Kelly v. Clark County Detention Center
Kelly v. Clark County Detention Center
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Brishauna Kelly, Case No. 2:24-cv-02138-CDS-NJK
5 Plaintiff Dismissal Order
6 v.
7 Clark County Detention Center, et al.,
8 Defendant
9 10 Pro se plaintiff Brishauna Kelly brings this civil-rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983to 11 redress constitutional violations that she claims she suffered while incarcerated at Clark County 12 Detention Center. ECF No. 1-1. On December 5, 2024, this court ordered Kelly to file a fully 13 complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee on or before 14 February 4, 2025. ECF No. 3. The court warned Kelly that the action could be dismissed if she 15 failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or 16 pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline.
Id. at 2. That deadline expired and 17 Kelly did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $405 filing 18 fee, or otherwise respond. 19 I. Discussion 20 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 21 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 22 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,
782 F.2d 829, 831(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an 23 action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 24
856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule 25 requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,
833 F.2d 128, 26 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 27 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 1 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of 2 prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and 3 (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,
460 F.3d 4 1217, 1226(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone,
833 F.2d at 130). 5 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and 6 the court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Kelly’s claims. The third 7 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 8 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 9 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,
542 F.2d 522, 524(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 10 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 11 the factors favoring dismissal. 12 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 13 correct the party’s failure that brought about the need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. 14 Amplifier,
191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives 15 before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 16
291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of 17 dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” 18 Henderson v. Duncan,
779 F.2d 1421, 1424(9th Cir. 1986). Because this court cannot operate without 19 collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff’s compliance with 20 court orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But issuing a 21 second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court’s finite resources. 22 Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 23 factor favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they 24 weigh in favor of dismissal. 25 26 27 Conclusion 2 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Kelly’s 3 || failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee 4 |lin compliance with this court’s December 5, 2024, order. 5 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No 6 ||other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Kelly wishes to pursue her claims, she 7 ||must file a complaint in a new case and either pay the required filing fee or properly apply for in 8 || forma pauperis status. -) 9 Dated: February 11, 2025 J, / Leta I] is ma DrSilva pited States District Judge 12 iY 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Reference
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