Karp v. Alonzo

District Court, D. Nevada

Karp v. Alonzo

Trial Court Opinion

1

2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 GEORGE KARP, Case No. 2:24-cv-02208-GMN-MDC 6 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 7 v.

8 ALONZO, et al.,

9 Defendants.

10

11 Plaintiff George Karp brings this civil-rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

to 12 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated. (ECF No. 13 1-1.) On December 3, 2024, this Court ordered Plaintiff to: (1) file a fully complete 14 application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee, (2) file a complaint 15 on this Court’s approved form, and (3) file a change of address notification on or before 16 January 31, 2025. (ECF No. 4.) The Court warned Plaintiff that the action could be 17 dismissed if he failed to timely comply with that order. (Id. at 3.) That deadline expired 18 and Plaintiff did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the 19 full $405 filing fee, file a change of address, or otherwise respond. 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 22 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 23 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

782 F.2d 829

, 831 24 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 25 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41

(9th Cir. 26 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 27 1 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th 2 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 3 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 4 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 5 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 6 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 7 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d 1217, 1226

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

833 F.2d 128, 130

(9th Cir. 1987)). 9 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 10 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 11 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 12 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 13 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542

14 F.2d 522

, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 15 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 16 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 17 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 18 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 19 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 20 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

291 F.3d 639

, 643 & n.4 (9th 21 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 22 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 23 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 24 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 25 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 26 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

27 F.2d 1421

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until 1 || and unless Plaintiff files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays 2 || the $405 filing fee for a civil action and files an updated address with the Court, the only 3 || alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating 4 || anignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite 5 || resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: 6 || there is no hint that Plaintiff needs additional time or evidence that he did not receive the 7 || Court’s order’. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 8 || circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. || I. CONCLUSION 10 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 11 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 12 || prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 13 || pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee in compliance with this Court's December 3, 2024, 14 || order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 15 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue 16 || his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 17 18 DATED: Monday, February 11, 2025. 19 Ly, Yj, 20 Gu ‘Le Gloria’. Navarro, Judge 21 Gras tiatce District Court 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 The Clerk’s Office sent a courtesy copy of the last order, which directed Plaintiff 38 to file his updated address, to Plaintiff at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 4 at 3.)

Reference

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