1

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5

6 VAOGA COLEMAN JEFFERSON, Case No. 2:24-cv-01948-RFB-BNW

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8

9 HDSP CORRECTIONAL, et al.,

10 Defendants.

11 12 Plaintiff Vaoga Coleman Jefferson brings this civil-rights action under

13 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert 14 State Prison and Ely State Prison. ECF No. 1-1. On October 31, 2024, this Court ordered Jefferson 15 to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee on 16 or before December 30, 2024. ECF No. 3. The Court warned Jefferson that the action could be 17 dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the 18 full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline.

. In response, Jefferson filed three 19 incomplete applications to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 4, 5, 6. 20 In light of Jefferson’s attempt to comply with the Court’s order, the Court extended the 21 deadline for Jefferson to file a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis to February 10, 22 2025. ECF No. 7. That extended deadline expired, and Jefferson did not file a fully complete 23 application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $405 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 24 I. DISCUSSION 25 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 26 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 27 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may 1 dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See 2 Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply 3 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal 4 Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In 5 determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) 6 the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 7 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 8 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 9 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. 10 U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1987)). 11 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 12 Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Jefferson’s claims. The third 13 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of 14 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court 15 or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 1976). The fourth 16 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by 17 the factors favoring dismissal. 18 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used 19 to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish 20 v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 21 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 22 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive 23 force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives 24 prior to disobedience of the court’s order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting 25 of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been 26 “eroded” by Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally 27 dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 1

(9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 2 unless Jefferson either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the 3 $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a third order setting another 4 deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable and 5 squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will 6 be an exception: there is no hint that Jefferson needs additional time or evidence that he did not 7 receive the Court’s order. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 8 circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 9 II. CONCLUSION 10 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 11 favor of dismissal. 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 13 Jefferson’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full 14 $405 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s October 31, 2024, and January 10, 2025, orders. 15 The Clerk of Court is kindly requested to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jefferson may move to reopen this case and vacate the 17 judgment by filing a motion for reconsideration of this Order. In this motion, Jefferson is required 18 to explain what circumstances delayed him from paying the filing fee or filing the application to 19 proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint in compliance with LSR 2-1. If the Court finds there 20 to be good cause or a reasonable explanation therein, the Court will reopen the case and vacate the 21 judgment. 22 DATED: February 27, 2025.

23

24 ___ RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27