UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 THADDEUS TYSON MANN, Case No. 3:24-cv-00599-ART-CLB 3 Plaintiff, ORDER 4 v.

5 MINERAL COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., 6 Defendants. 7 8 Plaintiff Thaddeus Tyson Mann brings this civil-rights action under 42

to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered 10 while incarcerated at Mineral County Detention Center. (ECF No. 1-1). On 11 January 10, 2025, this Court ordered Mann to file a fully complete application 12 to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee on or before March 13 11, 2025. (ECF No. 3). The Court warned Mann that the action could be 14 dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 15 pauperis with all three documents or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action 16 by that deadline. (Id. at 2). The Court’s order came back as undeliverable to the 17 last address that Mann provided. The March 11, 2025, deadline past, and Mann 18 did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full 19 $405 filing fee, file an updated address, or otherwise respond. 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n 22 the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where 23 appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los 24 Angeles,

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based 25 on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 26 King,

(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to 27 comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of 1 address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th Cir. 1987) 2 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 3 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 4 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to 5 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 6 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 7 alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 8 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(9th 9 Cir. 1987)). 10 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this 11 litigation and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of 12 dismissal of Mann’s claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also 13 weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the 14 occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or 15 prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

(9th Cir. 16 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 17 merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 18 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic 19 alternatives can be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the 20 Court’s need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 21 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before 22 the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 23 Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 24 “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted 25 pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s order as 26 satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 27 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by 1 || Yourish). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 3 || alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986). 4 || Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Mann either 5 || files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays the $405 6 || filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 7 || another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often 8 || only delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The 9 || circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. Without 10 || an updated address for Mann, it is unlikely that a second order would even reach 11 || him. Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 12 || circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 13 Il. CONCLUSION 14 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that 15 || they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is 16 || dismissed without prejudice based on Mann’s failure to file a fully complete 17 || application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee in 18 || compliance with this Court’s January 10, 2025, order. The Clerk of Court is 19 || directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents 20 || may be filed in this now-closed case. If Mann wishes to pursue his claims, he 21 || must file a complaint in a new case. 22 23 DATED THIS 20t8 day of March 2025.

24 Aras pled 7d 25 ANNER.TRAUM—sC‘“—™ 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27