintiff 8 || submits a complaint and either files a fully complete IFP application or pays the 9 || $402.00 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a third order 10 || setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating two ignored orders is that 11 || it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. 12 || The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there 13 || is no hint that Plaintiff needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive 14 || the Court’s order. Setting a third deadline is not a meaningful alternative given 15 || these circumstances. The fifth factor thus favors dismissal. Having thoroughly 16 || considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of 17 || dismissal. 18 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based 19 || on Plaintiffs failure to submit a complaint and file a fully complete IFP 20 || application or pay the full $402.00 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s 21 || November 17, 2023, and February 16, 2024, orders. 22 It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment 23 || accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now- 24 || closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, Plaintiff must file a complaint 25 || and satisfy the matter of the filing fee in a new case. 26 Dated this 2"4 day of April 2024. 27 i dun 28 ANNE R. TRAUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE