1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3

4 MATT RADDUE, et al., ) ) Case No.: 2:23-cv-02124-GMN-NJK 5 Plaintiffs, ) 6 vs. ) ) 7 LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION, et al., ) ) 8 Defendants. ) ) 9 ) 10 MARVIN CUTCHINS, et al., ) ) Case No.: 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY 11 Plaintiffs, ) vs. ) 12 ) 13 LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION, et al., ) ) 14 Defendants. ) ) 15 16 Order Consolidating Actions 17 Each of the above-captioned plaintiffs, in a proposed class action, bring claims alleging 18 that defendants failed in their duty to make a racetrack race ready for the “Practice Run” event 19 at the 2023 Formula 1 Las Vegas Grand Prix, resulting in the event being delayed to the point 20 that attendees were forced to leave before it resumed and did not receive a refund. (See First 21 Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-4 in Raddue et al. v. Liberty Media Corporation, No. 2:23-cv-02124- 22 GMN-NJK (“Raddue Action”)); (Compl., ECF No. 1-3 in Cutchins et al. v. Liberty Media 23 Corporation, No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY (“Cutchins Action”)). 24 The plaintiffs in the Raddue Action filed a Motion to Consolidate, arguing that 25 consolidation is warranted because the two actions “are based on the same set of core factual 1 allegations and involve overlapping questions of law.” 1 (Mot. Consolidate 5:23–24, ECF No. 2 29 in No. 2:23-cv-02124-GMN-NJK). The plaintiffs in the Cutchins Action argue 3 consolidation is not warranted because the cases concern different parties and causes of action, 4 and as a result, consolidation could “cause inconvenience, delay, confusion, and prejudice.” 5 (Resp. Mot. Intervene 6:7–9, ECF No. 28 in No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY).2 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 42(a) governs the consolidation of 7 separate actions. When two cases “involve a common question of law or fact,” district courts 8 may join them for any or all matters at issue, consolidate the suits, or issue any other order that 9 would prevent unnecessary cost or delay. Id. “Consolidation requires only a common question 10 of law or fact; perfect identity between all claims in any two cases is not required; so long as 11 there is some commonality of issues.” Firefighters, Local 1908 v. Cnty. of Clark, No. 2:12-cv- 12 00615,

, at *2 (D. Nev. June 1, 2012). Put differently, “[d]ifferences in 13 causes of action, defendants, or the class period do not render consolidation inappropriate if the 14 cases present sufficiently common questions of fact and law, and the differences do not 15 outweigh the interests of judicial economy served by consolidation.” Kaplan v. Gelfond, 240

, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). “District courts enjoy substantial discretion in deciding 17 whether and to what extent to consolidate cases.” Hall v. Hall,

(2018) 18 Here, the two cases involve several shared questions of fact and law, namely whether 19 defendants failed to ensure the track was race-ready for the “Practice Run” event, that this 20

21 1 Defendant Liberty Media Corporation does not oppose consolidation. (Resp. 3:5–6, ECF No. 32 in No. 2:23- 22 cv-02124-GMN-NJK). 2 Originally, the Cutchins Action plaintiffs also argued that consolidation is not warranted because the two 23 lawsuits involved different parties. (Id. 6:8–10). Specifically, the plaintiffs in the Cutchins Action named TAB Contractors, Inc. as a defendant, a party the plaintiffs in the Raddue Action originally included but later replaced 24 with LV Paving after additional investigation. (Mot. Consolidate 13:17–20 in No. 2:23-cv-02124-GMN-NJK). However, the plaintiffs in the Cutchin Action have since filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, explaining that 25 they “improperly named” Tab Contractors, Inc. as a defendant in their lawsuit. (Not. Voluntary Dismissal 2:3, ECF No. 31 in No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY). Accordingly, this argument is moot. In any event, any difference in defendants does not outweigh the interests of judicial economy served by consolidation. 1 failure resulted in two racecars making contact with a dislodged manhole, that this contact 2 resulted in the race being halted and the event delayed, that attendees of the event were forced 3 to leave before the event resumed, and that defendants ultimately did not offer any refunds to 4 the attendees. (Compare First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 17, 19, 21, 22–46 in No. 2:23-cv-02124- 5 GMN-NJK with Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 16–20, 24–44 in No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY). Based on 6 these allegations, both lawsuits allege claims for breach of contract, negligence, and Nevada’s 7 Deceptive Trade Practices Act. (See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–46 in No. 2:23-cv-02124-GMN- 8 NJK); (Compl. ¶¶ 27–58 in No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY). 9 The difference between the two Actions is that the plaintiffs in the Cutchins Action 10 bring additional claims for negligent, hiring, training, and supervision, intentional 11 misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and conversion. (Compl. ¶¶ 37–42, 49–71 in 12 No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY). However, a court’s consolidation determination is not 13 reducible to how many claims are alleged. Put differently, a court must ascertain whether the 14 additional claims, if any, arise from the same alleged misconduct as the shared claims and 15 implicate similar evidence. See Alich v. Opendoor Tech. Inc., No. 22-cv-01717,

1472849, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2023) (“While the complaint in the Related Action includes an 17 additional Securities Act claim, this does not preclude consolidation.”); Griffey v. Magellan 18 Health Inc., No. 20-cv-01282,

, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2020) (consolidating 19 cases where, having reviewed the factual allegations underlying the complaints, the court found 20 them to be “substantially identical, with the exception being [] two additional claims” raised in 21 one complaint); Alvarez v. YRC Inc., No. 12-cv-01374,

, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 22 Nov. 4, 2016) (same); Berkowitz ex rel. Affymetrix, Inc. v. Fodor, No. 06-cv-05353,

3365587, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2006) (same). If they do, it is likely that the interests in 24 judicial economy will outweigh any marginal differences in the cause of actions alleged.

25 Here the additional claims in the Cutchins Action all derive from the same alleged 1 misconduct that forms the basis of the Raddue Action and implicates substantially similar 2 evidence that underly the parties shared claims. “Both cases are at the initial stages of 3 litigation, and no prejudice will result from consolidation. Moreover, consolidation will 4 remove the need for duplication of labor that would otherwise result from having the cases 5 continue separately.” Griffey,

, at *2. Accordingly, the difference in claims 6 alleged does not outweigh the benefits posed by consolidation.3 Because the Court finds that 7 consolidation is merited and will conserve judicial and litigation resources, it GRANTS the 8 plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate in the Raddue Action and consolidates these cases for all 9 purposes under the Raddue Action as the earlier-filed action pursuant to Local Rule 42-1(b).4 10 See Local Rule 42-1(b) (dictating that consolidated cases “will be transferred to the judge 11 whom the earliest-filed action is assigned”). 12 Additionally, the plaintiffs in the Raddue Action assert that the Court should appoint the 13 laws firms representing them—Hagens Berman and Dimopoulos Law—as interim class 14 counsel. (Mot. Consolidate 14:14–20:20 in No. 2:23-cv-02124-GMN-NJK). The plaintiffs in 15 the Cutchins Action oppose the appointment of interim class counsel, arguing “it is premature 16 and unnecessary at this time.” (Resp. Mot. Intervene 7:3–4 in No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY). 17 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3), the district court may appoint interim counsel to act on 18 behalf of a putative class before determining whether to certify a class. This rule “authorizes 19 [a] court to designate interim counsel during the pre-certification period if necessary to protect 20 the interests of the putative class.” Azpeitia v. Tesoro Refining and Marketing Co. LLC, No. 17- 21 cv-00123-JST,

, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 14. 2017) (citation omitted). The 22 23 24 3 Furthermore, the difference in claims can be addressed by way of a consolidated complaint and does not pose a substantive impediment to consolidation. Griffey,

, at *1. 25 4 In light of the Court’s consolidation, it DENIES as moot the Motion to Intervene for Purposes of Requesting Consolidation filed by the Raddue Action plaintiffs in the Cutchin Action. (Mot. Intervene, ECF No. 19 in No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY). 1 appointment of interim class counsel is discretionary and is particularly suited to complex 2 actions: 3 If the lawyer who filed the suit is likely to be the only lawyer seeking appointment as class counsel, appointing interim class counsel may be unnecessary. If, however, 4 there are a number of overlapping, duplicative, or competing suits pending in other courts, and some or all of those suits may be consolidated, a number of lawyers 5 may compete for class counsel appointment. In such cases, designation of interim 6 class counsel clarifies responsibility for protecting the interests of the class during precertification activities. 7 8 In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., No. 19-cv-04286-BLF,

, at *1 9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2020) (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 10 (FOURTH) § 21.11). The commentary to Rule 23 also notes that “[i]n some cases . . . 11 there may be rivalry or uncertainty that makes formal designation of interim counsel 12 appropriate.” Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (discussing former subd. 13 G(2)(A) now renumbered as (g)(3)). 14 This case does not warrant appointment of interim class counsel at this time. First, there 15 are no “overlapping, duplicative, or competing suits pending in other courts,” MANUAL FOR 16 COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.11, nor is there a “gaggle of law firms jockeying to 17 be appointed class counsel.” Parrish v. Nat’l Football League, No. 07-cv-00943,

1624601 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2007). Similarly, the potential for “tag-a-long lawsuits and 19 competing firms in the future” does not justify appointing interim class counsel. In re Seagate 20 Tech. LLC Lit., No. 16-cv-00523,

, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2016). Second, 21 “[t]hat another set of law firms has filed a related action against [defendants] does not 22 automatically create a ‘rivalry or uncertainty between counsel as to who should be appointed 23 lead counsel.” Dhruva v. CuriosityStream, Inc., No. 23-cv-2265,

, at *4 (D. 24 Md. Feb. 21, 2024) (citation omitted). Although the attorneys in the Raddue Action and 25 Cutchins Action held differing views on whether consolidation was warranted, the Court finds 1 that this disagreement does not demonstrate that they are unable to cooperate and prioritize the 2 interests of the class. “The Court welcomes the parties’ continued cooperation and ‘does not 3 wish to invite future parties to manufacture conflict in an attempt to get an early bite at the 4 apple for motions for the appointment of lead plaintiff and selection of lead counsel.”5 In re 5 LinkedIn Advertising Metric Litigation, No. 20-cv-008324,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 6 Apr. 23, 2021) (quoting In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig.,

, at *2). 7 To recap, the Court finds consolidation is warranted because the Raddue Action and 8 Cutchins Action share common questions of law and fact. While the Court consolidates the 9 two Actions, it does not find the appointment of interim class counsel is necessary at this time 10 because there is no overlapping, duplicative, or competing suits pending and there is not a 11 present threat of rivalry or uncertainty between the lawsuits which threatens the interests of the 12 class.6 13 Accordingly, 14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Consolidate, ECF No. 29 in Raddue et 15 al. v. Liberty Media Corporation, No. 2:23-cv-02124-GMN-NJK is GRANTED. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Raddue et al. v. Liberty Media Corporation, No. 17 2:23-cv-02124-GMN-NJK and Cutchins et al. v. Liberty Media Corporation, No. 2:24-cv- 18 00048-GMN-EJY are consolidated for all purposes under Case No. 2:23-cv-02124-GMN-NJK. 19 The parties are directed to make all future filings in Case No. 2:23-cv-02124-GMN-NJK. The 20 Clerk of Court is kindly directed to administratively close No. 2:24-cv-00048-GMN-EJY. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 19 in No. 2:24- 22 cv-0048-GMN-EJY is DENIED as moot. 23 24 5 Because the Court does not find appointing interim class counsel necessary at this point, the Court does not reach the question of whether the Raddue Action attorneys meet the factors outlined in Rule 23(g)(1) of the Fed. 25 R. Civ. P. Gibson v. MGM Resorts Int’l, No. 2:23-cv-00140,

, at *2 (D. Nev. July 11, 2023). 6 The Court will revisit this finding and entertain motions for appointment of interim class counsel should such issues arise. ] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall have until May 24, 2024, to file a 2 || consolidated complaint. 3 DATED this 23 _ day of April, 2024. 4 5 6 Gloria avarro, District Judge 7 Unite tes District Court 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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