Diaz v. Ramirez

District Court, D. Nevada

Diaz v. Ramirez

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * * 7 8 JOSE MANUEL DIAZ, Case No. 2:24-cv-00980-RFB-BNW

9 Plaintiff, ORDER

10 v.

11 ALEXANDRO RAMIREZ, et al.,

12 Defendants.

13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiff Jose Diaz brings this civil-rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

to redress 16 constitutional violations that he allegedly suffered while he was incarcerated at High Desert State 17 Prison. ECF No. 1-1. On June 3, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to either pay the full $405 filing 18 fee or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis by August 2, 2024. ECF No. 3. That deadline 19 expired and Plaintiff has not paid the fee, applied for pauper status, moved to extend the deadline, 20 or otherwise responded. 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 23 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 24 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

782 F.2d 829, 831

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 25 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 26 Carey v. King,

856 F.2d 1439

, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 27 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 28 Service,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 1 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 2 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 3 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 4 their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 5 Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d 1217, 1226

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

833 F.2d at 130

). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 7 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Diaz’s claims. The third 8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 9 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 10 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

542 F.2d 522, 524

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 11 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 12 the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 14 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 15 v. Cal. Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

291 F.3d 639

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 18 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 19 meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

779 F.2d 1421, 1424

(9th Cir. 1986). This Court 20 cannot operate without collecting reasonable fees from litigants and this action cannot realistically 21 proceed without the plaintiff’s compliance with court orders. The only alternative to dismissal is 22 entering a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is 23 that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The 24 circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting another deadline is 25 not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 26 III. CONCLUSION 27 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 28 favor of dismissal. 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice based 2 on Jose Diaz’s failure to either pay the filing fee or apply for in forma pauperis status in compliance 3 with the Court’s June 3, 2024, Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly 4 and close this case. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may move to reopen this case and vacate the 6 judgment by filing a motion for reconsideration of this Order. In this motion, the Plaintiff is 7 required to explain what circumstances delayed him from paying the filing fee or filing the 8 application to proceed in forma pauperis in compliance with LSR 2-1. If the Court finds there to 9 be good cause or a reasonable explanation therein, the Court will reopen the case and vacate the 10 judgment. 11 12 DATED: January 5, 2025. 13 14 __________________________________ RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Reference

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