1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 JERRY SANTISTEVAN, Case No.: 2:24-cv-01038-APG-MDC

4 Plaintiff Order

5 v.

6 BEAN, et al.,

7 Defendants

8

9 Plaintiff Jerry Santistevan brings this civil-rights action under

to redress 10 constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert State 11 Prison. ECF No. 1-1. On November 25, 2024, the magistrate judge ordered Santistevan to 12 update his address by December 27, 2024. ECF No. 5. That deadline expired without an updated 13 address from Santistevan, and his mail from the court is being returned as undeliverable. See 14 ECF No. 6. 15 I. Discussion 16 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 17 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 18 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 19 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 20 Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 21 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. 22 Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court 23 order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) 1 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its 2 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,

5

). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 7 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Santistevan’s claims. The 8 third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 9 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 10 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th 11 Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is 12 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 14 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish

15 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 18 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 19 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial 20 granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have 21 been “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 22 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. 23 Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the court and the defendants to send Santistevan case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Santistevan is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s 5|| finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 7) IL. Conclusion 8 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 9] dismissal. I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Santistevan’s failure to file an updated address in compliance with this court’s November 25, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this 12||case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Santistevan wishes to pursue 13]| his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide the court with his current address. 14 I FURTHER ORDER that Santistevan’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) is denied as moot. 16 17 Dated: January 16, 2025 18 Co. Chief United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23