2

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 ROBERT HOGAN, Case No. 3:24-cv-00466-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 CODY ANDERSON, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Plaintiff Robert Hogan brings this civil-rights action under

to 13 redress constitutional violations he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Northern 14 Nevada Correctional Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On February 19, 2025, the Court ordered 15 Hogan to update his address by March 21, 2025. (ECF No. 5.) That deadline expired 16 without an updated address from Hogan, and his mail from the Court is being returned as 17 undeliverable. (See ECF No. 6.) 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 20 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 21 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles,

, 831 22 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 23 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King,

(9th Cir. 24 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 25 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service,

(9th 26 Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 27 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 28 2 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 3 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 5 Malone,

). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 7 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal. The third 8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal, because a 9 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 10 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West,

, 11 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 12 their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 14 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 15 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 16 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 17 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza,

, 643 & n.4 (9th 18 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 19 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 20 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 21 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 22 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 23 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779

, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 25 Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the Court 26 and the defendants to send Hogan case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only 27 alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated 28 address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Hogan is low, so issuing 1 || a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the Court's finite 2 || resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these 3 || circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these 4 || dismissal factors, the Court thus finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. 5 || lll. CONCLUSION 6 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on 7 || Hogan’s failure to file an updated address in compliance with this Court's February 19, 8 || 2025, order. 9 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 10 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Hogan wishes to pursue his 11 || claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with his current 12 || address. 13 It is further ordered that Hogan’s application to proceed in forma pauperis for 14 || inmates (ECF No. 1) is denied as moot. 15 DATED THIS 1* Day of April 2025. 16 17 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28